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PREFACE 
 
The purpose of this ex post evaluation is to assess the contribution of the 1999-2001 Phare 
national and cross-border co-operation (CBC) programmes to supporting Bulgaria in meeting 
the Copenhagen criteria so as to facilitate its accession to the European Union.  This is an in-
depth evaluation which also includes an analysis of post-2001 allocations. 
 
This report has been prepared between December 2005 and June 2006,1 and reflects the 
situation where the Phare national Programmes in the 1999-2001 period have substantially 
ended.  The evaluation is based on an analysis of documents provided at the start, during and 
on completion of the national Programmes, including previous interim evaluations, on the 
results of questionnaires, and on interviews with beneficiaries, contractors, and stakeholders.  It 
examines the performance of the programmes in addressing the objectives stated in the formal 
programming documents, provides a general assessment of the programmes and draws 
conclusions and lessons learnt from them.   
 
The evaluation of Bulgarian national and CBC programmes is one of a series of ten evaluations 
in the new member states.  The evaluations of the eight new member states in 2004 will feed 
into a consolidated evaluation of Phare national and CBC programmes, which, together with 
the in-depth evaluations of Romania and Bulgaria, will form part of a consolidated ex post 
evaluation of the Phare programme.   
                                                 
1  The initial draft was prepared by Colm Dunne and finalised by Ann Hyde, Lead Evaluator.  It was reviewed at MWH 
Central Office by Martin White and Richard Thomas. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Scope and objectives 
 
The purpose of this ex post evaluation is to assess the contribution of the 1999-2001 Phare 
national and cross-border co-operation programmes to supporting Bulgaria in meeting the 
Copenhagen criteria in order to facilitate its accession to the European Union.  A review of 
post-2001 programmes is also provided.  The overall objective of this evaluation is to provide 
accountability with respect to the use of European Commission funds, and lessons learned for 
decision-making on improvements to pre-accession aid for remaining and future candidate 
countries.  
 
Key Evaluation Findings 
 
Limited overall achievement of Phare due to institutional and operational weaknesses.  
Phare offered a valuable opportunity to accelerate progress towards accession, but this was not 
fully utilised.  Although programme relevance and design were stronger in acquis-related 
sectors and much of the assistance was concerned with legal approximation and the creation of 
new structures for those sectors, the strategic approach was weak on the Bulgarian side.  
Institutional capacity for problem analysis and objective setting was generally inadequate or 
absent and most Bulgarian administrations were under-resourced in terms of human resources, 
equipment, sectoral knowledge and experience, which made it difficult for them to cope with 
the Phare environment and contributed to poor project readiness and an overall impression of 
operational fatigue.  Despite a substantial number of Phare interventions related to the 
modernisation of public administration, this lack of institutional capacity combined with 
widespread resistance to change has meant that Phare institution building interventions have at 
the same time overloaded the administration and consistently under-performed. The stalled 
reforms of the judiciary and of public administration further undermined both effective use of 
Phare assistance in all sectors and the sustainability of the results.  
 
Performance varied significantly across different sectors.  Overall, too many programmes and 
projects suffered from weaknesses in design and widespread inefficiencies in implementation 
which led to delayed impact or loss of funds (particularly in the CBC and transport sectors). 
Moreover, the systemic lack of institutional absorption capacity was a continuous threat to 
efficient implementation for all capacity building interventions. Nevertheless, in the internal 
market, agriculture, public finance - and particularly environment – sectors, Phare effectively 
supported the creation of technical and procedural systems to apply and enforce the newly 
transposed EU acquis.  
 
Programme relevance and design were stronger in acquis-related sectors, but the strategic 
approach was weak on the Bulgarian side.  Where acquis requirements were precisely 
defined in the EU legislation, as with harmonisation of legislation and the introduction of 
border control procedures for example, there was a pre-defined objective for programming.  
However, programming was weak in accession areas that required the Bulgarian administration 
to provide a strategic policy framework, supported by in-country analysis and prioritisation of 
differing needs.  Progress in these areas depended on a high degree of political commitment, 
which was generally not present. Commitment to planning processes, notably for CBC, was 
limited and there was no real needs’ analysis, particularly at local level. There was little 
connection between the agreed priorities and the support actually funded. Too often, the 
support was effectively used as an extension of the national programme with little or no 
genuine cross-border content. Where such content existed, inadequate collaboration with the 
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partner country in certain instances led to project failure. In many cases, the main actor 
deciding where Phare CBC investments should be made was the Commission, rather than the 
Bulgarian authorities which, while understandable, did nothing to encourage national 
‘ownership’ and created a negative image and perception of Phare CBC assistance.  
 
Reasonable immediate impact; intermediate and wider impacts weak in the absence of 
adequate public administration reform.  The immediate impacts achieved from specific 
interventions were generally good in relation to the enactment of legislation and the 
establishment of new institutions and operational procedures in acquis areas such as agriculture 
and environment (though these impacts required disproportionate administrative effort and 
were almost always achieved much later than originally planned).  In the other sectors, such as 
the accession driven sectors of CBC and social affairs, immediate impact was sometimes weak 
or missing.  Intermediate impacts from support in the earlier period have recently begun to 
emerge in some acquis-related sectors, and in some other areas such as the fight against money 
laundering.  However, lack of progress in public administration reform, with frequent changes 
in staff and late implementation, have substantially constrained the intermediate and wider 
impact of Phare assistance in Bulgaria.  Impact measurement and monitoring systems are 
weak, which makes assessment problematic.   
 
Pre-conditions for sustainability are generally fragile and it is therefore insufficiently 
assured.  Programmes were mostly implemented in the context of a largely unreformed public 
administration which suffered from insufficient administrative and absorption capacity, high 
turnover of personnel, low salary levels and the widespread under-resourcing of Phare-related 
tasks.  In consequence, prospects for sustainability, especially of institution and capacity 
building, are poor.  In the recent past, measures have been adopted by some ministries to 
increase the salary levels and to enhance the working conditions of public servants, and this 
should go some way to improving sustainability of know-how and to strengthening the 
capacity of public institutions. 
 
Delays and late contracting seriously hampered operational efficiency.  Implementation 
delays were principally caused by inadequate staffing levels in the implementing agencies; the 
time taken to approve documentation, and overall lack of management responsibility in the 
contracting process.  The Bulgarian public administration is weak, inexperienced and under-
staffed.  Practical improvements were made in management structures from 2002 onwards, and 
increasing programme ownership has improved the commitment to Phare.  Twinning was 
generally successful, but there was insufficient use of grant schemes, especially to support 
preparation for Structural Funds at an early enough stage in the pre-accession period. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Conclusion 1: Institutional and operational weaknesses constrained overall achievements. 
Programme design had clear and direct links to the closing of acquis chapters and to building 
capacity to take on the obligations and opportunities of EU membership.  An appropriate mix 
of Phare instruments was used.  In the earlier period, much of the effort was concerned with 
legal approximation and the creation of new structures and, by 2004, outputs achieved 
reasonable immediate impact especially in the acquis-driven sectors.   
 
However overall performance was limited due to many negative influences, including a non-
existent or weak strategic approach, especially in the non-acquis areas; serious operational 
inefficiency in all sectors and, most importantly, inadequate political commitment and 
Bulgaria  Executive Summary 
Ex post evaluation of Phare: National & CBC Programmes - Bulgaria - November 2007, MWH Consortium  III
management capability to pursue a modernising agenda.  Some progress has been made since 
2004, but it is not dynamic or widespread enough to compensate for the time lost or to 
complete preparations to take full advantage of the opportunities of EU membership from the 
date of accession.    
 
Conclusion 2:  More assistance should have been given, earlier, to embedding a strategic 
approach to national and sectoral policy making. 
Individual Phare programmes have contributed to the creation or modernisation of acquis-
related structures and procedures in Bulgaria, and have catalysed progress through the 
provision of staff training, equipment and other capital items.  
 
However, the lack of strategy has inevitably been disadvantageous, most importantly for issues 
arising under the political criteria, such as reform of public administration and judicial reform 
where there is neither acquis nor a standard template to build on, and those issues where the 
acquis absolutely requires, but does not define, a national strategic framework covering the 
areas of responsibility of a number of ministries, such as economic and social cohesion.    
 
Conclusion 3:  Phare support was crucial to initiate public administrative and judicial 
reform but very little progress was made.   
Phare support was a crucial factor to kick-start the process of public service reform.  Although 
some progress was made in a number of key sectors and in some key institutions, the breadth 
and depth of change was not sufficient to have an influence across the public sector.  There is 
no visible high-level commitment to the reform process, and what has been achieved has been 
a slow and intermittent process of change.   
 
A number of permanent institutions were created, crucial to provide the framework for guiding 
public and judicial reform, but inadequate human resource management and investment in 
human capital has seriously constrained administrative and judicial capacity, and thus progress 
in all sectors.  Bulgaria could make the necessary resources available but has not seen the value 
of making this deployment or indeed of the reform process.  
 
Conclusion 4:  Support to building the management structures for Structural Funds was 
not enough to alleviate serious institutional weakness.  
The general neglect and lack of investment, particularly in municipalities and other potential 
local partners, coupled with failure to develop the structures necessary for the management and 
administration of Structural Funds, has meant that Bulgaria is unprepared to benefit 
appropriately from the socio-economic opportunities that these Funds offer to Member States. 
 
Recommendations 
 
There are two groups of recommendations; strategic and operational.  The strategic 
recommendations are generally applicable only to future enlargements.  The operational 
recommendations could usefully be taken into account in programming and implementing 
remaining Phare and Transition Facility assistance in Bulgaria.  
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Strategic recommendations 
 
Recommendation 1: Future programming of assistance should be strategy-based.   
Assistance should not be started until the relevant national or sectoral strategy is in place to 
provide a secure basis of information about needs and capacities to enable the Commission and 
the national authorities to set the priority, sequence, balance, content and pace of assistance.  
The only exception should be comprehensive EU assistance to such strategy development and 
project cycle management throughout the public administration concerned, centrally and 
regionally. 
 
In planning for assistance, the balance of support to public administrative and judicial capacity 
and other aspects of the political criteria and to acquis chapters, and the balance of support 
across the acquis chapters, should take account of the relative difficulty that recent candidates, 
including Bulgaria, have found with the issues concerned. 
 
Recommendation 2: The preparation of Multi-annual Indicative Planning Documents for 
the Instrument for Pre-Accession and of national strategies should take full account of 
lessons learned from Phare. 
In order to maximise the value-added of Multi-annual Indicative Planning Documents as a 
needs’-based strategic document, a checklist should be prepared by the Commission Services, 
and used by those responsible for programming, of the lessons learned from Bulgaria (and 
other recent candidates).  Priority points are the need to assess country resources and capacities 
and adapt the extent and pace of programming to absorption capacity, and to progress public 
administrative and judicial capacity reform in step with acquis institution building. Candidates 
should also be assisted to develop their own multi-annual strategies, both for investments and 
for administrative structures and human and financial resources, and this should be an essential 
pre-condition before assistance is given to Structural Funds-type operations.   
 
Recommendation 3: Public administration and judicial capacity assistance should be given 
from the start. 
From the start of pre-accession assistance, and throughout the pre-accession period, a high 
priority should be afforded to assistance to improve public administrative and judicial capacity, 
throughout the pubic administration, centrally and regionally, to avoid the pervasive 
undermining of the sectoral impact of Phare assistance observed in Bulgaria. 
 
Operational recommendations 
 
Recommendation 4:  There should be full involvement of stakeholders in an effectively 
scaled programming process.  The prospects for successful assistance depend of those 
responsible feeling a sense of ownership and commitment to the objectives of that assistance. 
Programming of Phare assistance has been too centrally-driven until recently, resulting in lack 
of transparency and suspicion of bias.  Further efforts should be made to develop an approach 
to programming which is fully inclusive of all the stakeholders including, where appropriate, 
those at local level.  At the same time, the scale of programming should be realistically 
matched to administrative capacity properly to prepare and implement assistance, otherwise the 
shortcomings observed in this evaluation, in terms of lack of programme readiness, overload 
and operational fatigue, and consequent under-performance, will simply be repeated. 
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Recommendation 5: There should be greater investment and stronger commitment to 
administrative and judicial reform for the remainder of Phare and Transition Facility 
assistance.   
This evaluation has clearly demonstrated the pervasive and debilitating consequences of weak 
public administration.  If the current overload on the national administration is not to persist for 
the remainder of the Phare and Transition Facility periods, urgent reconsideration is needed of 
what can be realistically achieved, and a specific and comprehensive public administrative and 
judicial capacity strategy and assistance action plan should be prepared by the Commission 
Services and the Bulgarian national authorities together, taking account of measures already in 
hand.  
 
Recommendation 6:  Concerted effort needs to be made to address and minimise the 
recurring delays that occur in the contracting and implementation processes.   
The protracted timescales in the contracting process and other implementation delays have 
become endemic and, in many cases, have significantly reduced the achievement of objectives, 
impact and sustainability.  Much more effort should be applied to project start-up and pre-
contract preparatory activities as well as better management of slack time and stricter 
enforcement of document processing deadlines to reduce delays and to generate and maintain 
momentum in implementation.  The National Aid Co-ordinator should encourage beneficiaries 
not to wait for final approval before starting preparation of necessary documents.   
 
Recommendation 7:  More and better training is needed on the subjects associated with 
effective strategic planning.   
The Commission Services, in agreement with the Bulgarian authorities, should provide 
resources to develop comprehensive training in strategy development and implementation.  For 
better sustainability of training effort, support should also be offered to develop the market 
place provision for human resource development training to build competences in key areas 
like policy analysis, monitoring and evaluation.  
 
Recommendation 8: Good practice and lessons learned from Phare programming and 
implementation should be more widely applied.   
The Bulgarian administration should ensure that the project cycle management approach, in 
particular the needs’-based problem analysis techniques for setting desirable and attainable 
objectives, is applied rigorously in every ministry to optimise the value added of national and 
EU resources.  The prospects for sustainability should be realistically assessed at design stage 
and provisions included in assistance to maximise the probability of sustainability. 
 
Much more attention should be paid to setting indicators that relate to achievement of 
objectives and impact that can be used as management tools.  Regular, formal assessment of 
the extent to which agreed indicators are being achieved should be built into Joint Monitoring 
and Sectoral Monitoring Sub-Committee procedures. 
 
Similarly, those with responsibilities for programming should ensure that cost-effectiveness 
indicators are defined before approving investments in infrastructure, and they need to be 
measured after the assistance is completed and the newly built infrastructure becomes 
operational.  Otherwise the only measurement of success is the completion of the works per se, 
which is not an adequate indicator of effective spending of EU or national funds.  The ‘rate of 
return’ tool should be more widely used and properly assessed before assistance is approved.   
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Recommendation 9:  Co-ordination between beneficiaries should be further improved; 
especially between those in the national administration and in the Commission Services 
responsible for assistance management.     
 
This co-ordination has a major effect on the functioning of Phare assistance through its various 
phases.  The particular elements that could be considered jointly by the Commission Services 
and National authorities are a better communications mechanism, including use of an intranet 
between the various parties, improved networking between the parties (with more emphasis on 
ad hoc meeting and less on formal correspondence) to resolve routine difficulties more quickly 
and share elements of good practice that can have wider application.  
 
 
Bulgaria  Introduction 
Ex post evaluation of Phare: National & CBC Programmes - Bulgaria - November 2007, MWH Consortium  1
MAIN REPORT 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Objectives 
1. The purpose of this ex post evaluation is to assess the contribution of the 1999-2001 
(“earlier period”) Phare national and cross-border co-operation (CBC) programmes to support 
Bulgaria in meeting the Copenhagen criteria in order to facilitate its accession to the European 
Union.  The evaluation also includes an analysis of post-2001 allocations (“later period”).  The 
evaluation of the Bulgarian national programmes is one of a series of ten similar evaluations in 
the ten candidate countries (CC).  The results of this evaluation will feed into a consolidated 
ex post evaluation of the Phare programme.   
1.2. Background and Context 
2. The key objectives of the Phare Bulgarian national and CBC programmes during the 
period under review were to provide assistance in the following areas:  
• Support public administration reforms, the judicial system, anti-corruption measures and 
protection of minorities; 
• Support economic reform including financial intermediation,2 small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SME), reduction of state aid, and simplification of licensing procedures. 
• Enhance the administrative and judicial capacity to implement and enforce legislative 
measures and assume the obligations of EU membership. 
• Improve the strategic planning and effective utilisation of EU funds and prepare for 
Structural Funds (including implementing the Extended Decentralised Implementation 
System, EDIS). 
 
3. National and CBC programmes provided about M€ 331 during the evaluation period 
(1999-2001).3  Total post-2001 allocations until 2004 amounted to approximately M€ 560.4  
The key sectors of assistance were economic and social cohesion, public administration, 
including adoption of the acquis and justice and home affairs (JHA)/civil society.  CBC 
projects represented 26% of the funding.  A summary of the Phare programmes from 1999 to 
2004 is set out in Annex 2. 
 
4. Bulgarian national programmes have been subject to regular interim evaluations (IE).  A 
Country Phare Evaluation Review5 (CPER) pointed to good progress in the harmonisation of 
Bulgarian legislation with the acquis, although the effective implementation of harmonised 
legislation appeared to be generally some way off.  The CPER highlighted that institution 
building projects had limited success due to their lack of relevance to the commitment and 
absorption capacity of beneficiary institutions and that efficiency, effectiveness and 
sustainability of Phare assistance were negatively affected by continuing high rates of staff 
turnover in key Phare implementation structures.  Phare interventions were expected to have a 
positive impact in the long term although it was not possible, when the CPER was prepared, to 
                                                 
2  The collection of savings and the loaning out of the proceeds to others.  
3  See Annex 2 for details.  The programmes to be evaluated include the so called Other Financing Memoranda, which were 
implemented by national authorities and subject to previous interim evaluation, but excludes Community and nuclear safety 
programmes.  Bulgaria benefited from Phare-funded multi-beneficiary programmes, such as TAIEX and SIGMA, which are 
also outside the scope of this evaluation.  
4  This figure includes some special allocations, e.g. for the decommissioning of nuclear plants, which are excluded from the 
scope of this evaluation. 
5  EMS Consortium: CPER, Bulgaria 18 November 2003. 
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assess the extent to which the achievement of wider objectives could be attributed to Phare or 
other factors.  
  
5. The 2005 Comprehensive Monitoring Report (CMR) stated that Bulgaria had reached a 
considerable degree of alignment with the acquis in most areas,6 but demanded increased 
efforts in many other areas to complete preparations for accession; such as air and maritime 
transportation; taxation; labour law, social dialogue, public health, anti-discrimination and 
social inclusion.  The report expressed serious concerns about institutional capacity and the 
efficiency of public administration in general, and specific areas such as controls in the 
agriculture sector, including the Paying Agency and the integrated administration control 
system (IACS), and institutional structures and financial management and control in the area of 
regional policy.  The report demanded urgent action in the justice and home affairs sector, 
including management of EU external borders, preparation for the application of the Schengen 
acquis, police cooperation and the fight against organised crime and fraud.   
 
6. The 2006 CMR noted further progress towards the preparations for membership, with a 
high degree of alignment with the acquis in most areas.  However, the Commission identified 
areas of continuing concern, where it would initiate appropriate measures to ensure the proper 
functioning of the EU, unless Bulgaria took immediate corrective action.  The areas that 
require further work include the financial control, the justice system, fight against corruption, 
police cooperation, the fight against organised crime, money-laundering, IACS, and 
transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE).  The CMR referred to the acquis-based 
safeguard measures laid down in the Accession Treaty that will, if necessary, be maintained 
after accession.  These include: 
• A mechanism for cooperation and verification of progress in the areas of judicial reform 
and the fight against corruption, money-laundering and organised crime, which will be 
set up by the Commission, after consultation with Member States;   
• The necessary legal provisions to ensure the proper management of EU agricultural 
funds, already adopted by the Commission; 
• In the area of food safety, certain animals and animal products may not be exported to 
the EU from Bulgaria because of the presence of animal diseases;  
• In the area of aviation safety, particular measures will be needed for Bulgarian aircraft 
and carriers. 
1.3. Evaluation Questions 
7. This evaluation focuses mainly on the outputs produced by the national and CBC 
programmes for Bulgaria.  It assesses the impact and sustainability of these outputs.  The 
evaluation also assesses the effectiveness and efficiency of the contribution of the national and 
CBC programmes towards the actual performance of services in the beneficiary country, taking 
into account EU standards as benchmarks where relevant. 
 
8. Evaluation questions were established in a Terms of Reference (ToR) for the evaluation, 
and these were divided into performance evaluation questions, and thematic/cross-cutting 
questions (see Annex 1).  The methodology is also given in the ToR in Annex 1.  This 
evaluation is in-depth, and includes not only a retrospective assessment (the ex post evaluation 
of the 1999 – 2001 programmes) but also interim evaluation of post-2001 allocations. 
 
                                                 
6  European Commission: 2005 Comprehensive Monitoring Report, {COM (2005) 534 final}. 
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9. Following a sampling approach, a number of example projects were selected by the 
Steering Group for this evaluation7 covering the following eight sectors: agriculture, cross 
border co-operation, economic and social cohesion, energy and transport, environment, internal 
market, justice and home affairs and social affairs.  As the scope of this evaluation was 
in-depth, the sample of projects included post-2001 allocations.  The sampling approach 
enabled conclusions on impact and sustainability at sectoral level to be based on the most 
recent experiences of Phare assistance and the current position in the Bulgarian administration.  
An evaluation plan summary is given in Annex 3 and the reference evaluation indicators are 
given in Annex 4.  Details of the sample projects referred to in the evaluation are set out in 
Annex 5, including a summary of their operational results. 
 
                                                 
7  The Steering Group consisted of representatives of the Evaluation Unit of DG ELARG, the country team in DG ELARG, 
Financial Assistance Follow-up unit at DG ELARG, the EC Delegation, and the National Aid Co-ordination Unit. 
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2. PERFORMANCE OF PHARE ASSISTANCE 
10. This chapter examines the overall performance of Phare national and cross-border 
co-operation programmes in the 1999-2001 period, and reviews the continuation of Phare 
assistance in the post 2001 period.  It assesses sectoral performance by reference to the 
performance evaluation questions set in the ToR (see Annex 1).  These require a methodical 
consideration of needs’ assessment and design, inputs, outputs, levels of impact and 
sustainability.  
2.1. Limited overall achievement of Phare due to institutional and operational 
weaknesses  
11. Although Phare offered a valuable opportunity to accelerate progress towards accession, 
this was not fully utilised.  Programme relevance and design were stronger in acquis-related 
sectors and much of the assistance was concerned with legal approximation and the creation of 
new structures.  However, the strategic approach was weak on the Bulgarian side.  Institutional 
capacity for problem analysis and objective setting was generally inadequate and there was a 
shortage of internal resources to develop sectoral plans in many line ministries.   
 
12. Performance varied significantly across different sectors.  Overall, too many programmes 
and projects suffered from weaknesses in design and widespread inefficiencies in 
implementation which led to delayed impact or loss of funds (particularly in the CBC and 
transport sectors). Moreover, the systemic lack of institutional capacity was a constraint for all 
capacity building interventions. Nevertheless, in the internal market, agriculture, public finance 
- and particularly environment – sectors, Phare effectively supported the creation of technical 
and procedural systems to apply and enforce the newly transposed EU acquis.   
 
13. The stalled reform of the judiciary and public administration undermined both the 
effective use of Phare assistance in all sectors and the sustainability of the results.  There have 
also been capacity absorption issues with some aspects of the proposed reforms.  Some 
progress was made since 2004, but not dynamic or far reaching enough to compensate for lost 
time or to close the gap in preparations to be ready to take full advantage of the opportunities 
of EU membership from the moment of accession.   
2.2. Insufficient high-level commitment to a strategic approach for Phare assistance   
14. This section examines the needs’ assessment and design of the Phare programmes in the 
1999/2001 and post-2001 reference periods.  It focuses on the extent to which the 
objectives/strategies of the national programmes identified the needs and the involvement of 
the stakeholders in the design (ownership).  The key considerations were the adequacy of 
underlying strategies (clarity of objectives set and availability of needs’ assessment), and the 
degree of consultation with stakeholders. 
 
15. The sectors supported by Phare fall into two groups, ‘acquis driven’ and ‘accession 
driven’.  The former have highly specific requirements with a direct link to the closing of the 
acquis chapters.  These included agriculture, environment, energy and transport, internal 
market and economic development/finance.  The second group of sectors supported the 
progress towards accession, that is, acquis chapters with less clearly defined requirements, or 
activities directed to meeting the Copenhagen criteria, including public administration and 
judicial capacity, the justice and home affairs sector, social affairs and economic and social 
cohesion (ESC). 
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Box 1: Sectoral strategies did exist for some sectors 
The environmental sector strategy was relevant for 
the pre-accession years as a guide for meeting acquis 
requirements through the enactment of primary and 
secondary legislation.  However, long-term relevance 
beyond the provisions of the acquis is limited.  
Although sustainable development is a key issue, it 
has not been reflected in the direction or design of 
Phare assistance.   
In the justice sector, a strategic approach is pushing 
the reform process.  Earlier diagnostic reviews 
concluded that the sector was unreceptive to 
modernisation and was corrupt in many areas.  A 2000 
SIGMA report drew attention to profound weaknesses 
in the sector.  USAID, in partnership with Matra, 
developed a reform strategy that, together with the 
preparation of a detailed action plan, provided the 
direction and pathway for Phare support.   
16. Where sectoral strategies did exist they arrived very late in the pre-accession period 
and did not attract sufficient commitment to offer the context and priorities for programming.  
The concept of creating long-term overarching ‘strategic’ documents to provide the context for 
Phare assistance has not yet been fully taken on board in Bulgaria.  Strategic documents 
created internally have had very little, if any, effect on programming over the pre-accession 
period.   
 
17. Some sectors developed strategies 
with Phare assistance in the earlier period 
(e.g. environment, justice and public finance 
sectors, see Box 1), but there was not 
enough high-level inter-ministerial 
commitment behind these strategies to 
support sound multi-annual programming.  
In addition, the recurrent restructuring and 
frequent personnel changes in the Bulgarian 
public administration made it difficult for 
strategies to remain relevant for any length 
of time.  Bulgaria, like many of the CCs 
before it, looked to the acquis and other 
external strategic documents to provide the 
context and direction for Phare 
programming.8   
 
18. Highly-specified requirements of the acquis provided a good base for programming.  
The annual programming priorities for Phare in Bulgaria emerged out of a process of 
negotiation between Commission representatives and from a gap analysis of the findings and 
recommendations contained in the Commission’s annual report on Bulgaria’s progress towards 
accession.9   In the acquis-driven sectors, programme design was tied to accession priorities 
and the overall objectives were usually stated in terms of meeting the objectives of a relevant 
chapter of the acquis.  There was a clearer sense of direction and a verifiable endpoint.    
 
19. Much of the assistance in acquis driven sectors was concerned with legal approximation 
and support to the creation of new structures, and for the enforcement of regulatory obligations.  
For example, the Accession Partnership (AP) priorities for the environment sector are related 
mainly to legal approximation and to developing the enforcement capacity and the assistance 
focused on these priorities.  Similarly, in the internal market sector, Phare support has been 
directed towards the stated accession priorities and has focused on institution building and 
legal approximation.   
 
20. It was less clear how to programme support in the accession-driven sectors.  In the 
accession-driven sectors, where there should have been complementarity between the Phare 
priorities and a strategically defined policy framework, based on in-country analysis and 
prioritisation of identified need, the direction was much less apparent.   
 
21. Programme design in the accession-driven sectors in the earlier period was weakened by 
a combination of inexperience of the national counterparts and weak political commitment to 
                                                 
8  Consolidated Summary Report, “From Pre-Accession to Accession - Interim Evaluation of Phare Support Allocated in 
1999-2002 and Implemented until November 2003”, March 2004.  
9  These reports are often described as the Regular Report.  
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Box 2: Weak strategic commitment to CBC 
The Joint Programming Document (JPD) provides the 
framework for CBC assistance, which should be 
prepared by the lead ministry in close cooperation and 
partnership with local actors, for example 
municipalities and locally based organisations from 
both sides of the border.  However commitment to 
planning process was limited and there was no real 
needs’ analysis at local level to support the JPD.  The 
proposals submitted by municipalities had little or no 
foundation in local economic development plans 
developed on the basis of based proven need.  In 
many cases, interviewees stated that the main actors 
deciding where Phare CBC investments should be 
made was the EC headquarters and ECD, rather than 
the Bulgarian authorities in the border regions.    
the reform agenda being offered by Phare for these sectors (see Box 2).  The expertise of final 
beneficiaries in the use of the technical 
toolkit for studying needs, identifying 
problems and converting them into coherent 
sectoral responses was limited.   The 
identification of real need was often vague.  
The analytical information and the systems 
to supply the necessary data to support 
programme design were limited within the 
state administration.  The institutional 
structures and the expertise to support the 
development of a policy framework at 
national and regional levels were limited 
and the mechanisms to involve 
municipalities in economic development 
planning were largely missing.  
 
22. In the later period, since 2002, programme design in the accession-driven sectors has 
begun to improve due to the availability of key strategic planning documents like Agenda 2000 
for ESC, and the 2002 Roadmap,10 which contributed to a better focus and understating of 
horizontal issues like public administration and judicial capacity (PAJC).  Two key Bulgarian 
strategies (Strategy for the Modernisation of the Public Administration and Strategy for 
Reform of the Bulgarian Judiciary) were approved in 2002.  Experience and prior lessons have 
been more constructively utilised and as the expected deadline for accession approached, there 
was more investment and attention in these areas of intervention.   
 
23. Insufficient involvement of stakeholders in the programming process.  Programming of 
Phare assistance has been a centrally-driven process controlled by the National Aid 
Co-ordinator (NAC) in Bulgaria.  Until recently, the process used to select and approve 
proposals for inclusion in the Phare programme was subject to some criticism both from 
applicant line ministries and some task managers in the ECD for its lack of transparency and 
for the exclusion of stakeholders in the decision-making process.  After line ministries 
submitted proposals for inclusion in Phare programmes, final decisions were made internally 
within the NAC without open participation or consultation with line ministries.  The ECD and 
line ministries were generally unclear about why certain proposals were accepted and others 
were rejected, which led to a feeling of detachment in many line ministries.  Recently the NAC 
has tried to make the process more open and inclusive, and has begun informing line ministries 
which projects have been rejected and the reasons for rejection.11   
 
24. Multi-annual programming provided limited improvement.  Multi-annual programming 
(MAP) was introduced in 2004, but it has not been possible to maximise the full potential of 
this approach because the multi-annual framework has retained a strong reference to the annual 
programming process, and in many areas there was a lack of adequate strategic documentation 
(see 21).  Every year either a new phase of a project or the continuation of the earlier phase has 
                                                 
10  Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Roadmaps for Bulgaria and Romania, 
November 2002. 
11  In its comment on the draft version of this report, the NAC stated that the decision-making/project selection process has 
always been based on strict and clear rules and criteria reflected in checklists filled in for each project proposal that have 
been available to all interested parties.  All eventual rejections and proposals for changes have been justified and comments 
have been provided to the beneficiaries that had the option to object them and provide a stronger justification on the 
respective project proposals. 
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Box 4: Delays in project fiche preparation  
Basic changes to a project fiche took up to two 
months to be approved by the ECD.  More 
substantive changes took much longer (e.g. a 
change to the project evaluation list for ecotourism 
to avoid a conflict of interest took 6-9 months).  
There were no agreed timescales for acceptance that 
might have improved the efficiency of the approval 
process.  There appeared to be little or no follow-up 
when a change request was submitted.  The 
approval procedure involved many non-value added 
steps (that is several iterations or exchanges of 
documents to resolve issues).  Even at this late 
stage, there is a case for revising co-ordination 
arrangements to speed up approval processes.  
to be programmed and incorporated into the 
Financing Memorandum.  Opinions about 
the MAP are mixed.  Some consider that 
while the idea for MAP is good on paper it 
is difficult to put into practice.  Others 
praised the concept as it helped to reinforce 
the need to think in terms of a longer term 
sectoral perspective (the absence of which 
had been a criticism of annual planning) and 
place a higher weight on the specific 
purposes (immediate impact) and broader 
results (intermediate impact) of assistance 
rather than just on outputs.  The preparation 
of a multi-annual sectoral fiche was viewed 
as a useful preparation for the planning for Structural Funds (SF).   
 
25. Programme planning was often out of date when the proposal was being included in a 
Phare programme.  For large infrastructure projects in the environmental, transport and CBC 
sectors, the pre-programming preparation was weak and many of the projects were based on 
out-of-date proposals supported by over-simple feasibility studies in terms of location, budget 
and technical relevance.  As a consequence the design of projects had to be realigned and 
amended after the Financing Memoranda (FM) were signed to guarantee sectoral relevance and 
viability (see for example, Box 3).  However, awareness did grow over time and the situation 
began to improve in the later period.   
2.3. Pervasive delays in contracting and implementation seriously hampered efficiency  
26. In this section, the efficiency with which inputs/activities produced outputs is considered.  
The criteria used included rates of commitment and disbursement of funds, implementation 
scheduling, the visible quantification of output, the relative cost effectiveness of programmes, 
and the choice of implementation method (twinning, technical assistance, or grant schemes). 
 
27. Project management capacity across Phare administration was weak.  Efficiency relies 
heavily on the capacity of the implementing bodies and the ECD, and co-ordination between 
all the actors.  Overall project management capacity was generally poor in both the earlier and 
later periods.  This was compounded by resource shortages, for example at the Central Finance 
and Contracting Unit (CFCU) up to 2004, and scarcity of reliable operating data, which 
continues up to the present.  The result is a 
predominantly reactive approach to situations, 
rather than a proactive one that anticipates the 
actions required for forthcoming 
interventions.  There were major delays and 
significant time lags between programming 
and implementation.  In most situations, very 
little was done to prepare for future projects.  
  
28. Major causes of delays were the lengthy 
procedures for processing basic modifications 
to project fiches and the fact that preparation 
of programming documents only started after 
signature of the FM (see Box 4).  An analysis 
Box 3: Pre-project preparation for Sofia WWTP 
Planning and needs’ assessment for the Sofia 
wastewater treatment project was insufficiently 
thorough or accurate from the outset.  The initial 
concept was proposed by the municipality with an 
estimated cost of M€ 17.  On the advice of DG 
Environment, a detailed feasibility study was carried 
out before the project fiche was prepared, which 
established that a full rehabilitation project would cost 
M€ 33.  However, the FM was signed with a budget 
of only M€ 23.  A tender was launched with a mixture 
of obligatory and optional components.  A contract 
was signed for M€ 18, covering mainly the obligatory 
components. As a consequence of inadequate funds, 
the full rehabilitation work remains incomplete.    
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of the times to process project fiches in a small sample of projects (see Annex 8) showed 
delays ranging between 33 days and 154 days.  There was also a very rigid adherence to 
regulations, which is commendable but in many ways this was at the expense of efficiency.     
 
29. Late contracting was extensive, and there was no real management of the problem.  
Late contracting was very common, and there is a local view that this was exacerbated by the 
timing of the signing of the FM.  In pre-2004 programmes,12 the date of signing the FM 
coincided with the contracting deadline for the previous year when staff resources at the CFCU 
and in the ECD were stretched to full capacity.  The stress of completing one year led to a lull 
in the subsequent period and momentum did 
not pick up again until the next contracting 
deadline approached.  The effect of the 
delays in the completion of the 2004 
programming has been to create a 
significant overlap in the contracting 
schedule for Phare 2004 and Phare 2005 
projects.  Serious efforts were made in early 
2006 to complete the contracting in an 
orderly fashion and to avoid the contracting 
crush as the deadline approached.  
 
30. The “last minute” approach to 
contracting meant that in most cases 
implementation periods were reduced (see 
Box 5),13 that the process was unnecessarily 
hurried, and that there was no scope to 
re-tender, if no suitable application was 
received, or to re-allocate resources if the 
costs were lower than originally anticipated.  
Although all of the central actors share some 
responsibility for the delays, the under resourcing of the CFCU until recently and the timelines 
for approval procedures in the ECD were dominant contributing factors.  However, no single 
organisation is managing the timetable leading up to contacting and no single official takes 
absolute responsibility to ensure that the allocated Phare assistance is disbursed.  The lack of 
supporting information confirms an overall lack of management responsibility for the 
contracting process.14   
 
31. The multi-annual approach created additional pressure which compounded the already 
severe contracting inefficiencies.  The first phase of the multi-annul programme was mostly 
delayed, which caused a build up of pressure in the second year to finish Phase 1 but also to 
move into and to complete Phase 2.  For example, in 2004, the adoption of the FM took eight 
months which meant that all the multi-annual implementation timetables were out of date from 
the outset.  The knock-on effect of this was widespread requests for implementation extensions 
to complete the first and second phases.  These delays affected the 2006 FM and resulted in 
reconsideration of the viability of the third multi-annual phase.  
                                                 
12  From Phare 2004 onwards, there were three FMs signed in each year. Early September 2004 (contracting November 2004), 
the main part in February 2005 and a final component in May 2005.    
13  In one project, the implementation period was reduced to 17 months of which over 50% was allocated to contracting. 
14  Attempts were made during the evaluation to investigate the late contracting process in detail, but this was not possible 
because the CFCU was unable to provide basic management information about the progress of contracting for the projects 
included in the evaluation sample. 
Box 5: Delays in the contracting process 
• According to the CFCU the main cause of delays is 
in the preparation and approval of tender dossiers.  
Much of the delay is in the time required for ECD 
approval for this process where in many cases 
independent experts are hired to review the 
documentation.   
• The CFCU considers that 80% of projects approved 
by them are ready to go – but then even small, and 
possibly unnecessary changes required to the 
project fiche can take considerable length of time.    
• Alterations appear at different times.  There are 
cases where as soon as one change is approved the 
need for another one will emerge; 
• Requests for changes can halt the process – work 
does not continue on the assumption that the 
change will be approved; 
• There is no difference in approach between a 
change that affects the integrity of the project and 
superficial changes that are purely about the 
absolute accuracy of documents.  For example, a 
change of name to an institution (not the change of 
institution) took one and a half months to achieve.    
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32. Inefficiencies and shortening of implementation time limited effects of Phare support.  
While there have been some notable successes in some areas, inefficiencies and shortening of 
implementation time have limited the effects of the Phare support.  Late contracting and 
inadequate responses to tenders resulted in loss of funds in some sectors.15  For many IT 
projects, late contracting in a rapidly changing environment meant that specifications and 
requirements became out-dated.  Results of 
capacity building support (particularly staff 
development and the introduction of new 
internal procedures) were also reduced by 
shortened implementation times.  Although 
significant effort and resources were 
directed towards delivering project outputs, 
there is a limit to how much new 
information can be absorbed in a short 
period of time (see Box 6). 
 
33. Limited absorption capacity was a 
continuous threat to efficient 
implementation.  Most Bulgarian 
administrations were under-resourced in 
terms of human resources, equipment, 
sectoral knowledge and experience, which made it difficult for them to cope with the Phare 
environment that was generally complex and bound by bureaucratic procedures requiring 
inputs from many individuals.  Staff were overworked with the lengthy contracting processes, 
and under significant pressure to deliver high-quality outputs.  This gave an overall impression 
of operational fatigue.  Although in recent times some steps have been taken to improve the 
conditions of service for public servants, the effects of these are not yet apparent, and 
absorption capacity is still an area of concern. 
 
34. Practical improvements were made in the Phare management structures from 2002 
onwards.  The transfer of the National Aid Co-ordinator (NAC) to the Management of 
European Union Funds Directorate (MEUFD) of the Ministry of Finance (MoF) was an 
important change and it had the desired effect of tightening up and improving the management 
of Phare.  There were improvements in the management of co-financing and more recently the 
National Fund (NF) has been in a position to front load project start-up if EU funding was late 
and provide supplementary finance should an unanticipated expenditure or gap in the budget 
arise during implementation. This has helped to improve the efficiency of implementation in 
the later years and in some cases has circumvented project fiche amendments.  It does however 
suggest an inadequacy in co-ordination of project and budget planning procedures. 
 
35. Increasing programme ownership has improved commitment to Phare.  The 
consolidation of monitoring arrangements through Sectoral Monitoring Sub-Committees 
(SMSCs) and the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) was set in place from 2002 onwards.  
The key effect of this has been that that Phare is no longer thought of in terms of an external 
donor and the increased ownership of the programmes by the Bulgarian ministries has been an 
important change.  Similarly the introduction in 2004 of monthly monitoring meetings 
organised by the NAC and the SMSC Secretariats, involving the ECD, implementing bodies, 
                                                 
15  For example, in the agriculture sector some € 348,000 worth of phytosanitary equipment could not be contracted and one of 
the supply lots failed, resulting in a loss of resources. 
Box 6.  Limited output in capacity building  
The initial 24 months envisaged for implementation of 
a technical assistance contract to improve the strategic 
planning systems (BG 0103.01) was reduced to 18 
months due to the delayed tender preparation.  This 
was then further reduced to 16 months as a result of 
difficulties relating to the management of the member 
state TA teams.  The project was delayed by a lack of 
capacity in the beneficiary; then the team leader was 
not approved by the beneficiary, and then the team 
leader was rejected by the ECD.  By the time a new 
team leader was selected and approved a further six 
months had lapsed, leaving only 10 months for 
implementation.  The project did deliver a highly 
efficient team of 24 experts but in the end the 
achievements fell well short of the expected 
outcomes.   
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NF and all beneficiaries has been an important factor that has gone some way to improving 
implementation efficiency and to strengthen co-ordination between the relevant stakeholders.  
While these changes have provided a much-needed boost to the overall management of Phare 
activities, the extent of the backlog of development that had accumulated by 2004 has placed a 
considerable burden on the central co-ordinating institutions.  
 
36. Choice of implementation instrument was mostly appropriate, but grant scheme 
projects have not always followed needs.  Twinning was generally successfully used in 
legislation harmonisation and institution building in the public institutions, and TA has tended 
to be used for interventions requiring specialist input.  Between 1998 and 2003 there were 86 
separate twinning projects.   
 
37. However, the extent of the use of 
grant schemes in Bulgaria has been small 
and they have suffered from many failures 
leading to unspent funds, and a lack of 
transparency in the decision making process 
for the selection of projects (see Box 7).  
The final decision on projects to be funded 
was often taken at a political level, 
notwithstanding the efforts undertaken at the 
project design stage to prioritise investment 
projects according to identified needs.   
 
38. The management and administration for CBC grant schemes, for example, was 
controlled from Sofia with little genuine input from the administrations in the border regions.  
There was little connection between the priorities set out in the Joint Programming Document 
(JPD) and the projects actually funded, and criteria other than needs were used for project 
selection, some positive, such as readiness of a project to start and equitable distribution, and 
some negative, such as vested interests.16  Lack of involvement of border region institutions has 
created a negative image and perception of Phare CBC assistance.  
 
39. In the civil society sector there were concerns over the susceptibility of grant schemes to 
corrupt practices in the award process.  There are quite close connections between high-ranking 
public servants, politicians or the partners of politicians, and the NGO sector. Until relatively 
recently, the practice of multiple registrations of NGOs by the same person or group of people 
using the same address has been commonplace.  In a recent civil society programme, the EC 
Delegation took steps to ensure that no multiple applications filtered through the evaluation 
process.  Although this was a time-consuming and human-resource-intensive practice it was a 
positive step that should go some way to guarantee the integrity of this and, if repeated, the 
future civil society grant scheme programme.   
2.4. Phare institution building for acquis sectors constrained by systemic lack of 
administrative capacity. 
40. This section considers the Phare programme outputs in terms of the improvements in 
legislative/ administrative structures, systems and resources with specific reference to the 
ability of the Bulgarian administration to take on the obligations of the acquis. 
 
                                                 
16  The considerable deficiencies in infrastructure provision in all border regions meant that it was not difficult for project 
sponsors to make a justification for their own projects. 
Box 7:  Example of grant scheme project 
A 2002 eco-tourism project in the internal market 
sector had a grant component.  A good aspect of the 
project was the extent of inter-ministry co-operation 
on the steering committee where four ministries were 
represented.  On the other hand, the design of the 
scheme was poor as it emerged that National Parks 
(an intended beneficiary group) could not participate 
because they were a part of the beneficiary ministry.  
In 2004 the project fiche was change to remove the 
conflict of interest but the change took six months to 
be ratified.  A further problem arose when some of the 
selected beneficiaries were later declared ineligible 
when it was discovered that they had no property 
assets.  
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Box 8 : Examples of Phare outputs  
Sector Output 
New Institutions 
Agriculture Agriculture Statistic Directorate 
Public Finance  Internal Control Directorate 
Audit of EU Funds Directorate 
JHA National Institute of Justice 
Modernised Institutions 
Public Finance National Customs Agency  
Public Finance Public Internal Financial Control Agency 
Internal market SME promotion agency was reshaped to take 
account of comments in the Commission 
Regular Report.  
Merger of the production and trade functions 
in the Ministry of Economy  
Combining foreign trade functions in the 
Ministries of Economy and Energy. 
Investment outputs (equipment and systems) 
Public Finance New organisational structures in the Ministry 
of Finance, modernisation of systems, 
including state budgeting and financial 
reporting, and economic modelling 
Agriculture Inspection and control areas like TSE 
control, phytosanitary control, biological 
testing and the registration of plant 
protection products. 
CBC Vessel Management Information System 
project for the Black Sea 
Public 
Administration 
Various IT systems for human resource 
management.  Unified software installed on a 
central server will be accessed for the 
management of appointments, promotions, 
etc. and has been tested in nine pilot 
administrations.  A web-based information 
database for public administration. 
41. Phare supported modernisation in some key sectors, but performance was constrained 
by limited capacity and resistance to change.  There is evidence of the delivery of good 
outputs from both institution building and investment interventions in some key sectors in the 
1999/2001 period.  However, despite a substantial number of projects, either directly or 
indirectly related to the modernisation of public administration, and significant effort from 
many individuals, the lack of institutional capacity across many of the line ministries combined 
with widespread resistance to change has meant that the performance of Phare institution 
building projects did not make as much of a contribution as was originally planned and 
expected.    
 
42. The key outputs are summarised in 
Box 8 and more detail of sectoral 
performance is given in Annexes 5 
and 6.  In sectors such as agriculture, 
environment, public finance and JHA, 
Phare support for the transposition of EU 
standards into new legislation led to the 
creation of new institutions, the 
development of systems and procedures 
(both manual and electronic) and staff 
training and investment in equipment 
(e.g. new information management 
systems).  In other sectors, such as 
public finance and internal market, 
existing institutions were modernised.  
Where this work continued in the post-
2001 period, (for example in internal 
market and justice sectors), the 
effectiveness of performance improved.  
Phare support for the creation of new 
institutions and the harmonisation of 
others has gone some way to achieve a 
better allocation of roles and 
responsibilities across the centralised 
administrations in Bulgaria.   
 
43. Mixed performance of support to internal market, agriculture, and environment 
sectors.  Phare supported the creation of technical and procedural systems to apply and enforce 
the newly transposed EU acquis.  Important restructuring of institutions in the internal market 
(Ministries of Economy and Energy) was successful both in the earlier and later period, and the 
agencies showed good cooperation.  Following earlier delays, administrative structures in the 
agriculture sector were strengthened to improve the testing and control of animal and plant 
diseases.  However, further efforts are needed to strengthen veterinary controls and the 
fisheries inspection and control.  In the environment sector, twinning was instrumental in 
achieving harmonisation of the primary legislation, and a key output from twinning in the 
earlier period was the first environmental strategy for Bulgaria (2000 – 2006).  Twinning in the 
later period made good progress in delivering the required procedural changes for the 
implementation and enforcement of the legislation.  Further consolidation of this progress 
depends on the ability of the new structures to retain key staff. 
 
Bulgaria  Performance of Phare assistance 
Ex post evaluation of Phare: National & CBC Programmes - Bulgaria - November 2007, MWH Consortium  12
44. Phare generally underperformed in the social sector.  In the earlier period, Phare 
supported the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy to develop and implement job creation 
programmes at a time of economic crisis in Bulgaria, when there was virtually no economic 
activity.  Although the job creation programmes initially appeared to deliver results, over time 
the crude ‘active labour market’ methodology became outdated and no longer appropriate for a 
pre-accession country with a growing construction economy.  However, Phare social sector 
programmes did not respond to these changes and investment in large low- performing 
employment and training programmes 
continued (see Box 9).  In the later period, 
more successful social sector programmes 
provided physical investment to upgrade the 
vocational educational facilities across a 
number of key locations.   
 
45. The performance of CBC assistance 
was weak on a number of levels.  CBC 
infrastructure projects were problematic and 
were often not adequately prepared to 
guarantee successful completion and 
achievement of the immediate objectives.  
The worst examples were two border 
crossing points with serious delays due to 
poor or indifferent performance from the 
contracting ministry and the contractor,17 
and such weak cooperation between 
Bulgaria and the Romanian counterpart that 
the Commission Services suspended transfer 
of payment of EU funds.  Other projects eventually achieved the anticipated result, but much 
later than originally expected.  Although the outputs from the Joint Small Project Fund usually 
had a positive impact on those individuals who participated, they were generally small-scale 
one-off interventions with no strong economic development focus. 
 
46. Still far to go with restructuring the Bulgarian justice sector.  Individual Phare capacity 
building programmes for the JHA acquis often successfully delivered their outputs.  Twinning 
was used effectively to develop revised versions of the penal, civil, procedural and 
administrative codes, all of which were enacted, and the formation of the National Institute of 
Justice was a positive step.  The IT reform process, when fully completed, should result in the 
modernisation of procedures and practices across all courts in Bulgaria.  However, although 
these specific programme results are important, they did no more than address isolated topics 
and could not contribute significantly to the quality of justice because of their context was the 
unreformed governance of the justice sector as a whole. On the other hand, Phare support to the 
more specific requirement of the Home Affairs acquis was generally more effective. 
2.5. Reasonable immediate impact; intermediate and wider impacts weak in the absence 
of adequate public administration reform 
47. This section provides an updated view of the progress being made of Phare support in 
terms of impacts achieved.18  While some progress has been made in achieving immediate 
                                                 
17 Progress was also delayed by floods. 
18  The results or immediate impacts are the short-term or initial effects of an intervention at the level of the direct 
beneficiaries.  The intermediate impacts are short-to-medium term effects on both direct and indirect beneficiaries and 
Box 9: Outputs in the social sector  
Phare supported ‘Beautiful Bulgaria’ - a large-scale 
employment and training project.  This temporary 
employment scheme involved 11 municipalities and 
over the years created 8,500 jobs (one third for Roma) 
for renovation of public and private buildings that had 
historical or cultural value.  Some 179 sub-contracts 
were concluded, 221 sites were refurbished and 
business start-up training courses were delivered to 
526 unemployed persons.   
The intermediate impact of Beautiful Bulgaria has not 
been fully realised, as the project failed to establish a 
strong link between participation in the project and 
real employment for most participants.  Only 15% of 
jobs created became permanent, which is significantly 
lower than similar intermediate labour market projects 
in other countries - where 50% of project participants 
would be expected to find permanent work.   
Participants obtained a work-based qualification, but 
there are no statistics or method to determine whether 
this improved employability brought benefits to 
individual participants or to the construction market. 
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impact with direct beneficiaries, issues of political commitment of the beneficiaries, absorption 
capacity, co-financing and retention of key staff have restricted intermediate and wider 
impacts.  Impacts of assistance to acquis sectors are rated in Table 1 below.  Overall, only the 
environment sector showed a strong impact from Phare interventions.  The Agriculture and 
Internal Market sectors performed reasonably well, with ESC, Transport and Social Affairs, 
somewhat weaker, but the level of performance of Phare assistance to CBC and to justice was 
low. 
Table 1.-  Mixed rating of sectors for different categories of impact 
Sector  Immediate Intermediate Socio-economic Overall 
Agriculture average average average average 
Cross Border Cooperation low low low/average low 
Economic and Social Cohesion low/average low/average low/average low/average 
Transport low/average low/average low/average low/average 
Environment average high average/high average/high 
Internal Market average average average average 
Justice and Home Affairs low/average low low low 
Social Affairs low/average low low/average low/average 
 
48. Some evidence of immediate impact with direct beneficiaries.  Phare assistance has 
achieved some immediate impact but a lack of implementation capacity means that many 
achievements fell short of expectations.  In the stronger sectors (agriculture, environment and 
internal market) immediate impacts achieved from specific interventions ranged between good 
and very good, but at the expense of disproportionate administrative effort and substantial 
delay.  In other sectors, such as the accession driven CBC and the social sectors and also in 
areas closely related to the political criteria, immediate impact was sometimes weak or missing 
(for example, there is little impact from the support to create, develop and support a quality 
development programme for Roma inclusion (see Box 10).  
 
49. In the acquis areas, Phare was 
instrumental in achieving the enactment of 
primary and secondary legislation and 
establishing new institutions and operational 
networks.19  In the agriculture and 
environment sectors the commitment for 
institutional reform and modernisation is 
growing and earlier Phare programmes have 
strengthened the legal, organisational and 
administrative pre-conditions for that 
process.  This is demonstrated by the 
existence of some new systems, 
methodologies, and regulations, and the 
installation of new or upgraded equipment, 
software applications, statistical collection 
methods, the development of databases and 
national and international networking that 
can be attributed to earlier Phare 
                                                                                                                                                          
socio-economic impacts (global impacts) are the longer-term effects usually expressed in terms of broad socio-economic 
consequences in the sector, region or country as a whole. 
19  For example, the Agriculture Statistic Directorate, the Public Internal Financial Control Agency and the National Institute 
of Justice. 
Box 10:  Weak impact in the area of minorities 
The central institutional structures to support 
implementation of Phare assistance to Roma 
minorities appear to be in decline.  The National 
Council on Ethnic and Demographic Issues (NCEDI) 
is mandated to co-ordinate government policies, 
programmes and funds related to ethnic issues, and 
facilitate the dialogue and interaction between ethnic 
minorities, government and civil society.  After 
changes in the Government in the summer of 2005, a 
new Council was not appointed.  In November 2005 
the Deputy Prime Minister became chairperson of the 
NCEDI and new members of the NCEDI were 
appointed on 26 February 2006.  However, no 
meeting of the NCEDI has been held in more than a 
year.  Also, on the basis of an EU recommendation, a 
Directorate for Ethnic and Demographic Issues was to 
be established, employing ~ 20 people.  Despite a 
commitment to the establishment of the Directorate, at 
the cut-off date of this report, no staff had been 
appointed.  
Bulgaria  Performance of Phare assistance 
Ex post evaluation of Phare: National & CBC Programmes - Bulgaria - November 2007, MWH Consortium  14
interventions.  
 
50. Significant results from Phare support to the JHA sector are uncertain in an 
unreformed context.  The aim is that, through a combination of different interventions, for 
example recruitment of and training of new magistrates and the introduction of new systems 
and procedures, a growing cohort of new recruits with modern views towards corruption and 
transparency will be absorbed into the system every year and that these growing numbers of 
enlightened people will accelerate the judicial reform process.  While procedural reform will 
modernise the operational environment, without political commitment behind the reform 
process it is unlikely, in itself, to change the outmoded behaviour of the current system.  There 
is an additional risk when the instrument of change is newly trained recruits (young people 
with limited influence) and new systems that they will simply conform to fit into the existing 
environment rather than struggle to influence and drive forward change.   
 
51. Intermediate impact is mainly limited to interventions from the earlier period.  
Intermediate impacts and value added from the Phare interventions in the earlier period are 
beginning to emerge in some of the acquis-related sectors.  However, as a consequence of 
delays and widespread institutional weakness, hardly any intermediate impact has yet emerged 
from Phare applied in the later period, especially in the accession-related sectors, such as CBC 
and social affairs. 
 
52. The strongest sector in terms of intermediate impact was environment, built on some 
good results with twinning.  One example is the development of an innovative wetlands 
project.  This is a relatively new concept, combining environmental management and 
community development, which is being piloted in Bulgaria.  If successful, the concept has the 
potential to be a highly influential development model in the longer term that can be replicated 
in other countries.  Also in the environmental sector, the recommendation and instruction from 
a twinning partner led Bulgaria to adopt a river basin management approach for four separate 
river areas in Bulgaria in line with the EU Water Framework Directive.  This has proved to be 
a success and will continue to be an effective management approach for the river system in 
Bulgaria.  The long-term environmental and economic implications stemming from improved 
river management in Bulgaria have the potential to increase impact significantly. 
 
53. In some sectors, Phare assistance has resulted in increased professional contacts and 
peer networking.  For example, contact is occurring on a regular basis on money laundering 
issues, environmental development and on various aspects related to training of the judiciary.  
In particular, the potential for intermediate impacts is beginning to emerge in the fight against 
money laundering where Phare support is being given to establishing the Financial Intelligence 
Agency (on the basis of a national strategy and action plan), and to maintaining up-to-date 
legislation. However, although the number of reported potential prosecution cases has 
increased from 300 to 600, no case has yet been processed through the courts, so intermediate 
impact has yet to materialise.  Although the general conditions for intermediate impacts remain 
generally weak, due to weak enforcement and sanction procedures in the public prosecutor’s 
office, Phare support is targeting the required improvements in co-ordination, feedback and 
communication mechanisms with the aim of making the system operationally effective.  The 
availability of good practice information from member states, often introduced via TAIEX, has 
also been a useful ‘soft’ contribution to intermediate impact.  
 
54. Wider impact has been negligible in nearly all sectors.  With the exception of the 
environment sector, and some parts of the agriculture and internal market sectors, wider impact 
was effectively precluded by inadequate progress in public policy formulation resulting from a 
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lack of commitment to good governance, complacency about corruption and acceptance of a 
lack of transparency and inclusiveness in all aspects of civil society.  Consequently, although 
there are many committed individuals working to support modernisation and reform, the 
Bulgarian administration still lacks the necessary critical mass of reformed systems, structures 
and attitudes to drive the change process forward.  Wider impact has been undermined by the 
constant inflow and outflow of people from public administration with consequential ever-
changing policies and plans, which has created an atmosphere where changes in public 
administration (even positive changes) are seen as only transient.  This has a pervasive adverse 
effect on all sectors.  For example, the wider impact in the JHA sector was also undermined by 
the lack of progress in reform of the judiciary. 
 
55. The potential to achieve wider objectives was also weakened by the delays in 
implementation.  Firstly, the delays in the programming cycle caused a reduction in relevance, 
and uncertainty in preparatory activities and partnership, in consequence of which 
commitments were difficult to sustain.  Secondly, the delays in contracting and shorter 
implementation times jeopardised the results and impact of many planned interventions (see 
para 32).20  
 
56. The next few years should bring an accelerated pace of change.  There are signs that 
the next few years will bring an accelerated pace of change, as much of the current Phare 
assistance will move beyond the planning and early implementation stages to absorb and 
stabilise the results of earlier efforts.  However this is also dependent on the public institutions 
absorbing and acting upon the various Phare interventions that will have an impact on 
improving the employment conditions for civil servants.   
 
57. Expected impacts have generally been poorly specified at design stage.  It is evident 
that the ‘logframe’ methodology has been largely neglected when the expected impacts of 
Phare assistance have been described in the course of programme and project design.  Impacts, 
particularly intermediate and wider socio-economic impacts, have mostly been described in 
very general terms unrelated to what the activities and outputs may reasonably be expected to 
deliver. Indeed, for some types of assistance including infrastructure, social services, and 
support to vocational schools, the objectives, even the immediate objectives, were often 
defined in terms more appropriate to wider socio-economic impact, which impacts can be seen 
only in the longer term and in consequence of a range of assistance, not just one intervention.   
58. Lack of impact measurement constrains both evaluation and analysis of cost-
effectiveness.  No system is currently in place to measure impact.  Provision was not made for 
the external data gathering activities that are essential to supply the information needed to 
study wider impact.   Internal evaluation and data analysis structures are largely missing and 
where they do exist, they are quantitative in nature measuring for example only the quantity of 
works, the numbers of training and other deliverables that have been completed.   
2.6. Pre-conditions for sustainability are generally fragile and insufficiently assured.   
59. This section considers sustainability in terms of the long-term viability of institutional 
reforms following the withdrawal of Phare support.  The preconditions for sustainability 
include the level of beneficiary commitment, consolidated and stable administrative capacity, 
timely provision of co-financing, and the integration of the assistance with local strategies. 
 
                                                 
20  The reduction in implementation time was severe in the project sample included in this evaluation. 
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60. Prospects for sustainability are moderate in many sectors but risk being undermined by 
weak administrative capacity.  While Phare has strengthened the legal, organisational and 
administrative pre-conditions for sustainability in many acquis-intensive areas, programmes 
are too often being implemented in the context of an unreformed public administration and 
without adequate counterpart capacity. 
 
61. Where the nature of the deliverables was the creation of new or upgraded structures, 
these organisations are functioning.  In the agriculture and environment sectors the 
commitment to change is good, as represented by the implementation of improved systems, 
methodologies, and regulations, and the installation of new or upgraded equipment, software 
applications, statistical collection methods, the development of databases and national and 
international networking.  Institutions newly established with the support of Phare, such as the 
PIFCA, National Institute of Justice, the Agriculture Statistic Directorate are functioning and 
will soon be in a position to demonstrate that institutional sustainability has been achieved (see 
Box 11).  The State Budget allocation for 2006 reflects significant national support.21   
62. Sustainability is at risk in many cases due to difficulties with retention of staff.  The 
investment in training and capacity building will only be fully realised and sustained if the civil 
servants involved remain in their jobs, and if not in their jobs then at least in the sectors for 
which they were trained.  However in Bulgaria the civil service is regarded as a short-term 
training ground where young graduates spend a few years building up their knowledge and 
making connections in public service, before moving into the business sector.  All ministries 
are affected by high turnover of staff, and even within the civil service there is poaching of 
staff by the better-paid ministries from lower paid institutions like the Ministry of 
Environment.  The under resourcing of the Phare related positions as well as the pressurised 
and rapidly changing working environment is a major contributing factor which drives many, 
particularly trained and experienced staff, to look for more rewarding and less stressful 
employment opportunities elsewhere.   
 
63. Although Bulgarian institutions in most sectors will be able to complete the essential 
tasks related to the obligations of membership, the workload in these areas is high and is 
constantly increasing.  This has a negative impact in that staff have little or no time to 
participate in discussions in Brussels on formulating EU policy, or to participate in further 
training or be involved in transfer of knowledge to new potential candidates for EU 
membership.   
 
                                                 
21  The Bulgarian budget allocation increased from 2004: €K 600 and 2005: €K 660 to 2006: M€1.18.  
Box 11.  Example of mixed sustainability  
Institutional structures for the environment sector are stable and the chances for sustainability are good, 
particularly through the prospects of continued support from the SF.  Sustainability was enhanced through 
good links between early and later programmes.  The commitment to sustainability is demonstrated by an 
expansion of the achievements generated by Phare support, e.g. the shift towards comprehensive sustainable 
development programmes, the continued modernisation of the working environment through the introduction 
of new equipment and procedures and the preparation of plans based on methodologies introduced through 
Phare; for example the river basin management and the wetlands development programmes.   
In social affairs, UNDP has been the contractor responsible for the management of two Phare SME support 
projects, Beautiful Bulgaria and the Joint Opportunities for Business Start-ups.  Much of what has been 
achieved has been for the benefit of the UNDP rather than in the Bulgarian authorities.  UNDP is preparing an 
exit strategy following accession.  There is a risk that the institutional and operational capacity that UNDP 
filled will then remain as a gap, and that this will occur when Bulgaria requires the capacity to guarantee 
implementation of the European Social Fund. The prospects for sustainability should improve when the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Policy takes the project over in 2006.  There continues to be a strong demand 
for the project (more than four times the maximum available budget).      
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64. Recently introduced measures may improve the working environment in the public 
service.  In the very recent past measures have been adopted by different ministries to increase 
the salary levels and to enhance the working conditions for public servants.  In terms of 
sustainability this is a very welcome decision, but it will take time to filter down and to have a 
significant effect on staff turnover.  There is still a risk that the effect of the decisions will not 
be experienced sufficiently soon to guarantee the sustainability of the volumes of staff training 
that has been applied with Phare assistance.  However, the fact that the staff recruitment and 
retention problem has been acknowledged and that some initial steps to turn the problem 
around by a number of key ministries is itself a major achievement that can be attributed to the 
human resource development work carried out in the Phare public administration reform 
programmes, and should go some way to assure sustainability of know how and to strengthen 
the capacity of the public institutions.   
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3. THEMATIC/ CROSSCUTTING FINDINGS 
65. Having examined overall and sectoral performance of the Phare programme in Chapter 2, 
this chapter reviews progress made with the support of Phare towards three key thematic areas 
of the pre-accession strategy: 
• Phase’s factual contribution to Bulgaria’s improved performance in the pre-accession 
process, 
• Building public administrative and judicial capacity (PAJC) to apply the acquis, and 
• Supporting ESC and the preparation for the SF. 
3.1. Bulgaria’s pre-accession process was heavily dependent on Phare assistance  
66. The first thematic crosscutting criterion is to assess whether Phare support in practice 
addressed the ex post needs of the Bulgarian beneficiaries.  The evaluation sought to assess 
whether the original objectives (ex ante needs) of the programme were appropriately set.  The 
essence of this evaluation criterion is to consider the extent to which Phare support improved 
the performance of the Bulgarian beneficiaries.  
 
67. Capacity to fulfil the obligations of EU membership is present but needs to be further 
developed.  Not enough was done with Phare in the earlier period to guarantee that the key 
ministries would be adequately prepared for EU membership.  Much of the Phare 1999-2001 
assistance was concerned with the important process of preparing the ground in terms of 
legislation, harmonisation and approximation, creation of new structures and institution 
building activities.  However these efforts have been somewhat constrained by the 
shortcomings in public administration, such as frequent and political restructuring, poor project 
management, poor human resource management, frequent personnel changes, and resistance to 
change.  A further key weakness is the virtual absence of administration and implementation 
structures outside of Sofia.  These issues are reflected in the following indicative cause and 
effect diagram for Bulgaria.  
Figure 1.- Impact cause and effect diagram - Bulgaria 
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68. Figure 1 is a basic representation of the influence of key factors on the delivery of impact 
from Phare interventions.  It shows that a combination of institution building and investment 
outputs should provide a transfer of knowledge, skills and expertise from member states to the 
candidate countries.  By combining this knowledge transfer with the development of new or 
upgraded structures and more efficient administrative systems (supported by investments in 
office information and communication technology), an immediate impact should be achieved 
to transform the operating capabilities of the supported institutions.   
 
69. Figure 1 acknowledges the many positive effects of Phare, including transfer of 
knowledge and investment to Bulgaria.  However, it also indicates where potential impact has 
not been fully realised for a number of reasons, including the delays in approval and 
contracting processes and the late commencement of a public administration reform strategy, 
an unreformed civil service leading to high staff turnover, and a lack of development of 
regional structures.  These issues have restricted the achievement of intermediate impacts in 
many sectors.   
 
70. For the sectors directly concerned with the closing of acquis chapters, the findings in 
Chapter 2 show that Phare assistance in the earlier period (1999-2001) started to indicate what 
legislative and administrative structures would be necessary for membership.  From an ex post 
perspective, the intermediate impact has not yet been fully achieved in the Bulgarian 
administration and as a consequence the level of preparedness falls some way short of the 
planned position at this time.  The wider objective of improving the performance of the 
Bulgarian administration with particular reference to its post membership obligations has not 
been adequately achieved in terms of administrative substance and institutional relevance.   
 
71. Absence of regional or local involvement in Phare implementation is a significant 
weakness.  Most of the earlier efforts were concentrated in the central ministries, and very little 
attention has been given to build institutional or administrative capacity at regional and local 
levels, although there were a few exceptions, for example in the environmental sector, where 
concentrated accession-focused training was provided at regional level.  The limited use of 
grant schemes in most sectors has limited the coverage and scope of Phare implementation and 
has curtailed the involvement and potential growth in capacity of regional administrations, 
municipalities and civil society organisations.   
 
72. External Phare expertise has been a substitute for institutional know how.  The 
institutional know-how that was used for the pre-accession institution building process was 
supplied through Phare, via twinning advisors, consultants and TAIEX.  However, because the 
level of know-how transfer was constrained by institutional instability which is endemic across 
many public institutions, foreign experts were used intensively to compensate for widespread 
institutional weakness and to plug the operational and institutional gaps that exist in many of 
the line ministry structures.  This institutional uncertainty has continued in the preparation for 
Structural Funds (see 83). 
 
73. Accelerating the capacity building process depends on a level of institutional strength 
and stability that is not apparent in Bulgaria.  There has been an attempt to accelerate the 
capacity building process in the later period, and to concentrate more effort on building 
regional and local capacity in advance of accession.  However the success of such intense 
efforts depends heavily on the strength and stability of the institutions involved, and at this 
time the regional strands of most public institutions are not sufficiently robust or institutionally 
stable to guarantee long-term sustainability.  Therefore Bulgaria faces a significant challenge in 
advance of accession to turn this situation around by making a serious commitment to ensure 
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that those who have the relevant know how are given the opportunity and the necessary support 
to inject speed and enthusiasm into the process of change.   
3.2. Phare achievements were restrained by underperformance in horizontal PAJC  
74. The second thematic/ crosscutting evaluation criterion was the examination of the Phare 
contribution to the public administrative and judicial capacity (PAJC) of the Bulgarian 
beneficiary administrations.  Horizontal PAJC issues are non-sector specific but are needed to 
meet the requirements of the first Copenhagen criterion – the ‘Political Criteria’.22  Experience 
of such reforms in many countries is that the agenda has a very long time horizon and takes a 
considerable amount of time in its planning phase, and therefore needs to start very early in the 
pre-accession period.23  
 
75. Slow progress on horizontal PAJC.  In response to the Roadmap, a public sector reform 
strategy is in place but the process is patchy and generally fragmented.  Although Phare made a 
substantial contribution to initiate progress in important areas like civil service reform, 
improvements in strategic planning, anti-corruption strategy and strengthening human resource 
capacity, the Bulgarian administration does not have sufficient robustness to capitalise fully on 
the outputs from these interventions.  The same factors that impair sustainability of Phare 
assistance have constrained the contribution that has been made to building PAJC in Bulgaria.  
Progress in public administration priorities, such as decentralisation, public policy reform and 
strategic planning, has not reached the stage of wide-scale implementation and there is limited 
commitment behind the process.  The lack of progress on remuneration reform for public 
servants was a contributing factor that slowed down other related civil service reform 
initiatives.    
 
76. Public administration reform started too late.  An important intermediate impact of 
Phare interventions was the introduction of drivers of change and modernisation based on good 
practice in EU-15 member states.  In the case of Bulgaria, this effort was applied against a 
background of a public administration and judicial structure that were not geared for change. 
From these interventions, a number of positive signs have emerged in certain ministries.  
However, in the critical area of public administration reform, the key civil service reforms were 
launched too late to underpin the modernisation efforts of sectoral Phare interventions.  Only in 
2003, did the Government approve an action plan for the implementation of a revised ‘Strategy 
for Modernisation of the Public Administration – from Accession to Integration’, and adopt 
amendments in the Civil Service Law that made recruitment of civil servants through 
competition mandatory and strengthened the merit principle in recruitment and performance.  
The Code of Conduct of State Administration Officials was adopted only in 2004.  Legislative 
amendments in the area of mobility and pension schemes, career development and structural 
organization of the administration are only now awaiting approval by the National Assembly.  
 
77. Inadequate support for the development of managerial skills.  There has been little 
Phare support relevant to the development of senior civil servants’ managerial skills.  
                                                 
22  As emphasised in the 2000 Phare Review communication, these would involve general public administration reforms 
including civil service reforms, inter-ministerial coordination and anti-corruption programmes.  The requirements of 
strengthening and reforming the administrative and judicial capacities were stressed in the Madrid, Luxembourg, Feira and 
Gothenburg Councils. 
23 It is also the case that the Commission had not formulated a specific strategy for public administrative reform and judicial 
capacity building overall.  The Accession Partnerships (AP) and the National Programmes for the Adoption of the Acquis 
(NPAA), whilst noting the need for upgrading public administrations in general terms, focused on the requirements of the 
acquis, and the 2002 Action Plans for Administrative and Judicial Capacity, while listing outstanding horizontal PAJC 
components, did not sequence, prioritise or correlate common components of them. 
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However, some efforts are being made in Phare 2004 to strengthen the capacity of the Institute 
of Public Administration and European Integration (IPAEI) to provide a management 
development programme aimed at senior civil servants, but the scheduling of this project 
means that implementation will only take place in 2006 and 2007.  Such a management 
development programme was needed much earlier in the accession preparation programme.  
 
78. Horizontal adverse effects of the slow performance in public administration reform are 
pervasive across all sectors.  Phare assistance in certain sectors has provided intense levels of 
training and know-how transfer has been significant,24 but the effects of this are not sufficiently 
widespread to observe on the administration as a whole.  Training is an ongoing process in the 
public service of Bulgaria and there are a number of institutions responsible for the provision 
of professional and new entrant training for public servants.  For example there is a Public 
Finance School that is an internal and permanent feature of the Ministry of Finance; the IPAEI, 
a state institute responsible for training for new entrant public servants and for servants that are 
appointed at managerial position for a first time; and the National Institute of Justice 
responsible for recruitment and training of magistrates.  Therefore the institutional framework 
structure is partly in place to underpin and deliver the necessary capacity building 
interventions, but progress has been slow and commitment is weak, which has led to an 
approach that is fragmented and without clear direction. 
 
79. The following impact cause and effect diagram (Figure 2) illustrates how the limited 
scale of intermediate and wider impacts in a key sector – justice – is a factor in the failure to 
stimulate change and to counteract the weakness in judicial capacity in Bulgaria.  The figure 
acknowledges the effort that has been applied to achieve impact in the sector, as reflected by 
outputs and immediate impact that were discussed in Chapter 2.  However the changes that 
have been realised were restricted to a small part of the sector and are not sufficiently visible to 
alter the external perception of the sector.  Figure 2 illustrates how the overall lack of judicial 
capacity, in this case in terms of the efficiency of the court system, to apply and visibly enforce 
new areas of legislation that symbolise change and modern EU values such as money 
laundering or the fight against corruption further compound the lack of public confidence in the 
judiciary.   
 
80. Figure 2 highlights the negative effects that a combination of a lack of support from 
senior officials and a lack of implementation capacity can have in terms of low public 
confidence.  In the case of anti-corruption strategy, there are many worthwhile initiatives to 
change the behaviour and tolerance of corruption in society, especially through education 
programmes that target young people.  This important work is put at risk if the judicial system 
is unable to carry through a successful enforcement of the strategy.  
 
                                                 
24  For example in the environmental sector the twinning interventions have been at the core of delivering training and working 
in partnership with their Bulgarian counterparts to ensure they have the knowledge, understanding and vision of what will 
be required.   
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Figure 2.- Impact cause and effect diagram – modernisation of the justice sector 
 
 
81. Experience of the new member states has shown that many more well-trained and 
well-qualified staff will be required for SF.  Possibly as much as ten times more staff may be 
required, but at this time this knowledge does not seem to be motivating the action that needs 
to be taken (see 87).  Phare support to the PAJC is continuing through the 2004-06 multi-
annual programmes and an Operational Programme “Administrative Capacity” will be 
prepared to continue this work after accession.  However until human resource management is 
recognised as an essential tool in the management of the public service, progress is likely to be 
limited.  It is the significant number of skilled, well-qualified, hard-working individuals with 
modern attitudes that are currently working in the public sector who are the key to change and 
the instrument that can guarantee improvement and significant growth in administrative 
capacity.   
 
82. Commitment to public administration reform in Bulgaria is growing but it still lacks 
commitment or visibility.  The lack of progress in civil service reform (including remuneration 
reform) has attracted some attention in fairly recent times.   A Council of Ministers report in 
2005 criticised the lack of investment in human capital in the Bulgarian administration and a 
survey by the Ministry of Interior regarding internal corruption identified low rates of pay as 
one of the six factors behind corruption.  The message about the need and value of investing in 
the human capital seems to be gathering some strength and is beginning to be acknowledged as 
important by certain key institutions.  The fact that human resource management is higher on 
the agenda is a positive change and an indication that some serious effort may be applied to 
resolve what is an unacceptable and undermining situation for a new Member State.   
3.3. National preparations for Structural Funds came too late and with little enthusiasm 
for achievement   
83. The third thematic/crosscutting criterion addresses the extent to which Phare contributed 
to the strengthening of ESC and to the preparation for the use of Structural Funds.  Previous 
evaluation and assessment reports have noted that further efforts were required to make the 
structures at central, regional and local level fully functional and that Bulgaria needed to focus 
on administrative capacity and preparing the whole system from the managing authorities and 
intermediary bodies through to the final beneficiaries for efficient management of the 
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Structural Funds.  In the early period, a single SMSC for ESC was not in place, and ESC 
interventions were monitored under other sectors, like social affairs.  
 
84. Structural Fund preparation in Bulgaria was insufficient for accession in 2007.  There 
are some examples of positive and immediate impacts from Phare support in this area, but the 
effect is not sufficiently far reaching or decentralised to have made adequate provision for the 
absorption of Structural Funds.  Recent effort suggests some acceleration of the process, but 
this may be too little, and too late to ensure a rapid uptake of Structural Funds in 2007.     
 
85. A lack of institutional stability in the ESC sector has hindered the preparation process, 
and at the time of the evaluation field work there was uncertainty about what the MA and IB 
structures would look like.  For example, in the environment sector, The Ministry for the 
Environment and Water (MoEW) has been proposed as the MA, but has not been adequately 
trained or prepared for this role.  At regional level, six regional directorates that are expected to 
act as Intermediary Bodies (IBs) have not been involved in SF preparatory activities.25  A 
tender dossier was prepared in April 2006, to provide training to the six proposed IBs, but this 
has come very late in the preparatory process.  Furthermore the MoEW and regional 
directorates are under pressure to meet the acquis requirements and do not have sufficient 
resources to participate and absorb an SF training programme.  There is a growing risk that 
because of the ongoing institutional uncertainties that expertise could be lost and the prospects 
of developing and maintaining a body of experience will diminish.   
 
86. Effort has been concentrated on the MAs, and IBs will be ill-prepared for SF 
implementation.  Knowledge transfer and training activities have been heavily concentrated in 
the institutions that will be the MAs for SF, but the same effort has not been applied to the 
institutions that will become IBs.  The decision about the MAs was made reasonably early as it 
tends to be clearer which ministries should become the MAs, but there has been uncertainty 
about which institution would become IBs.  As a consequence there has not been the same 
opportunity to involve the organisations in preparatory training.  The functions will be new to 
many of the organisations selected to be IBs, and given that they are complex and 
administratively demanding, they will place considerable pressure on untrained and under-
prepared institutions.  Furthermore the institutional capacity to fulfil the role of both MA and 
IB tends to require a significant increase in well-trained experienced individuals.  At this time 
there is fairly widespread awareness about the growing demand for good staff, but this 
knowledge has not yet been transferred into actions.   
 
87. Since 2004, the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy (MLSP) became the implementing 
agency (IA) for the Phare labour market initiatives project, which in many ways is a pre-cursor 
to ESF.  The time operating as the IA for these programmes should have provided valuable 
experience to the potential IB for the HRD Operational Programme (OP), but in Bulgaria this 
learning opportunity has not been fully realised as the Ministry will become the MA for the 
HRD OP and much of the administrative responsibilities for implementation, the areas where 
the Ministry has gained most knowledge through the management and implementation of 
Phare, will be transferred to the IBs – the Ministry of Education and other institutions.26   
 
                                                 
25  The regional institutions were involved in training, but this was not concentrated towards the administration of SF. 
26  In its comments on the draft of this report, the NAC stated that IBs involved in the implementation of OP “Human 
Resources Development” are second level spending units under MLSP which should assist know-how transfer, and that the 
Ministry of Education has long experience with joint management of grant schemes together with the MLSP. 
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88. Regional structures are very much underdeveloped.  The regional structures to support 
economic development on a geographic context are generally very weak in Bulgaria.  There is 
no commitment to regionalisation at political level and no strong institutional structures to 
support decentralised activities.  Moreover the structures that will be needed to support the 
absorption of SF are very much underdeveloped and fragile in the sectors where they have 
been established.  The Ministry of Regional Development and Public Works acknowledge that 
the biggest risk for Bulgaria on accession is the lack of capacity at regional and municipality 
level.  There was a Special Preparatory Programme in 2001 to invest in training activities to 
build institutional and human capital at a regional level.  The programme made a start, but the 
process of development was not continued and there was a pause for the reorganisation that 
took place in 2002.  Interventions to build the capacity at regional level did not really get 
started again until 2005.  There is now, albeit very late, ongoing Phare support to train 
municipalities in the planning and design concepts that underpin SF interventions.   
 
89. Insufficient attention has been given to build capacity of municipalities and other 
likely SF partners.   There has been a neglect of investment in municipalities or other potential 
future partners to prepare them to benefit from the socio-economic opportunities that are 
offered by the SF.  Experts from the MoF have organised workshops around Bulgaria to 
outline the arrangements for what should happen after accession.  The aim of the workshops is 
to inform municipalities of what is expected from them.  There is also a public awareness 
campaign.  Consideration is also being given to using TAIEX support later in 2006 to extend 
this work to areas not covered by the Phare projects.  This however is very much an 
information dissemination process and is not a substitute for the extensive capacity building or 
learning-by-doing activities that should have taken place. 
 
90. Even Phare cross border programmes have fallen short of what could have been achieved 
if more attention had been given to promote genuine border region involvement.  For Bulgaria 
and for Phare this is very much an opportunity lost as it takes significant time and effort to 
germinate and grow local participation.  It is however a situation that will have to be rectified 
and that will require significant attention and investment of SF.   
 
91. A key decision has been made that the national budget will ensure the co-financing of 
projects at municipality level, which will encourage municipal participation for the first three 
years.  However, this will not compensate for the lack of operational capacity and prior 
experience of preparing and implementing EU projects.   
 
92. Limited use of grant schemes has constrained SF preparation in some areas.  There 
has been little or no investment to strengthen the capacity of municipalities and other potential 
future partners to prepare them to benefit from the socio-economic opportunities that are 
offered by the Structural Funds.  The first Phare supported grant schemes in this area were 
implemented in 2003/04 with disappointing results (see 36).  A key decision has been made 
that for the first three years the national budget will ensure the co-financing of projects at 
municipality level.      
 
93. Phare 2005 is providing much needed support to accelerate the preparation for 
accession.   The NAC is performing a special co-ordinating role for all projects associated with 
the preparations for SF.  Phare 2005 is supporting the preparation of the Sectoral Operating 
Programmes for the main areas, although some of these efforts were blocked by the MoF.  
There is widespread use of TA and twinning to support the co-ordinating MAs for SF and so 
far the NDP has been prepared with the support of TA.  Many of the SF preparation projects 
involve training projects to support the preparation of staff to assume roles in MAs and 
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implementing bodies.  As these projects are due to finish in June 2006, there is a concern that 
there will not be adequate support in the second half of 2006 and that the emerging gap in 
know how and support will place insurmountable pressure on the fragile institutional structures 
that have been created for SF.   
 
94. Support is also coming from non-Phare sources.  ISPA is supporting the development of 
a pipeline of projects for the transport and environment sector.  Support is also obtained from 
other external donors.  The drafting of the administrative capacity SOP was achieved with 
multi-lateral donor support.  Matra funds are supporting a project for the development of 
performance indicators for the SOPs.  CBC should be a precursor to INTERREG but there 
could be serious absorption capacity issues as there has been no real participation of the border 
regions in the policy and planning for CBC and the institutional structures and operational 
capacity in the border regions are very much underdeveloped.   
 
95. There is good support for the development of the information systems for monitoring the 
SF.  Twinning support, with a budget of approximately M€ 2, for the development of the 
Unified Information System is at inception stage.  This system will cover the central 
co-ordinating unit and six of the seven SOPs.  
 
96. SF preparatory programme was not as intensive in Bulgaria as some other accession 
countries.  The SF preparatory process in Bulgaria has not been as intensive as in some of the 
earlier wave of candidate countries.  This could simply be because there were fewer SF 
preparatory projects included in the FMs or because the effort was still being directed towards 
the acquis requirements and the emphasis had not shifted towards SF preparation activities.  
Whatever the reason a contributing factor was and continues to be the lack of institutional 
capacity, to absorb and implement the volume and complexity of interventions that are required 
to create an EU-ready environment. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 
97. This chapter sets out the conclusions on strategy and performance of Phare support in 
Bulgaria.  It is crucial that lessons are fully learned about the strengths and weaknesses of the 
how Phare support for Bulgaria was programmed and realised in order to optimise the 
approach to future pre-accession support.  As a way forward, this evaluation recommends four 
sets of actions and provides lessons learned from the Bulgarian example. 
4.1. Conclusions 
98. The conclusions cover overall Phare performance in Bulgaria, and three key issues: 
• Whether Phare support in practice addressed the ex post needs of Bulgarian beneficiaries; 
• Building public administrative and judicial capacity to apply the acquis; 
• Supporting economic and social cohesion including preparation for Structural Funds. 
 
Conclusion 1:  Institutional and operational weaknesses constrained overall 
achievements.  
 
99. Phare programme design had clear and direct links to the closing of acquis chapters and to 
building capacity to take on the obligations and opportunities of EU membership.  An 
appropriate mix of Phare instruments was used.  For the earlier period under consideration, 
much of the effort was concerned with legal approximation and the creation of new structures. 
Substantial progress had been made by 2004, and outputs delivered by Phare achieved 
reasonable immediate impact especially in the technical acquis-driven sectors.   
 
100. However, the overall performance was limited and fell short of expectations.  There are 
many factors that have limited the performance of Phare in Bulgaria, including a non-existent 
or weak strategic approach, especially in the non-acquis areas; serious operational inefficiency 
in all sectors, and most importantly, inadequate political commitment and management 
capability to pursue a modernising agenda.  Some progress has been made since 2004, but it is 
not dynamic or widespread enough to compensate for the time lost or to complete preparations 
to be ready to take full advantage of the opportunities of EU membership from the date of 
accession.  
 
Conclusion 2:  More assistance should have been given, earlier, to embedding a strategic 
approach to national and sectoral policy making. 
 
101. Phare has been partly effective in the creation or modernisation of acquis-related 
structures and procedures in Bulgaria, and has started the process of staff training and the 
provision of equipment and other capital items.  One of the factors for success was that the 
objective of assistance was clear, largely defined by the acquis, and widely accepted as 
necessary.  There was a rapid transposition of the acquis into legislation, reflected by the 
closing of acquis chapters.  There has, however, been limited achievement of the intermediate 
and wider impact that would have been expected from implementation of the acquis, which has 
reduced Phare’s overall performance.   
 
102. The concept of a strategic planning and pathway for change has been introduced too late 
and generally the concept is too embryonic to have had a significant impact in the period under 
review.  Inevitably this lack of strategy has been most disadvantageous for issues arising under 
the political criteria, such as PAJC and where there is neither acquis nor a standard template to 
build on, and those issues where the acquis absolutely requires, but does not define, a national 
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strategic framework covering the areas of responsibility of a number of ministries, such as 
ESC. 
 
103. There is also a risk that the level of know-how transfer has been constrained by the 
institutional instability that is endemic across many of the public institutions.  In many ways, 
foreign experts have been used intensively to compensate for institutional weaknesses that 
exist in many of the line ministries.  The institutional know-how that has been used for the pre-
accession institution building process has been supplied through Phare, via twinning advisors, 
consultants on technical assistance projects and also TAIEX interventions.   
 
Conclusion 3:  Phare support was crucial to initiate reforms to public administration and 
the judiciary but only limited progress was made.   
 
104. Phare support has been a crucial factor to kick-start the process of public service reform.  
Although some progress has been made in a number of key sectors and in some key 
institutions, the breadth and depth of change was not sufficient to be felt across the public 
sector.  There is no visible high-level commitment to the reform process.  As a consequence 
what has been achieved has been a slow intermittent process of change.   
 
105. A number of permanent institutions have been created which are crucial for providing 
the framework to guide and support widespread public and judicial reform.  On the other hand, 
inadequate human resource management and investment in human capital has seriously 
constrained PAJC in Bulgaria, and thus progress in all sectors.   
 
106. Bulgaria could have the necessary resources available but has not seen the value of 
making this deployment or indeed of the reform process.  Each ministry has many skilled, 
well-qualified, hard working individuals with modern attitudes who are the key to change and 
who constitute a potential instrument that could guarantee improvement and significant growth 
in administrative capacity in Bulgaria.  There is still a need, however, for those skills and 
attitudes to be more pervasively deployed across the public administration as a whole.  There is 
also a need for a change in perception of the value of the work of civil servants and greater 
recognition and remuneration for skilled and motivated public servants.  This requires that the 
civil service reforms that are already in progress should be carried through to completion to 
provide a platform for further development.   
 
Conclusion 4: The Phare contribution to building the management structures for 
Structural Funds was not be enough to alleviate serious institutional weakness  
 
107. Inadequate investment in building the structures necessary for the management and 
administration of SF, particularly at regional and local level, has created a serious weakness in 
the institutional framework for SF.  A serious risk for Bulgaria in terms of absorption of SF is 
the lack of capacity at regional and municipality level.  The general neglect and lack of 
investment in municipalities or other potential future partners has meant they are unprepared to 
benefit from the socio-economic opportunities that are offered by the Structural Funds. 
4.2. Lessons Learned 
108. This report has demonstrated areas where the lessons to be learned from the experience 
of Bulgaria so far have been taken on board by the Commission Services and the national 
authorities.  However, many of these lessons, which are set out below, need to be taken into 
account at the start of, or much earlier in, any pre-accession period.  They are therefore 
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principally of relevance to future enlargements and they are of two kinds, strategic and 
operational.  Some of the lessons learned included here are also common to Romania. 
 
Strategic Lessons 
 
Lesson 1:  Adopt a strategic approach for non-acquis specific interventions.  
 
109. In the technical acquis-driven sectors, the achievement of intermediate impact is 
assisted by the availability of a specific objectives and gap assessments.  For sectors that are 
accession rather than acquis-driven and for horizontal Phare interventions, the degree to which 
these are driven by strategic objectives is less apparent and accordingly, there is less support 
for the identification and achievement of intermediate impact in these sectors.  Coordinated 
sector strategies are needed.  The skills and expertise for the pre-planning work (including 
needs’ analysis, problem analysis and objective setting) need to be provided on a sufficient 
scale for the planning methodologies to gain acceptance.  There is also a need to target senior 
officials (political and administrative) from an earlier stage. 
      
Lesson 2:  Give more support to horizontal PAJC including coordination arrangements. 
 
110. The time needed to prepare for accession, particularly in the more difficult technical 
areas (agriculture) and in horizontal areas (PAJC, ESC) was seriously underestimated, resulting 
in the likelihood (as was the case for the 1 May 2004 candidates) that preparations for 
membership will not be complete and leading to the need for a Transition Facility.  The 
availability of the Administrative Capacity Operational Programme under the Structure Funds 
is a further indication of the large amount of work that remains in the horizontal areas.  
Everything possible should be done to avoid such a situation recurring in future enlargements.  
This requires accurate needs’ and capacity assessment before assistance starts; a realistic rate 
of deployment of assistance and funding in relation to the growth in national capacities and 
resources, and an adequate time for testing systems before accession (e.g. paying agencies, 
Integrated Administrative and Control System for the Common Agriculture Policy, and ESC 
bodies). 
  
111. In future, EU support to candidates should do far more to help them to appreciate the 
nature, scale and financial and human resource implications of operating PAJC reforms to the 
standard needed to meet the Copenhagen political criteria and underpin satisfactory operation 
of the acquis.  Such support should include assistance with high-level networking and peer 
support for a benchmarking approach to the improvement in national PAJC. 
 
112. Candidates should be encouraged and assisted to establish adequate machinery of 
government to ensure that the cooperation and collaboration which EU policies require 
between ministries and agencies for policy development and implementation can be fostered.   
 
Operational lessons. 
 
Lesson 3: Invest in staff resources for those involved in the programming and 
implementation of projects and in the central actors involved, plan the investment to avoid 
any weak links, and improve co-ordination to enhance the performance of pre-accession 
assistance.   
 
113. Many of the causes of poor performance in the programming and implementation of 
Phare assistance can be traced back to two areas of weakness: staff allocation in the 
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Programme Implementation Units (PIUs) and poor co-ordination between the final 
beneficiaries and the central actors (NAC, IA, ECD).  In setting up the central management and 
co-ordinating structures it should be kept in mind that the system will only be as strong as its 
weakest link.  For example, the positive changes in 2002 with the repositioning of NAC were 
counterbalanced by an inability to deal with the resourcing issues at the CFCU.  Accordingly, it 
is essential that all the actors are sufficiently resourced and trained for the roles they are 
expected to play.  This did not happen in Bulgaria and is a contributing factor to the current 
situation.  
 
114. Similarly, good staff continuity in the PIUs and a reduction in the level of responsibility 
placed in the hands of a small number of staff would strengthen the overall performance.  The 
training of PIU staff in the rules and regulations of pre-accession assistance (including project 
cycle management (PCM) techniques) should be allocated to a central national actor (possibly 
the NAC).  Training should be provided to the more senior managers who oversee the work of 
PIU staff.  As PIUs can often work in isolation from their peers in other sectors, some 
investment in networking of PIUs and in improving co-ordination and communication with the 
NAC and IAs would be worthwhile. 
 
Lesson 4:  Phare programming would benefit from stronger quality control and a greater 
degree of flexibility. 
 
115. Multi-annual programming is highly desirable, but the current arrangements maintain 
the annual approval cycle.  Some of the problems with contracting and implementation delays 
could have been minimised if it had been possible to have a greater degree of overlapping 
between project phases.  The counter argument was that the time spent on draft documents, like 
tender specifications, might be wasted if programming proposals were significantly altered 
during the proposal stage.  A key principle of quality management is preparing documents right 
the first time.  The embedding of internal quality control to achieve this usually requires early 
interaction between the co-ordinating actors and PIUs and a greater degree of collaboration in 
the preparation of the documents.  There is scope for improving the quality control processes in 
the Phare management cycle. 
 
116. The management systems should also be sufficiently flexible to react appropriately to 
significant reassessments of priority arising from major progress reviews like the 2002 
Roadmap, the 2003 revision of the AP, and Sigma reviews.  It would have been useful if there 
was a more direct use of the Roadmap and AP for the reshaping of programme objectives and 
for progress monitoring purposes. 
 
117. The annual funding mechanism acted as a driver to keep the system moving, even 
where management problems were accumulating.  This poses a risk to the value for money 
derived from the continued spending of allocations when the management problems are not 
being properly addressed.  It would be helpful, and in the best interests of the beneficiaries, if 
there was a funding pause for reflection when problems become apparent.     
  
Lesson 5: Sectoral monitoring systems should be closely aligned to strategies. 
  
118. Weaknesses in the functioning of the monitoring system contributed to the problems 
experienced in Bulgaria.  The local definition of sectors was not well aligned to the 
Commission perspective and this may have contributed to the limited progress in ESC.  Some 
sectors, like internal market, were widely defined which diluted the strategic focus within the 
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sector.  A greater alignment, perhaps through a larger number of more discretely defined 
sectors might allow more effectively management.   
 
Lesson 6: Pay more attention to impact indicators of achievement. 
 
119. Indicators of achievement, where they exist, have not been used at all adequately in the 
management of interventions.  For example, better use of cost-effectiveness indicators could be 
made in investment assistance if they were defined before approving infrastructure assistance, 
and were monitored after the completion.  Otherwise the only measurement of success is the 
completion of the works per se, which is not an adequate indicator of effective spending of EU 
and Bulgarian funds.   
 
120. In many interventions, particularly those with a long time horizon for achievement of 
impact, the activities stopped short at installation of the new systems or arrangements.  There 
would be a better chance for impact if assistance was programmed to include some assessment 
of the quality of implementation.   
 
121. In some cases, although good indicators were identified, the systems to provide the data 
to measure the indicator (e.g. conducting a survey) were not provided for.  In the validation of 
programming documentation, particular attention should be paid to the availability of sources 
of information to calculate the identified indicators.   
4.3. Recommendations 
122. There are two groups of recommendations; strategic and operational.  There are four 
strategic recommendations and one operational recommendation that are the same for Bulgaria 
and Romania and are based on a number of common problems which emerged separately 
during the ex post evaluation process.  The strategic recommendations are generally applicable 
only to future enlargements.  The second group are operational recommendations that could 
usefully be taken into account in programming and implementing remaining Phare and 
Transition Facility assistance in Bulgaria.  
 
Strategic recommendations 
 
Recommendation 1: Future programming of assistance should be strategy-based.   
 
123. Assistance should not be started until the relevant national strategy (sectoral or PAJC) is 
in place to provide a secure basis of information about national needs and capacities to enable 
the Commission and the national authorities to set the priority, sequence, balance, content and 
pace of assistance.  The only exception should be comprehensive EU assistance to such 
strategy development and project cycle management throughout the pubic administration 
concerned, centrally and regionally. 
 
124. In planning for assistance, the balance of support to PAJC and other aspects of the 
political criteria and to acquis chapters, and the balance of support across the acquis chapters, 
should take account of the relative difficulty that recent candidates, including Bulgaria, have 
found with the issues concerned.  
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Recommendation 2: The preparation of Multi-annual Indicative Planning Documents for 
the Instrument for Pre-Accession and of national strategies should take full account for 
Lessons Learned from Phare experiences. 
 
125. In order to maximise the value added of MIPD as a needs’ based strategic document, a 
checklist should be prepared by the Commission Services, and used by those responsible for 
programming, of the lessons learned from Bulgaria (and other recent candidates).  Priority 
points are: the need to assess country resources and capacities and adapt the extent and pace of 
programming to absorption capacity, and to progress public administrative and judicial 
capacity reform in step with acquis institution building. Candidates should also be assisted to 
develop their own multi-annual strategies, both for investments and for administrative 
structures and human and financial resources, and this should be an essential pre-condition 
before assistance is given to Structural Funds-type operations.   
 
Recommendation 3: PAJC assistance should be given from the start. 
 
126. From the start of pre-accession assistance, and throughout the pre-accession period, a 
high priority should be afforded to assistance to improve public administrative and judicial 
capacity, throughout the pubic administration concerned, centrally and regionally to avoid the 
pervasive undermining of the sectoral impact of Phare assistance observed in Bulgaria.  
 
Operational recommendations 
 
Recommendation 4:  There should be full involvement of stakeholders in an effectively 
scaled programming process.   
 
127. The prospects for successful assistance depend of those responsible feeling a sense of 
ownership and commitment to the objectives of that assistance.  Programming of Phare 
assistance has been too centrally-driven until recently, resulting in lack of transparency and 
suspicions of bias.  Further efforts should be made to develop an approach to programming 
which is fully inclusive of all the stakeholders including, where appropriate, those at local 
level.  At the same time, the scale of programming should be realistically matched to 
administrative capacity properly to prepare and implement assistance, otherwise the 
shortcomings observed in this evaluation, in terms of lack of programme readiness, overload 
and operational fatigue, and consequent under-performance, will simply be repeated. 
 
Recommendation 5:  There should be greater investment and stronger commitment to 
administrative and judicial reform for the remainder of Phare and Transition Facility 
assistance.   
 
128. This evaluation has clearly demonstrated the pervasive and debilitating consequences of 
weak public administration.  Therefore action needs to be taken to avoid a continuation of the 
current overload of responsibilities that has been placed on many of the staff working in the 
national administration for the remainder of Phare and the Transition Facility period.  Urgent 
attention is needed to determine what can be done to resolve the current backlog and 
pressurised environment that has built up in the public administration.  A specific and 
comprehensive public administrative and judicial capacity strategy and assistance action plan 
should be prepared by the Commission Services and the Bulgarian national authorities 
together, taking account of measures already in hand.   
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Recommendation 6:  Concerted effort needs to be made to address and minimise the 
recurring delays that occur in the contracting and implementation processes.   
 
129. The protracted timescales in the contracting process and other implementation delays 
have become endemic and, in many cases, they have significantly reduced the achievement of 
objectives, impact and sustainability.  Therefore strong commitment and effort should be 
applied by the Commission Services and National authorities, to secure better understanding of 
the critical path of the contracting and implementing periods.  Much more effort should be 
applied to project start-up and pre-contract preparatory activities.  Slack time should be 
managed and document processing deadlines should be strictly enforced to reduce delays and 
to generate and maintain momentum in implementation.  The NAC should encourage 
beneficiaries not to wait for final approval before starting preparation of necessary documents.   
 
Recommendation 7:  More and better training is needed on effective strategic planning.   
 
130. The Commission Services, in agreement with the Bulgarian authorities, should provide 
the resources to develop comprehensive training in strategy development and implementation.   
Greater effort should be made in the remaining period of Phare and Transition Facility 
assistance to embed a strategic planning ethos into the culture and practices for programme 
elaboration and implementation.  This should be applied across the public administration and 
should be disseminated and delivered in the regions as well as in the capital.  For more assured 
sustainability of training effort, support should also be offered to develop the market place 
provision for human resource training to build competences in key areas like policy analysis, 
monitoring and evaluation.  
 
Recommendation 8: Good practice and lessons learned from Phare programming and 
implementation should be more widely applied.   
 
131. The Bulgarian administration should apply the project cycle management approach, in 
particular the needs’ based problem analysis techniques for setting desirable and attainable 
objectives, on a wider basis in its national programmes to optimise the value added of national 
and EU resources.  The prospects for sustainability should be realistically assessed at design 
stage and provisions included in assistance to maximise the probability of sustainability. 
 
132. Much more attention should be paid to setting indicators which relate to the 
achievement of objectives and the attainment of impact which can be used as management 
tools.  Regular, formal assessment of the extent to which agreed indicators are being achieved 
should be built into JMC and SMSC procedures.27   
 
133. Similarly, those with responsibilities for programming should ensure that cost-
effectiveness indicators should be defined before approving investments in infrastructure, and 
they need to be measured after the assistance is completed and the newly built infrastructure 
becomes operational.  Otherwise the only measurement of success is the completion of the 
works per se, which is not an adequate indicator of effective spending of EU or national funds.  
The ‘rate of return’ tool should be more widely used and properly assessed before assistance is 
approved.   
 
                                                 
27  In its comments on the draft of this report, the NAC stated that new templates of Project and Sectoral Monitoring Reports 
which are in force from the XII session of the SMSCs (October-November 2006) contain a special chapter which deals with 
the status of achievement of indicators. 
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Recommendation 9:  Co-ordination between beneficiaries should be further improved; 
especially between those in the national administration and in the Commission Services 
responsible for assistance management.     
 
134. This co-ordination has a major effect on the functioning of Phare assistance through its 
various phases.  The particular elements that could be considered jointly by the Commission 
Services and National authorities (apart from more focused training in PCM methods already 
mentioned) are a better communications mechanism, including use of an intranet between the 
various parties, improved networking between the parties (with more emphasis on ad hoc 
meeting and less on formal correspondence) to resolve routine difficulties more quickly and 
share elements of good practice that can have wider application.  
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Annex 1.  Terms of Reference 
[These terms of reference were approved 29 November 2005 and have not been updated to 
take account of small changes, for example in the time line, that have occurred in the 
meantime.] 
OBJECTIVES 
 
The purpose of the ex post evaluation is to assess the contribution of the 1999 - 2001 Phare 
National and Cross-Border Co-operation (CBC) Programmes to support Bulgaria in meeting 
the Copenhagen criteria so as to facilitate its accession to the European Union.  This evaluation 
will also provide for an interim evaluation of post 2001 allocations up and including 2004 
multi-annual programmes. 
 
The evaluation of Bulgarian national and CBC programmes is one of a series of ten similar 
evaluations in the eight new member states, and in Bulgaria and Romania.  These will feed into 
two consolidated evaluations of Phare national and CBC programmes28, which, in turn, will 
form part of a consolidated ex post evaluation of the Phare programme.   
  
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
 
In accordance with the priorities of the 1999 and 2003 Accession Partnership, the key 
objectives of the Bulgarian National and CBC Programmes in 1999-2001 were to: 
 
• Support public administration reforms, the judicial system, anticorruption measures and 
protection of minorities 
• Support Economic reform including financial intermediation, Small and Medium Sized 
Enterprises and reduction of state aid/simplification of licensing procedures. 
• Enhance the administrative and judicial capacity to implement and enforce legislative 
measures and assume the obligations of EU membership. 
• Improve the strategic planning and effective utilisation of EU funds and prepare for 
Structural Funds (including implementing EDIS 
 
National and CBC programmes provided about M€ 331 during the evaluation period (1999-
2001)29.  Post 2001 allocations until 2004 amounted to M€ 308.  The key sectors of assistance 
were economic and social cohesion, public administration, including adoption of the acquis 
and justice and home affairs/civil society.  CBC projects represented 26% of the funding. 
The 2004 Regular Report30 stated that the overall impact of Phare in Bulgaria continued to be 
positive, although that in view of the target date for accession, further sustained effort was 
needed to ensure the capacity of the Bulgarian administration to absorb EC funds.  Whilst 
tangible progress was made in public administration reform with the adoption of amendments 
to the Civil service law, the Regular Report noted that attention should also be given to the 
                                                 
28   For (i) eight new member states, and (ii)  Bulgaria/ Romania.  
29  See Annex 1 for details.  The programmes to be evaluated include the so called Other Financing Memoranda, which were 
implemented by national authorities and subject to previous interim evaluation, but excludes Community and nuclear safety 
programmes.  Bulgaria benefited from Phare-funded multi-beneficiary programmes, such as TAIEX and  SIGMA, which 
are also outside the scope of this evaluation.  
30  European Commission: 2004 Regular Report on Bulgaria’s Progress Towards Accession. 
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legal framework for local and regional administration, which will play an important role in the 
implementation of the acquis.  Moreover the report noted that Bulgaria has implemented 
several measures in the fight against corruption, but it remains a problem.  Finally, the report 
noted that efforts have been made in the past years to develop a framework to tackle the 
problems faced by minorities, but the situation on the ground has not evolved much.   
 
Bulgarian national programmes have been subject to regular interim evaluations (IE).  A 
Country Phare Evaluation Review31 (CPER) pointed to good progress having been made in the 
harmonisation of Bulgarian legislation with the acquis, although the effective implementation 
of harmonised legislation appeared, generally, to be some way off.  Institution building 
projects had had limited success due to their lack of relevance to the existing commitment and 
absorption capacity of beneficiary institutions.  The efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability 
of much Phare assistance was negatively affected by continuing high rates of staff turnover in 
key Phare implementation structures.  Whilst Phare assistance was expected to have a positive 
impact in the long term, it was not possible to assess, at the time of the CEPR, the extent to 
which the achievement of wider objectives could be attributed to Phare or other factors.   
 
EVALUATION QUESTIONS 
 
This evaluation will focus on the following three interrelated sets of key questions:  
• Was Phare well focused on the objectives of pre-accession strategy? 
• What were the results and impacts and are these results and impacts sustainable? 
• Could the same results and impacts have been achieved more cost–effectively? 
 
These framework questions will be further specified by the performance evaluation questions 
and thematic/crosscutting questions set out below.  It should be noted that the issues and 
findings that are highlighted under the respective questions are not necessarily exhaustive. 
 
Performance evaluation questions 
 
Needs assessment and design 
 
The Interim Evaluation findings have highlighted the importance of the project programming 
and design processes to ensure that modifications, extensions and delays to projects are 
minimised.  The evaluation will focus on the extent to which the objective/strategy of the 
national programmes addressed identified needs and the involvement of the stakeholders in the 
design (ownership). 
 
The extent to which inputs/ activities have produced outputs 
 
Interim Evaluation findings have shown that management and implementation of Phare 
projects have been poor; with poor management and utilisation of preparatory assistance and 
lack of co-ordination between line Ministries leading to a lack of project co-ordination and 
delays.  As part of the examining the extent to which inputs have influenced the delivery of and 
produced outputs.  It will identify critical points in the project time tables and examine 
performance across implementation agencies. 
 
                                                 
31  EMS Consortium: CPER, Bulgaria 18 November 2003. 
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The extent to which outputs have produced intended results 
 
Interim evaluation findings have found that effectiveness has generally been poor largely as a 
consequence of poor design and weak project management; although a lack of beneficiary 
commitment and absorption capacity were also contributory factors.  The best effects were 
seen in relation to Justice and Home Affairs projects and the worst in economic development. 
 
The evaluation will assess the extent to which intended results were achieved by applying 
judgement criteria such as the clarity of national/ sector strategies and related action plans, 
adequate investment in equipment and infrastructure, adequate institutional capacity building 
and know-how absorption. 
  
The extent to which the results contributed to the achievement of objectives 
 
Whilst impact in the JHA sector was consistently rated above average in Interim Evaluations, 
in other sectors, impact was generally rated lower either due to the lack of effectiveness of 
projects or due to the lack of commitment or capacity to utilise the results of the assistance 
given. 
 
Long term viability of institutional reforms following the withdrawal of Phare support 
 
Institution building and know how transfer is frequently unsustainable.  Interim evaluations 
have stated that civil service legislation is often easily circumvented and that is potentially the 
single most important factor influencing the lack of sustainability of Phare capacity building or 
know-how transfer support. 
 
Thematic/cross-cutting criteria 
 
The extent to which Phare support improved the performance of the Bulgarian pre-
accession process 
 
The purpose of this question is to assess whether Phare support in practice addressed the ex 
post needs of the Bulgarian beneficiaries.  Thus the evaluation will seek to assess whether the 
original objectives (ex ante needs) of the programme were appropriately set.  This assessment 
would augment the analysis based on the five performance evaluation criteria. 
 
The 2005 Comprehensive Monitoring Report32 also provides an indication of ex post needs 
including enhanced efforts to improve the functioning of the justice system, protection of 
minorities, business environment, food safety and in fighting corruption and organised crime. 
 
The extent to which Phare support strengthened the administrative and judicial capacity 
of Bulgaria  
The examination of the Phare contribution to the public administrative and judicial capacity 
(PAJC) of the Bulgarian beneficiary administrations will fall into two parts: 
• Acquis-specific administrative capacity issues, where the nature of the component 
concerned explicitly demands, often in some detail, a particular capacity of PAJC 
performance, and 
                                                 
32  European Commission: 2005 Comprehensive Monitoring Report. 
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• Horizontal PAJC issues, which are non-sector specific but are needed to meet the 
requirements of the first Copenhagen criterion – the ‘Political Criteria’33. 
 
The 2004 Consolidated Interim Evaluation Report covering all candidate countries, concluded 
that in general, Phare support in this area had been hampered by – inter alia – the absence of a 
comprehensive strategy, poor coordination of relevant instruments of assistance and limited 
progress on horizontal public administrative reforms and governance.   
  
The extent to which Phare contributed to the strengthening of ESC and to the 
preparation for the use of Structural Funds 
 
Both Regular Report 2004 and the Interim Evaluation findings have noted that further efforts 
are still required to improve the administrative capacity in key ministries and improving the 
capacity of other relevant bodies such as intermediate bodies and other relevant players at 
central and regional level as well as to further improving the financial management and control 
systems. 
 
Building capacity to coordinate and deliver pre accession aid 
 
A separate Interim Evaluation report on the Aid coordination structures in Bulgaria34 concluded 
that the NAC performance improved since the function was moved to the Ministry of Finance 
Management of European funds Directorate.  However that Directorate faced urgent challenges 
given its parallel responsibilities for co-ordinating both pre-accession assistance and 
preparations for structural and cohesion funds and the fact that none of its staff had prior 
experience with Phare. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Because the ex post evaluation exercise has to meet not only accountability requirements (the 
five evaluation criteria), but also the requirements of being useful for operational decision 
making, and because of the critical position of Bulgaria and Romania in relation to accession, 
the evaluation of their national programmes will be in-depth, and will include not only a 
retrospective assessment (the ex post evaluation of the 1999 – 2001 programmes) but also an 
interim evaluation of post 2001 allocations.  The evaluation will also provide lessons learned 
for new candidate countries. 
 
The complete infrastructure for the management of Phare is still in place in Bulgaria, and the 
evaluation is expected to have full access to officials at the EC Delegation and at the National 
Aid Co-ordinator (NAC).  The evaluation will draw on the contents of all documentation 
supplied by the Commission Services and the Bulgarian NAC.  Following a desk study 
analysis, the evaluation team will undertake fieldwork in country.  The analysis of 
documentation will be accompanied by structured interviews, carried out both in country and at 
the Commission Services Headquarters, following a sampling approach of the 1999-2001 and 
post 2001 allocations (see Annex 1).  Other proven data collection tools such as surveys and 
questionnaires may also be used.  The performance evaluation questions have been structured 
                                                 
33  As emphasised in the 2000 Phare Review communication, these would involve general public administration reforms 
including civil service reforms, inter-ministerial coordination and anti- corruption programmes. The requirements of 
strengthening and reforming the administrative and judicial capacities were stressed in the Madrid, Luxembourg, Feira and 
Gothenburg Councils. 
34  Report R/BG/NAC/03.068 prepared by the EMS Consortium, issued September 2003 
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in line with the five standard evaluation criteria: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact 
and sustainability.  To support the evaluation questions, a set of judgement criteria and 
indicators will be developed.  These may be both quantitative and/or qualitative.   
 
There will be close consultation with stakeholders (either by electronic mail or by meetings, 
where appropriate).  For this purpose, the Bulgarian NAC has nominated a representative to 
ensure that the evaluation will be carried out in partnership, including arrangements for 
establishing a steering group. 
 
REPORTING AND TARGET AUDIENCES 
 
At the conclusion of the fieldwork, a draft evaluation report will be produced and circulated for 
comments.  The evaluation report will contain an introduction (objectives, background and 
context), performance of Phare assistance (responses to the performance evaluation criteria), 
thematic/cross-cutting findings, and conclusions and lessons learned.  (See Annex 2) 
 
The main users of the evaluation will be the ELARG Bulgaria Country Team and relevant line 
DGs.  In Bulgaria, the main evaluation users will include the NACs and the relevant 
implementing authorities.  Moreover, users will include relevant stakeholders responsible for 
the Western Balkans and Turkey.   
 
 
ACTIVITIES, RESOURCES AND TIMETABLE 
The evaluation of the Bulgarian national programmes will be conducted in a number of stages 
as follows. 
 
2005 Step Activity 
Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan  Feb 
1 Preparation         
2 Info gathering and processing         
3 Drafting of report         
4 Comments from E4 and national authorities        
5 Drafting of final Bulgarian report and submission 
to Consolidated National Programme Report 
        
 
The evaluation will be carried out be a team consisting of the deputy project director, a key 
expert, other senior and junior experts, and short-term technical specialists (STTS), both 
international and local.  The total resources envelope available for this in-depth exercise 
amounts to 85 man-days. 
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Annex 2.  Phare National and CBC Programme Data for Bulgaria 1999-2004 
 
Progr.  
Number 
Programme Title Expiry Date
Contracting 
Expiry Date 
Disbursement 
Allocated 
(M€) 
1999 National    
BG9907 
Integration of the Roma: Promoting the 
Integration of the Roma 31/12/01 31/12/02 0.500 
BG9908-01 Management Training 31/12/01 31/12/02 2.000 
BG9908-02 Capacity Building SME 31/12/01 31/12/02 2.800 
BG9909-01 Training for Public Administration 31/12/01 31/12/02 1.500 
BG9909-02 Medium Term Strategy for Ministry of Finance 31/12/01 31/12/02 3.000 
BG9910 Further Integration into the Internal Market 31/12/01 31/12/02 2.000 
BG9911 Justice/Home affairs 31/12/01 31/12/02 9.500 
BG9912 IB for MoEW 31/12/01 31/12/02 2.600 
BG9912 IB and Investment projects for MoEW 31/12/01 31/12/02 2.300 
BG9913 IB for MAF 31/12/01 31/12/02 2.027 
BG9913 IB for MAF 31/12/01 31/12/02 8.244 
BG9914 Beautiful Bulgaria II 31/12/01 31/12/02 4.591 
 CBC    
BG9904 CBC Bulgaria/Greece 31/12/01 31/12/02 25.207 
BG9916 CBC Bulgaria/Romania 31/12/01 31/12/02 5.059 
 Other FMs    
BG9903 LSIF part 4 31/05/00 31/05/01 2.699 
BG9906 LSIF part 5 31/12/00 31/12/03 23.000 
BG9915-01 Pre-Ins Facility - Steel and Mining 31/12/01 31/12/02 12.067 
BG9915-02 Pre-Ins Facility - Foreign Direct Investment Attraction 31/12/01 31/12/02 2.000 
BG9918 Consensus III 31/12/01 31/12/02 1.880 
BG9919 Project Preparation Facility 31/12/01 31/12/02 2.500 
BG9920 Participation of  5th RTD 30/12/01 30/12/02 1.310 
Total 1999    116.784 
 
2000 National    
BG0002  Economic Reform35 31/12/02 31/12/03 4.000 
BG0003 Adoption of the acquis & Strengthening the Regulatory Framework36 31/12/02 31/12/03 15.400 
BG0004 Economic & Social Cohesion37 31/12/02 31/12/03 15.000 
BG0005 Strengthening the Rule of Law and Protection of Vulnerable Groups 31/12/02 31/12/03 16.500 
BG0006 Public Finance & Management of EU Funds38 31/12/02 31/12/03 13.320 
 CBC    
BG0007 CBC Bulgaria/Romania39 31/12/02 31/12/03 8.000 
BG0008 CBC Bulgaria/Greece40 31/12/02 31/12/06 20.183 
 Other FMs    
BG0001  
Participation of Bulgaria in the 5th RTD 
Framework Programme and in the Community 
programmes Leonardo da Vinci II, Socrates II 
and Youth 2000 
31/12/00 30/06/01 8.797 
                                                 
35  Addendum signed.  The expiry disbursement date for BG0002.03 is 31/12/04. 
36  Addenda signed.  The expiry disbursement date for BG0003.01, BG0003.05.01, BG0003.05.02, and BG0003.05.03 is 
30/11/04. 
37  Addenda signed.  The expiry contracting date for BG0004.01 and BG0004.02 31/12/03 and the expiry disbursement date is 
31/12/05.  The expiry contracting date for BG0004.04 is 31/12/03 and its expiry disbursement date is 30/06/05. 
38  Addendum signed.  The expiry contracting date for BG0006.04.02 is 31/12/03 and its expiry disbursement date is 30/06/05. 
39 Addendum signed.  The expiry disbursement date for BG0007.03.01 is 30/06/04. 
40  Addendum signed. 
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BG0009-02 Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Plant 31/12/02 31/12/03 1.850 
BG0010 
Special Programme for Strengthening the Civil 
Society and preparing for accession of the ten 
candidate countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe / Access 2000 
30/11/02 30/11/03 2.000 
BG0011 
Participation of Bulgaria in the Community 
Programmes: Small and Medium Sized 
Enterprises, SAV II, Media II, Prevention of 
Aids in 2000 
30/06/01 31/12/01 0.706 
BG0012 Supplementary Investment Facility for Bulgaria 2000 30/11/02 
30/11/04*****
* 9.400 
BG0013 
Participation of Bulgaria in the 5th RTD 
Framework Programme and in the Community 
programmes Leonardo da Vinci, Socrates  
31/12/01 31/12/02 9.131 
Total 2000    124.288 
 
 
2001 National    
BG0101  Economic Reform and the acquis 30/11/03 30/11/04 8.195 
BG0102 Economic & Social Cohesion41 30/11/03 30/11/04* 37.113 
BG0103 Strengthening Public Administration 30/11/03 30/11/04 14.875 
BG0104 Ethnic Integration and Civil Society42 30/11/03 30/11/04** 6.550 
BG0105 Project Preparation, Twinning Light and EC Programmes 30/11/03 30/11/04 3.500 
BG0105.03 Participation in EC Programmes and Agencies 30/11/03 30/11/04 9.590 
 CBC    
BG0106 CBC Bulgaria/Greece43 30/11/03 30/11/04 20.000 
BG0107 CBC Bulgaria/Romania44 30/11/03 30/11/04 8.000 
 Other FMs    
BG0110 
Horizontal programme for Community support 
in the field of Nuclear Safety for 2001 for 
Bulgaria 
  4.500 
Total 2001    112.323 
 
Total 1999 to 2001    353.395 
 
                                                 
41  The expiry disbursement date for BG0102.04 is 30/11/05.  Addendum signed: the expiry disbursement date for BG0102.01, 
BG0102.02, BG0102.03, BG0102.05, and BG0102.06 is 30/11/05. 
42  Addendum signed: the expiry disbursement date for BG0104.04 is 30/11/05. 
43  Addenda signed.  The expiry contracting date for BG0106.01 is 30/11/04 and its disbursement date is 30/11/08.  The expiry 
disbursement date for BG0106.04 is 31/07/05.  The expiry disbursement date for BG0106.06.01 and BG0106.06.02 is 
30/06/07. 
44  The expiry disbursement date for BG0107.01 and BG0107.02 is 30/11/05.  Addenda signed: the disbursement date for 
BG0107.01 is 31/12/06, and for BG0107.02 is 31/05/06. 
Bulgaria  Annex 2 
Ex post evaluation of Phare: National & CBC Programmes - Bulgaria - November 2007, MWH Consortium  42
 
2002 National    
BG0201  Economic Reform and the acquis45,46 30/11/04 30/11/05 23.600 
BG0202 Economic & Social Cohesion44 30/11/04 30/11/05 14.000 
BG0203 Strengthening Public Administration44,47 30/11/04*** 30/11/05 36.400 
BG0204 Ethnic Integration and Civil Society44 30/11/04 30/11/05 8.000 
BG0205 Project Preparation, Twinning Light and EC Programmes 30/11/04 30/11/05 3.620 
BG0205.03 Participation in EC Programmes and Agencies 30/11/04 30/11/05 9.400 
 CBC    
2002/000-624 CBC Bulgaria/Greece 30/11/04 30/11/05* 20.000 
2002/000-623 CBC Bulgaria/Romania 30/11/04 30/11/05* 8.000 
 Other FMs    
2002/000-585 
Horizontal Programme preparing 
candidate countries for EDIS in the 
management of pre-accession funds 
in Bulgaria 
31/10/04 31/10/05 0.800 
2002/000-632.01 
Horizontal Programme for 
Community support in the field of 
Nuclear Safety for 2002 for Bulgaria 
30/11/04 30/11/05* 1.960 
ZZ9916 BG/TS/15 
Enhancement of Safety assessment 
capabilities of the Bulgarian Nuclear 
Safety Authority 
  1.400 
Total 2002    127.180 
 
 
                                                 
45  The expiry disbursement date for BG0201.02, BG0201.12, BG0202.01, BG0202.02, BG0202.03, BG0203.11, BG0204.01, 
BG0204.02, 2002/000-624.01, 2002/000-624.02, 2002/000-624.03, 2002/000-623.01, 2002/000-623.02, and 2002/000-
632.01.01 is 30/11/06.  Addendum signed: the expiry disbursement date for BG0201.04, BG0201.11, and BG0203.13 is 
30/11/06, and the disbursement date for BG0203.08 is 30/08/06. 
46 Addendum signed: the expiry contracting date for BG0201.04 and BG0201.12 is 16/07/05. 
47 Addendum signed: the expiry contracting date for BG0203.03 is 31/01/2005. 
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2003 National    
BG2003/004-937.01 Political criteria48 30/11/05 30/11/06 9.070 
BG2003/004-937.02 Internal market and Economic criteria 30/11/05 30/11/06 7.950 
BG2003/004-937.03 Agriculture47 30/11/05 30/11/06 5.606 
BG2003/004-937.04 Transport 30/11/05 30/11/06 4.222 
BG2003/004-937.05 Employment, Social policy and Education47 30/11/05 30/11/06 7.000 
BG2003/004-937.06 Energy 30/11/05 30/11/06 4.200 
BG2003/004-937.07 Environment 30/11/05 30/11/06 2.075 
BG2003/004-937.08 Justice and Home Affairs 30/11/05 30/11/06 13.850 
BG2003/004-937.09 Customs and Finance 30/11/05 30/11/06 7.708 
BG2003/004-937.10 Administrative Reform and capacity 30/11/05 30/11/06 10.012 
BG2003/004-937.11 Economic and Social cohesion47 30/11/05 30/11/06 11.260 
BG2003/004-937.12.02 Other programmes 30/11/05 30/11/06 1.938 
BG2003/004-937.12.01 Participation in EC Programmes and Agencies 30/11/05 30/11/06 10.009 
 CBC    
2003/005-630 CBC Bulgaria/Greece47 30/11/05 30/11/06 20.000 
2003/005-631 CBC Bulgaria/Romania47 30/11/05 30/11/06 8.000 
2003/005-632 2003 Phare External Border Initiative Programme in Bulgaria47 30/11/05 30/11/06 4.120 
 Other FMs    
2003/005-812.01 
Programme for Community support 
in the field of Nuclear Safety for 
2003 for Bulgaria 
30/11/05 30/11/06 1.037 
2003/005-867.02 
Assistance to Bulgarian NRA in the 
development of requirements and 
procedures for decommissioning of 
Kozloduy Units 1 and 2, follow-up 
30/11/05 30/11/07 1.900 
Total 2003    129.957 
**Extension of disbursement and/or contracting periods of 11 projects of the National Programme were agreed. 
 
                                                 
48  The expiry disbursement date for BG2003/004-937.01.02, BG2003/004-937.01.03, BG2003/004-937.01.04, BG2003/004-
937.03.03, BG2003/004-937.05.01, BG2003/004-937.11.01, BG2003/004-937.11.02, BG2003/004-937.11.03, 2003/005-
630.02, 2003/005-630.03, 2003/005-631.01, and 2003/005-632.01 is 30/11/07.  Addendum signed: the expiry disbursement 
date for 2003/005-631.01 is 30/11/08, and the disbursement date for 2003/005-632.01 is 30/04/09. 
Bulgaria  Annex 2 
Ex post evaluation of Phare: National & CBC Programmes - Bulgaria - November 2007, MWH Consortium  44
2004 National (Part I)    
BG2004/006-070.01 Employment, Social policy and Education 30/11/06 30/11/07 2.425 
BG2004/006-070.02 Energy 30/11/06 30/11/07 1.000 
BG2004/006-070.03 Justice and Home affairs 30/11/06 30/11/07 6.950 
BG2004/006-070.04 Customs and Finance 30/11/06 30/11/07 0.397 
BG2004/006-070.05 Economic and Social cohesion  30/11/06 30/11/07* 2.200 
 National (Part II)    
BG2004/016-711.01 Political criteria 30/11/06 30/11/07* 16.650 
BG2004/016-711.02 Internal market and Economic criteria 30/11/06 30/11/07 3.853 
BG2004/016-711.03 Agriculture 30/11/06 30/11/07* 10.989 
BG2004/016-711.04 Transport 30/11/06 30/11/07 0.900 
BG2004/016-711.05 Employment, Social policy and education 30/11/06 30/11/07 3.450 
BG2004/016-711.06 Energy 30/11/06 30/11/07 1.500 
BG2004/016-711.07 Environment 30/11/06 30/11/07 8.228 
BG2004/016-711.08 Justice and Home affairs 30/11/06 30/11/07 24.512 
BG2004/016-711.09 Customs and Finance 30/11/06 30/11/07 19.801 
BG2004/016-711.10 Administrative reform and capacity 30/11/06 30/11/07 15.802 
BG2004/016-711.11 Economic and Social cohesion 30/11/06 30/11/07* 26.127 
BG2004/016-711.12 Phare project preparation facility 30/11/06 30/11/07 2.000 
BG2004/016-711.12.01 Participation in EC programmes 30/11/06 30/11/07 10.516 
 National (Part III)    
BG2004/016-919.01 Political criteria 30/11/06 30/11/07 4.300 
BG2004/016-919.02 Justice and Home affairs 30/11/06 30/11/07 1.800 
BG2004/016-919.03 Customs and Finance 30/11/06 30/11/07 0.900 
BG2004/016-919.04 Administrative reform and capacity 30/11/06 30/11/07 6.425 
BG2004/016-919.05 Economic and Social cohesion 30/11/06 30/11/07 1.800 
 CBC    
BG2004/016-715 CBC Bulgaria/Turkey 30/11/06 30/11/07* 3.000 
BG2004/016-782 CBC Bulgaria/Greece 30/11/06 30/11/07* 20.000 
BG2004/016-783 CBC Bulgaria/Romania 30/11/06 30/11/07* 8.000 
BG2004/016-785 CBC Bulgaria/Serbia & Montenegro 30/11/06 30/11/07 3.000 
BG2004/016-786 CBC Bulgaria/Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 30/11/06 30/11/07 2.000 
 Other FMs    
BG2004/016815.01 
Programme for Community support 
in the field of Nuclear Safety for 
Bulgaria 
30/11/06 30/11/07 6.270 
Total 2004    214.795 
*The expiry disbursement date for BG2004/016-715.01, BG2004/016-782.01.01 is 30/11/09, the disbursement date for 
BG2004/006-070.05.01, BG2004/016-711.01.01, BG2004/016-711.01.02, BG2004/016-711.01.03, BG2004/016-711.03.01, 
BG2004/016-711.11.01, BG2004/016-711.11.03, BG2004/016-711.11.04, BG2004/016-919.05.01 and BG2004/016-783.01.01 
is 30/11/08.   
 
Total 1999 
to 2004    825.327 
Allocations data provided by the National Fund. 
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Annex 3.  Evaluation Planning Summary Sheet 
Phase (1, 2 or 3) 2 – National & CBC Subject BULGARIA 
Level of Evaluation (‘sample’ or ‘in depth’) In-depth 
Evaluation 
Conclusions 
A three point scoring system (S, BS, U) will be applied in reaching conclusions on 
effectiveness and impact of the sectors Agriculture, CBC, ESC, Energy and 
Transport, Environment, Internal Market, JHA, and Social Affairs.  The results will 
be presented at sector level in the consolidated report.  No scoring will be applied to 
the thematic/cross-cutting questions.   
Evaluation questions Performance criteria 
1. Needs assessment and design 
2. Extent to which inputs/activities have produced outputs 
3. Extent to which outputs have produced intended results 
4. Extent to which the results contributed to the achievement of objectives 
5. Long term viability of institutional reforms following the withdrawal of Phare 
support 
Thematic/Cross-cutting questions 
6. Extent to which Phare support improved the performance of the Bulgarian 
beneficiaries 
7. Extent to which Phare support strengthened the administrative and judicial 
capacity of Bulgaria 
8. Extent to which Phare contributed to the strengthening of ESC and to the 
preparation for the use of Structural Funds 
9. Building capacity to co-ordinate and deliver pre-accession aid 
Sampling The sample projects in Table 1 have been selected in consultation with the country 
steering group49 to be representative of the sectors and thematic areas defined for 
this ex post evaluation.  As envisaged in the ToR, there are 18 post-2001 projects 
(value M€ 66) in addition to 17 projects from the period 1999-2001 (value M€ 80). 
Sources of evidence The primary sources of evidence are desk review and interviews.  A questionnaire 
may be developed for horizontal aspects of the evaluation and to support the 
interview structure.  Some on-site visits may be made.   
Interviews 
 Commission staff 
Current Bulgaria desk staff in DG Elarg 
Senior ECD Officials 
ECD Task Managers covering the relevant sectors in Sofia 
 Beneficiary staff50 The Central Actors – NAC, CFCU, National Fund, MEI, MPF, SMSC chairs PIU officials responsible for the projects selected, including CBC 
Direct beneficiaries  
 Other stakeholders Involved line DGs (such as DG REGIO for ESC, and DG AGRI for SAPARD) and 
relevant national parties.   
Supporting documents Table 1.  (attached) - Proposed project samples with key contact persons 
Table 2.  (attached) - Primary Sources of Evidence  
Table 3.  (attached) - Evaluation Indicators  
Table 4.  (working document) - List of identified reports for desk review  
All attached tables are of an indicative nature 
                                                 
49  This includes the Evaluation Unit of DG ELARG; nominated representative(s) from the NAC and the EC Delegation. 
50  Other beneficiaries and stakeholders may be identified during fieldwork (for example from private entities, NGOs, etc.).  
The External Interim Evaluation Contractor contracted to DG Elarg Evaluation Unit will also be interviewed to ensure that 
there is no duplication of effort. 
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Table 1.  Proposed sample programmes and contact persons 
SMSC/ Sector Project No. Project title Allocation (M€) 
Agriculture BG-0103.08 Improving the quality of agricultural statistics 2.00 
Agriculture BG-9913 Development of the administrative capacity to adopt and implement the acquis in the 
agricultural sector 
10.63 
Total sample (62%) 12.63 
Total for the sector in the period 1999-2001 20.33 
Agriculture BG-0201.05 Improvement in phytosanitary control 1.10 
Agriculture BG0201.09 Enhancement of consumer health protection 1.00 
Total sample 2002-2004 (11%) 2.10 
Total for the sector in the period 2002-2004 18.72 
 
BC 
Cross Border Cooperation BG-0107 CBC BG-RO Construction of a crossing border check points in Silistra 2.60 
Total sample (5%) 2.60 
Total for the sector in the period 1999-2001 53.05 
Cross Border Cooperation 2002/000-624 Rehabilitation and Partial Reconstruction of Road II-19 "Razlog-Bansko - Gotse Deltchev - 
Sadovo" 
9.30 
Cross Border Cooperation 2002/0000624005 Small projects Bulgaria – Greece 0.85 
Total sample 2002-2004 (39%) 10.15 
Total for the sector in the period 2002-2004 32.78 
 
Energy and transport 
Transport BG-0106.01 Rehabilitation and partial reconstruction of Road II-19 6.95 
Transport BG-0012.01 Vessel traffic management information system 3.40 
Total sample (7%) 10.35 
Total for the sector in the period 1999-2001 146.37 
Energy 2003/004/937/06/03 Strengthening of the Bulgarian Energy Regulator  1.00 
Total sample 2002-2004 (2%) 1.00 
Total for the sector in the period 2002-2004 45.89 
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Environment 
Environment BG-9906  LSIF Part V    23.00    
Environment BG-0003.06  Environment acquis and institution building      5.35    
Total sample (29%) 28.35 
Total for the sector in the period 1999-2001 68.31 
Environment BG-0201.11 Integrated management planning and admin capacity for protected wetland areas 2.92 
Total sample 2002-2003 (14%) 2.92 
Total for the sector in the period 2002-2003 21.43 
 
Internal market 
Internal Market BG-0002.01 Strengthening the capacity of the Ministry of Economy      2.00    
Internal Market BG-0003.03 Support in the implementation of the reform in the Public Procurement System      1.30    
Total sample (31%) 3.30 
Total for the sector in the period 1999-2001 10.75 
Internal Market BG-0203.08 Development of Customs standards and practices      2.70    
Internal Market BG-0201.12 Strengthening the national conformity assessment system      4.90    
Total sample 2002-2004 (17%) 7.60 
Total for the sector in the period 2002-2004 44.16 
 
Social Affairs 
Social Affairs BG-9914  Employment and social affairs. Beautiful Bulgaria II: temporary employment and vocational 
training 
     4.62    
Social Affairs BG-0102.05  Labour Market initiatives      6.30    
Civil Society BG-0010 Access programme      2.00    
Total sample (14%) 12.92 
Total for the sector in the period 1999-2001 94.81 
Social Affairs BG-0203.05 TA to implement key measures of the Programme for the Implementation of the National Anti-
Corruption Strategy 
     1.00    
Social Affairs BG-0202.03  Lifelong learning and vocational education and training      4.00    
Social Affairs BG-2004/016-
711.01.03 
Improvement of the situation and inclusion of the disadvantaged ethnic minorities with a special 
focus on Roma 
9.00 
Total sample 2002-2004 (13%) 14.00 
Total for the sector in the period 2002-2004 108.62 
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JHA 
JHA BG-0006.01  Strengthening Public Internal Financial Control       2.00    
JHA BG-0005.01  Strengthening the public prosecutor’s office      3.00    
JHA BG-0103.07  Combating money laundering      1.20    
Total sample (13%) 6.20 
Total for the sector in the period 1999-2001 46.51 
JHA BG 0203/01 Implementation of the strategy for reform of the Judiciary in Bulgaria 9.30 
JHA BG 0203/04 Improvement of administrative justice in view of the fight against corruption 0.80 
JHA BG 2004/016-
711/08/01 
Support for further implementation of the strategy for reform of Bulgarian Judiciary 6.70 
Total sample (40%) 16.80 
Total for the sector in the period 2002-2004 42.01 
 
Others 
PAD BG-0103.02 Implementing civil service reform      2.40    
PAD BG-0103.01 Strategic policy-making and co-ordination       2.00    
Total sample 1999-2001 4.40 
EC-DEV BG-0202.02 Development of Bulgarian Eco-tourism      4.00    
EC-DEV BG-0201.01 Strengthening the administrative capacity of Bulgarian Trade Promotion Agency      1.50    
PAD BG-0203.07 Strengthening Human Resource Capacity in the Bulgarian Public Administration      2.00    
PAD BG-2004/016-
711/09/04 
Strengthening the institutional capacity of the Ministry of Finance 4.16 
Total sample 2002-2004  11.66 
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Primary Sources of Evidence 
The potential sources of evidence to answer the evaluation questions are desk review, questionnaire, analysis (e.g. of a database), and interviews.  For each evaluation question, 
a three-point weighting score is used to indicate for each source whether it is dominant (●●●) i.e. a major dependency on information from one source, not dominant (●●) 
where several sources are expected to support each other (i.e. provide good triangulation), or minor (●) where difficulty is expected in accessing data or the question is 
predominantly qualitative.  This is a planning tool and will be updated in the course of the fieldwork where new information sources become known, or a significant change in 
approach is required.  It is a support document to the Evaluation Plan, which contains Table 1, the proposed sample programmes and contact persons. 
 
Table 2. Primary Sources of Evidence - Performance Evaluation Questions for the National and CBC Phare Programmes 
Interviews 
Evaluation Questions Desk Review Questionnaire Analysis Commission Beneficiaries Stake-holders 
1. Needs assessment and design 
1.1. Adequacy of strategies ●●  ●●  ●● ●● 
1.2. Involvement of stakeholders in line DGs and beneficiary countries in the design  ●●  ●● ●● ●● 
2. Extent to which inputs/activities have produced outputs 
2.1. What are the outputs - institution building projects; - regulatory investment projects; - investment 
projects? 
●●  ●●  ●●  
2.2. What were the tools/activities/resources used to produce the outputs? ●●  ●●  ●●  
2.3. Were there resources/tools provided that were under-used or not used?   ●●  ●●  
2.4. Was the use and the relative importance of the tools provided appropriate? ●●   ●● ●●  
2.5. How cost effective was the production of outputs in relative terms?   ●●●  ●  
3. Extent to which outputs have produced intended results 
3.1. What were the improvements in legislative/administrative structures, systems and resources? ●● ●●  ●●   
3.2. Did the legislative/administrative and judicial performance related to the political criteria improve?  ●● ●● ●● ●● ●● 
3.3.  Did the legislative/administrative performance related to the economic criteria improve?  ●●  ●●  
3.4.  Did the leg/adm performance related to the ability to take on the obligations of the acquis improve?  ●● ●● ●● ●●  
3.5. Have the installed Phare equipment/ works/ grant schemes been usefully put into operation? ●●   ●●  
4. Extent to which results/impacts contributed to achieving wider objectives 
4.1. To what extent can the legislative and admin. impacts at programme level be separated and measured?   ●● ●● ●● ●● 
4.2. To what extent can the socio-economic impacts at programme level be separated and measured?   ●●  ●● ●● 
4.3. Examine likely leg/adm/soc-econ impacts on the basis of the extent to which pre-conditions are in place ●●  ●●  ●● ●● 
5. Long term viability of institutional reforms following the withdrawal of Phare support 
5.1. Have the legal, administrative and organisational outputs been sustained?  ●●   ●●  
5.2. To what extent has the trained staff in the national administrations been stable?  ●●   ●●  
5.3. Are the pre-conditions for sustainability in place or being put in place?     ●● ●● 
6. Extent to which Phare support improved the performance of the country’s pre-accession process 
6.1. Did the national and CBC programmes address ex-post needs?  ●●   ●●  
7.  Extent to which Phare support strengthened the administrative and judicial capacity of the country 
7.1. Development of a strategic approach for Phare support to building PAJC ●●  ●● ●● ●● ●● 
7.2. Development of national PAJC strategies to underpin Phare programme prioritisation ●●  ●● ●● ●● ●● 
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7.3. BG/RO ONLY: MAP as a strategic framework of support to Phare programming?  ●●  ● ●  
7.4. BG/RO ONLY:  Relevance of the experience of the new MS    ●● ●● ●● 
7.5. Adequacy of Phare support to horizontal reforms and governance  ●●  ●● ●● ●● ●● 
7.6. Adequacy of Phare support to cover the acquis    ●●  ●● ●● 
7.7. Adequacy of Phare support to develop regional and local PAJC   ●●  ●● ●● 
7.8. Efficiency, effectiveness, deployment and co-ordination of  instruments  (TAIEX, Twinning, Sigma, 
Technical Assistance, other related investments) 
●● ●● ●● ●● ●● ●● 
7.9. Prospects for promoting and supporting a government initiative for a systematic benchmarking 
approach to public administration reforms 
  ●●  ●● ●● 
7.10. Sustainability of post accession PAJC (related to, for example, scaling down of Phare support and 
financial/human resource constraints) 
  ●  ●● ●● 
8.  Extent to which Phare contributed to strengthening ESC and preparation for Structural Funds 
8.1. To what extent has Phare been successful in preparing the country to support ESC after accession, by 
assisting the country to put in place the pre-conditions for sustainable recourse to the SF? What are the 
factors underlying the observed performance? 
●●  ●● ●● ●●  
8.2. What Commission and national policies have been used to direct the course of preparations in the 
country? 
   ●● ●●  
8.3. What lessons can be learned from the planning/programming process of Phare ESC assistance?       
8.4. What lessons can be learned from the Phare funded ESC pilot investments in the country? Did they 
have immediate impact and did they contribute to wider socio-economic cohesion objectives? 
  ● ● ●●●  
8.5. What institutional arrangements have the national authorities put in place over time to plan, 
co-ordinate, and manage operations? 
●● ●●  ●● ●●  
8.6. To what extent has Phare institution building been successful in supporting the country in its 
preparation for SF implementation? 
●●  ●● ●● ●●  
8.7. Has there been any acceleration in the pre-accession performance of ESC programmes since the 
beginning of the support to ESC in the country? 
●● ●●     
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Annex 4.  Evaluation Indicators 
The evaluation indicators are a wider concept than “performance indicators”, and identify static and dynamic 
information and events for use in the evaluation.  They are divided into three categories, discrete, where there are 
only two possible states (e.g.  present/absent), relative, where more than two states are possible (e.g.  satisfactory, 
barely satisfactory and unsatisfactory), and qualitative, where the expert judgment of the evaluator will be used to 
reach a conclusion based on all the evidence gathered for the evaluation criteria.  This is typically in the areas of 
outcome and impact evaluation conclusions. 
 
Evaluation Indicators – Performance Evaluation Questions 
Evaluation Questions Evaluation Indicators Assessment 
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1.  Needs assessment and design 
1.1. Adequacy of strategies • Clarity of objectives  
• Quality of strategic planning 
documentation  
• Availability of needs assessment 
 
 
 
● 
●  
● 
1.2. Involvement of stakeholders in line DGs 
and beneficiary countries in the design 
• Whether stakeholders were consulted  
• Degree of consultation 
●  
● 
 
2.  Extent to which inputs/activities have produced outputs 
2.1. What are the outputs: institution building 
projects; regulatory investment projects; 
investment projects? 
Quantitative/qualitative measure of outputs   ● 
2.2. What were the tools/activities/resources 
used to produce the outputs? 
Quantitative/qualitative description of tools/ 
activities/ resources 
  ● 
2.3. Were there resources/tools provided that 
were under-used or not used? 
• Extent of participation in events  
• Unused resources/ excess resources 
provided 
 
● 
●  
2.4. Was the use and the relative importance 
of the tools provided appropriate? 
Suitability of activities for stated purpose   ● 
2.5. How cost effective was the production of 
outputs in relative terms? 
Relative cost of activities in sample 
programmes 
 ●  
3.  Extent to which outputs have produced intended results 
3.1. What were the improvements in 
legislative/administrative structures, 
systems and resources? 
• Clear allocation of the roles and 
responsibilities within and between 
institutions (structures) 
• Availability of procedures and guidelines 
(systems) 
• Availability of suitably qualified skilled 
staff and adequate financial resources 
(resources) 
 
 
 
● 
 
● 
 
● 
 
3.2. Did the legislative/administrative and 
judicial performance related to the 
political criteria improve? 
• Horizontal public administration reform 
• Judicial capacity 
• Rule of law 
• Respect of the protection of the minorities 
  ● 
● 
● 
● 
3.3. Did the legislative/administrative 
performance related to the economic 
criteria improve? 
• Legislative/administrative support to a 
functioning economy 
●  
3.4. Did the legislative/administrative 
performance related to the ability to take 
on the obligations of the acquis improve? 
• Support for the transposition of the acquis 
• Support for the implementation of the 
acquis 
• Support for the enforcement of the acquis 
● 
● 
 
● 
 
3.5. Have the installed Phare equipment/ 
works/ grant schemes been usefully put 
into operation? 
• effective use of the investment/ 
infrastructure upgrade and/ or Phare 
funding mechanisms 
●  
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Evaluation Indicators – Thematic/ Cross Cutting Questions 
Evaluation Questions Evaluation Indicators    
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4.  Extent to which results/impacts contributed to achieving wider objectives 
4.1. To what extent can the legislative and 
administrative impacts at programme 
level be separated and measured? 
• Prevailing observed changes in 
administrative behaviour, procedures, 
structures 
  ● 
4.2. To what extent can the socio-economic 
impacts at programme level be separated 
and measured? 
• Prevailing observed changes identifiable 
for the national/regional macro- and/or 
micro economic situation 
  ● 
4.3. Examine likely legislative/administrative 
/socio-economic impacts on the  basis of 
the extent to which pre-conditions are in 
place or are being put in place 
• Projects conceived within a strategic 
framework and based on needs assessment 
• The essentials for adequate public and 
administrative capacity in place, including 
stable institutions, appropriate public 
investment policies, adequate inter-
ministerial and central-regional 
collaborative machinery of government 
• Positive project ratings for effectiveness 
and achievement of objectives 
• Contribution of project outputs to overall 
objectives 
• Identifiable benefits for society or the 
economy 
• Awareness of the public administrative 
units, ministries and regional structures 
involved in project implementation of the 
activities; and existence of complementary 
public administrative systems 
• Beneficiary awareness of project outputs 
• Relevant civil society bodies involved, and 
roles defined, with respect to project 
outputs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
● 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
● 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
● 
 
● 
 
● 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
● 
 
● 
 
● 
 
 
5.  Long term viability of institutional reforms following the withdrawal of Phare support  
5.1. Have the legal, administrative and 
organisational outputs been sustained? 
• Availability of financial and human means 
for continuation of accession preparation 
and after accession 
 ● 
 
 
 
5.2. To what extent has the trained staff in 
the Slovene administrations been stable? 
• Fluctuation rate of trained staff  ●  
5.3. Are the pre-conditions for sustainability 
in place or being put in place? 
• Positive ratings for effectiveness in 
achieving project outputs 
• Sectoral strategy documents exist 
containing project needs identification.  
Project outputs contribute to achievement 
of the strategic objectives 
• Ownership is demonstrated by managers 
responsible for onward strategic 
implementation of project outputs 
• Horizontal public administration systems 
stable and adequate 
• Ongoing national finance available for 
maintenance, insurance, replacements, 
consumables, etc. 
• Secure provisions in place for ongoing 
staffing, staff replacement and training 
● 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
● 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
● 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
● 
 
 
● 
 
 
 
 
● 
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Evaluation Questions Evaluation Indicators    
• Procedures and systems fully documented, 
with defined responsibility for updating 
●  
6.  Extent to which Phare support improved the performance Bulgaria’s pre-accession process 
6.1. Did the Slovene national programmes 
address ex post needs? 
• Establishment of ex post needs 
• Alignment of project activity to ex post 
needs 
• Current position 
 ● 
● 
 
 
 
● 
7.  Extent to which Phare strengthened the administrative and judicial capacity of Bulgaria 
7.1. Development of a strategic approach for 
Phare support to building PAJC 
• Existence of a strategic framework 
• Evidence of a needs analysis 
• Logic of the approach to address the 
defined needs 
● 
● 
  
 
● 
 
 
7.2. Development of national PAJC strategies 
to underpin Phare programme 
prioritisation 
• Alignment with Phare priorities   ● 
7.3. Adequacy of Phare support to horizontal 
reforms and governance 
• Alignment of Phare support with defined 
needs 
• Extent to which project outputs contributed 
to achievement of objectives 
• Identification of non-sector specific 
capacities, strengthened by Phare.  Current 
position of these capacities 
  ● 
 
 
● 
7.4. Adequacy of Phare support to cover the 
acquis 
• Trend in Bulgaria’s administrative 
capacities, both qualitative and quantitative 
 ● ● 
7.5. Adequacy of Phare support to develop 
regional and local PAJC 
• Identification of these capacities, 
strengthened by Phare 
• Current position of these capacities 
 ●  
 
● 
7.6. Efficiency, effectiveness, deployment 
and co-ordination of instruments 
(TAIEX, Twinning, SIGMA, Technical 
Assistance and related investments) 
• Adequacy of inter-instrument co-ordination 
mechanisms 
• Whether the projects’ effectiveness in 
achieving their objectives were positively 
rated  
• Extent to which project outputs contributed 
to achievement of overall objectives 
 
 
 
● 
 
 
 
 
 
● 
● 
7.7. Prospects for promoting and supporting 
a government initiative for a systematic 
benchmarking approach to public 
administration reforms 
• Viability of proposed key performance 
indicators 
• Level of awareness and ownership amongst 
key actors 
  ● 
 
● 
7.8. Sustainability of post accession PAJC 
(related to, for example, scaling down of 
Phare support and financial/human 
resource constraints) 
• Existence of  planned PAJC resource levels 
for the medium and long term 
• Identification and availability of financial 
resources 
• Identification and availability of human 
resources 
• Existence and adequacy of human resource 
development planning 
● 
 
 
● 
 
● 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
● 
 
8.  Extent to which Phare contributed to the strengthening of ESC and to the preparation for Structural 
Funds 
8.1. To what extent has Phare been 
successful in preparing Bulgaria to 
support ESC after accession, by assisting 
the country to put in place the pre-
conditions for sustainable recourse to the 
SF? What are the factors underlying the 
observed performance? 
• Existence of a strategic framework 
• Adequacy and stability of institutional 
arrangements incl.  planning capacities 
• Stakeholder dialogue 
• Sequencing approach for implementation 
• Trend in Bulgaria’s ESC administrative 
structures and capacities, both qualitative 
and quantitative 
●  
● 
 
 
 
● 
● 
 
● 
8.2. What Commission and National policies 
have been used to direct the course of 
• Existence of relevant policies 
• Relationship of policies to  the strategic 
●  
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Evaluation Questions Evaluation Indicators    
preparations in Bulgaria? framework and the Phare 
planning/programming process 
● 
8.3. What lessons can be learned from the 
planning/programming process of Phare 
ESC assistance? 
   ● 
8.4. What lessons learned can be learned 
from the Phare funded ESC pilot 
investments in Bulgaria? Did they have 
immediate impact and did they 
contribute to wider socio-economic 
cohesion objectives? 
• Lessons learned from Phare-funded ESC 
pilot investments in Bulgaria 
• Reduction of regional disparities observed 
 ●  
 
● 
8.5. What institutional arrangements have the 
Bulgarian authorities put in place over 
time to plan, co-ordinate, and manage 
operations? 
• Establishment of bodies and allocation of 
responsibilities, at national and regional 
levels 
  ● 
8.6. To what extent has Phare institution 
building been successful in supporting 
Bulgaria in its preparation for SF 
implementation? 
• Remaining gaps in institutional structures, 
systems, resources and competences 
  ● 
8.7. Has there been any acceleration in the 
pre-accession performance of ESC 
programmes since the beginning of the 
support to ESC in Bulgaria? 
• Trend in key performance indicators ●   
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Annex 5.  Sample projects – Financial data and results 
Project No. Project Title Phare 
allocation (€) 
Final 
Commitment 
(€) 
Final 
Disbursement 
(€) 
Main results achieved 
Agriculture 
BG 9913.04 
TA Support to 
restructuring of 
agricultural statistics  
1,340,000.00 1,202,000.00 1,178,000.00 
• Institution building - Restructuring of the agricultural statistics and its 
approximation to the EU standards.  Transfer agriculture statistic department 
into Agriculture statistic directorate.  New structure that insures the 
possibility to collect administrative information from a high number of small 
agricultural enterprises.  Regional agro-statistics representations were set up 
in the following 9 macro-regions: Sofia north, Blagoevgrad, Plovdiv, 
Haskovo, Bourgas, Varna, Rousse, Lovetch, Montana.   
• Capacity building - The local staff was trained for creation of locale expertise 
for the implementation of the field surveys.  Introduction of pilot and test 
surveys in Livestock and animal products, Vineyards survey, Milk and milk 
products survey 
BG 0103.08 
Improving the quality 
of agricultural 
statistics 
2,000,000.00 1,587,255.00 1,467,924.80 
• Capacity building of agriculture statistic directorate- established full-
operating Bulgarian agricultural statistical network for the collection, the 
processing, and the dissemination of agricultural statistics to local, regional 
and national authorities and for the provision of EC databases in all regional 
offices and at headquarters. 
• Systems practices and procedures and introducing statistical surveys 
performed in EU practice accordance were developed.  The following 
surveys were conducted: vineyard and grape production,  fruits and 
vegetables, perennials, poultry and eggs,  and statistic data for the following 
aria were produced: for livestock and animal products, milk and milk 
products, crop production, crop yields.  FADN system was developed; 
Evaluation of land use/land cover – based on area frame sampling method. 
• Monthly information booklets on agriculture are issued. 
• Reports for the survey results for regional, national and EC use were 
published and disseminated. 
• The data produced by Agrostatistic Directorate are utilised during the 
negotiations on Chapter Agriculture in the relative sectors and in identifying 
the quotes for production of agricultural products in Bulgaria.   
• This data is the main sources of information for the establishment of 
country’s agricultural policy  
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BG 0101.04 
Improvement of 
animal health and 
diagnostics control 
1,725,000.00 1,691,623.90 1,463,234.20 
• Introduction of EU BVIP system of control: 10 veterinarian inspectors 
participated  in seminar and workshop for the management of BIPs and 
introduction of EU rules for the control of BIPs in Greece.  30 veterinarian 
inspectors attended a seminar in Bulgaria for training on current BIP 
requirements 
• Animal/Public Health and Diagnostics: 8 veterinarian inspectors were 
trained for improvement of contagious diseases diagnostic methods and with 
Contingency in Greece and Germany; 40 veterinarian inspectors were trained 
for tuberculosis [TB] diagnostics and for effective epizootic surveillance of 
bovine TB, Salmonella infection in poultry and Salmonella in food of animal 
origin in Bugaria.  60 veterinarian inspectors attended a training course for 
BSE diagnostics and surveillance and for Contingency Plans for epizootic 
diseases such as BSE and Srapie in Bulgaria. 
• Reliable and faster information for testing of tuberculosis due to established 
new laboratory equipment in Sofia   
BG 0201.05 Improvement in phytosanitary control 1,100,000.00 727,865.60 725,135.56 
• Completion of the equipment process to NSPP labs and offices in order to 
provide adequate capacity for implementation of their control activities 
regarding phytosanitary control and plant protection products.   
• Connection on border inspection posts with regional and central service  
• Proposals made for funding for meteorological stations which failed to 
contract in this project.   
• Number of analysis increased. 
BG 
0201.06.01 Control on TSE 
500,000.00 
 
494,865.40 
 401,308.15 
• Main part of the legislation was harmonised.  The LVA adopted in October 
2005 considered all the recommendations provided by the twinning 
component.   
• A brochure, specialised for the vet regional authorities providing information 
of the legislative development and measures for TSE control and 
management of animal by-products was issued. 
• Establishment of monitoring and analytical capacity.  Adequate laboratory 
capacity for implementation of TSE monitoring programme was established.  
Screening tests were significantly increase. 
Cross Border Co-operation 
BG 
0007.04.01 
Joint Small Project 
Fund 500,000.00 484,476.90 459,981.15 
Grant scheme to fund ‘people to people’ projects that stimulate cooperation and 
potentially joint activities and join commitment from both sides of the border.  
13 projects funded covering a range of activities such as business cooperation, 
conferences, cultural exchange etc. 
Technical assistance to assist potential applicants to complete application forms. 
Grant management and administrative capacity building including preparation 
of call for proposal, evaluation of applications, and implementation monitoring. 
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BG 
0007.01.01.
01 
Development of the 
Telecommunications 
Infrastructure of the 
BG-RO electricity 
companies for the 
improvement of data 
exchanges between 
their Dispatching 
Centre and UCTE – 
technical Study. 
300,000.00 119,878.00 110,901.20 
Improve the on-line data exchange between the Dispatching Centres of both 
countries with the UCTE Accounting Centre complying with the EC Directive 
for the open electricity market 
• Technical Study to identify the best technical and financial solution for the 
improved telecommunication infrastructure, the total investment cost and the 
technical specifications of the necessary equipment to be procured for 
interconnection of power networks was proposed.   
• Supplied and installed new equipment in both power systems (on the 
interconnection lines, in the NDCs and at the UCTE accounting Center 
• Certification by UCTE of new metering equipment and of new information 
provided by both power systems 
• Training on the job of technical staff from the National Dispatching Centers 
of both countries. 
• New hardware, software and communication equipment in both power 
systems on the electricity interconnection lines and at National Dispatching 
Centres (NDC) and at the UCTE Accounting Center, on-line information 
from the two power systems at both NDCs 
BG 0107.01 
CBC BG-RO 
Construction of a 
crossing border check 
points in Silistra 
2,600,000.00 1,979,211.73 686,807.77 
• The contract under the project was signed in 2003.  The construction work is 
not finished.  The expectation is to be completed by end of June 2006.  The 
Romanian border check point was officially opened on 26 of January 2006. 
• In order to put in operation border check point two additional contract were 
signed: 1) the design of the road to border was finished and contract for 
construction was signed.  The construction work will start on April and will 
finish on November; 2) The construction of ferry port and the provision of 
ferry was contracted through a concession procedure.   
BG 
2002/000.62
4.05 
Small projects 
Bulgaria – Greece 850,000.00 688,174.00 650,645.50 
• Grant scheme to fund ‘people to people’ projects that stimulate cooperation 
and potentially joint activities and join commitment from both sides of the 
border.  9 projects funded covering a range of activities such as business 
cooperation, conferences, cultural exchange etc. 
• Technical assistance to assist potential applicants to complete application 
forms. 
• Grant management and administrative capacity building including 
preparation of call for proposal, evaluation of applications, and 
implementation monitoring. 
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Public Finance 
BG 0006.01  
Strengthening Public 
Internal Financial 
Control  
2,000,000.00 1,779,675.00 1,389,713.92 
• Development of the legal framework: Audit Charter and Code of Ethics 
endorsed by the Public Internal Financial Control Agency (PIFCA), tertiary 
legislation in terms of the control over the EU funds management have been 
drafted, risk assessment mechanisms were finalised and adopted by the 
Ministry of Finance, manuals on internal financial control and internal audit 
have been prepared.  Follow-up activities: 25 November – 12 December 
2002 were held 4 pilot audits.   
• Institutional building: mainly activities related to communication: internal 
communication plan, amended set-up regulation of PIFCA in February 2004 
aiming to optimize the functions and the structures of the territorial 
directorates and the central office, elaboration of the Intranet site of the 
Agency.  The time for conducting an audit has been shortened. 
• Human resource development: staff assessment system, training of trainers – 
28 staff became trainers.  They trained some 700 staff for three/four days in 
the end of 2003. 
• ICT systems at the PIFCA: Strategy for Development of the Information 
System of the PIFCA.  The information network of the PIFCA is based on 
the data transfer network of the Ministry of Finance.  On its bases was 
elaborated the Intranet site and so was improved the communication between 
the staff.  60 internal auditors were trained on the specialized audit software.  
In few months they have trained 115 other internal auditors.  Recently, 60 
licensed software packages were transferred to state organizations where they 
are used by the internal auditors.  The municipalities received hardware. 
BG 0103.07  Combating money laundering 1,200,000.00 1,199,982.43 993,641.62 
• Recommendations for legislative changes – Penal Code and Penal Procedure 
Code and mainly secondary legisaltion. 
• Strategy for a PR and communication campaign.  The awareness among the 
bodies that should implement the law is still limited. 
• Working groups between institutions involved in the anti-money laundering.  
The reported suspicious cases raised from 300 to 600 in the past two years.  
However, no legal case has been completed in the justice system. 
• Cooperation links between the Financial Intelligence Agency and similar 
institutions from member states and neighbouring countries. 
• Training for the customs, tax administration, the Financial Intelligence Unit, 
and other administrations.. 
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BG 0203.08 
Development of 
Customs standards 
and practices 
2,541,040.00 2,499,337.00 2,089,366.62 
• Evaluation of the existing Bulgarian tariff; procedures for the application 
of Integrated Tariff of the European Communities (TARIC), design of a 
TARIC database, guidelines on non-tariff measures for import and 
export, assessment of the internal procedures at the Tariff Directorate of 
the National Customs Agency (NCA), training in the area of TARIC 
(trainers from the Tariff Policy Directorate).   
• Transit Management system; information system; connection and 
interoperability – to be completed by May 2006. 
• Development of a Data Dissemination System that includes direct trader 
input through a web-based software – to be completed by June 2006. 
BG 2004/016-
711.09.04 
Strengthening the 
institutional capacity 
of the Ministry of 
Finance 
4,160,000.00 2,123,708.51 371,039.85 
• The contracts under the project have been either recently signed or have 
been prepared. 
Social Affairs 
BG 0010 Access programme 2,000,000.00 1,999,819.56 1,838,789.69 
• Grant scheme funding 93 projects 
• Project management capacity building in NGO sector 
• Technical assistance supplied by consortium of NGOs  
• Training activities 
• Grant scheme management and building administrative capcity.   
BG 0202.03  
Lifelong learning and 
vocational education 
and training 
4,000,000.0
0 
  • Refurbishment and modernisation of vocational training institutions. 
•  
BG 2004/016-
711.01.03 
Improvement of the 
situation and inclusion 
of the disadvantaged 
ethnic minorities with 
a special focus on 
Roma 
9,000,000.0
0 0.00 0.00 
• No signed contracts under the project. 
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Transport 
BG 0012.01 
Vessel traffic 
management 
information system 
3,290,633.00 3,290,633.00 3,244,727.38 
• Decrease the number of emergencies with river vessels, and improve water 
quality and the micro environment: 
• Operation Centre and Technical Service Unit for management and 
maintenance of the system was established 
• The operational system in Varna region is developed and operating.  It 
include: VHF system for distress, safety and public correspondence and 
VTMIS; Telecommunications Network, VTMIS and GMDSS.   
• An update of the feasibility study for the scope of the Project VTMIS 
Phase 2 is envisaged with the help of a technical assistance and 
consultancy.   
BG 0106.01 
Rehabilitation and 
partial reconstruction 
of Road II-19 
6,950,000.00 6,944,468.00 1,430,047.94 
• Contract under the project was signed.  The construction work is expected 
to finish by the end of 2006 
BG 
2002/000.624 
Rehabilitation and 
Partial Reconstruction 
of Road II-19 
"Razlog-Bansko - 
Gotse Deltchev - 
Sadovo" 
9,300,000.00 8,566,405.68 2,073,954.40 
• Contracting was done.  The construction work is expected to be finished in 
2008. 
Environment 
BG 9906  
LSIF Part V Sofia 
Waste Water 
Treatment Project 
23,000,000.00 17,899,950.35 17,877,378.97 
• Large scale investment infrastructure proposed by the municipality of 
Sofia with and anticipated cost of €17million.  On the advice of DG 
Environment, a detailed feasibility study was carried out which established 
that a full rehabilitation project would cost €33 million.   
• The FM was signed allowing a budget of €23 million and the tender was 
launched to include a mixture of obligatory and optional components.  In 
the end the contract was achieved at €18 million for only part of the work, 
mainly the obligatory components.  This left only €5 million which was 
not enough to complete the optional components and it means that the job 
is only part complete.   
BG 0003.06  
Environment acquis 
and institution 
building 
5,350,000.00 5,049,253.03 4,407,036.14 
See Annex 7 for a comprehensive list of acquis related environmental outputs 
from the 2000 programmes 
BG 0201.11 
Integrated 
management planning 
and admin capacity 
for protected wetland 
areas 
1,800,000.00 1,755,243.84 760,945.37 
• Project in progress.   
• Preparation of integrated action plan for the management and community 
development of the Wetland areas 
• Technical assistance delivering capacity building activities and training in 
community involvement approaches.   
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Internal Market 
BG 0002.01 
Strengthening the 
capacity of the 
Ministry of Economy 
2,000,000.00 1,999,999.00 1,293,475.85 
Institutional reorganization:  
• A new organisation structure was implemented – Clear functional division 
of Directorates and clear inter-departmental lines of communication and 
information was established. 
• Every directorate was implemented inside roles for operation 
• New rules for  HR  management as well as the new management 
Information system was established 
• Linkages with agencies improved – new department responsible for the 
different agencies was established 
• The Agencies functions were strictly design 
Improved management skills 
• Training programmes for key personnel in analytic, forecasting, policy 
development and policy implementation skills, and core competencies was 
implemented. 
Strategy development 
• The strategies and concepts were developed and included in National 
strategy for investment 
BG 0003.03 
Support in the 
implementation of the 
reform in the Public 
Procurement System 
1,300,000.00 1,000,757.00 565,150.06 
• Complete the approximation of public procurement legislation to the EU 
acquis and strengthen the institutional capacity 
• Public Procurement Law assessed and recommendations for amendments 
prepared; secondary legislation drafted; proposal(s) drafted for re-
definition of responsibilities and authorities for the public procurement 
system 
• National training programme developed and implemented for Public 
Procurement Directorate staff and procuring entities as well as other 
possible entities or groups involved in procurement including prospective 
contractors:  2 Study tours to the Member State for the PPD members 
aimed at improving the practical experience of the PPD staff in public 
procurement; Modules for Training of Trainers in Public Procurement 
based on Bulgarian legal and commercial requirementsNational training 
program developed; 50 Bulgarian trainers of trainers in public 
procurement successfully trained;  
• Establishing an independent and effective public procurement body  
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BG 0201.07 Development of Company Law 1,100,000.00 1,040,380.53 939,678.76 
Developing of national cooperation and information exchange network for 
protection of intellectual and industrial property rights 
• Establish of a legal framework for the cooperation between the 
enforcement institutions and the protection providing bodies - Analysis of 
the legislation in force in the sphere of intellectual and industrial property.  
Signed a memoranda for understanding between the 5 institutions  
National Customs Agency, Ministry of Interior (National service for Fight 
against Organized Crime, National Police service – Economical 
Department), Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Culture, and Patent Office. 
• Human resource development: Training of officers working at the Patent 
Office, Copyright and Related Rights Directorate and the Ministry of 
Culture, dealing with registration of intellectual and industrial property 
rights and working out of expert opinions; Train-the-trainers course for 
officers, who will form a structural unit for interested agencies officers’ 
training; Training of officers working in the National Customs Agency, 
the Ministry of Interior (National Service for Fight against Organised 
Crime and the Economical Department to the National Police service); 
Training of officers, working with specialised software; 
• Setting up of national information system between the institutions for 
information exchange in the sphere of intellectual and industrial property - 
Working out of the technical specifications from Danish partner.  Working 
information through providing of technical equipment and software.   
BG 0202.02 
Development of 
Bulgarian Eco-
tourism 
4,000,000.00 3,944,405.07 2,904,000.00 
The expected result is improvement of tourist potential in Bulgaria through 
diversification of the tourist products and quality improvement of tourist 
services in the ecological sector 
• Grant scheme – 27 grant contracts are concluded on 30.11.2004.  
Maximum execution period of the contracts is 24 months, i.e.30.11.2006.  
At the moment 3 projects are successfully finished  
Justice and Home Affairs 
BG 0005.01  
Strengthening the 
Public prosecutor’s 
office 
3,000,000.00 2,997,131.12 2,838,560.21 
• Implementation of an integration IT system for document handling across 
the public prosecution  
• Twinning component with the counterpart institution in Bavaria Germany 
BG 0203.01 
Implementation of the 
strategy for reform of 
the Judiciary in 
Bulgaria 
9,300,000.00 8,204,490.76 6,712,226.06 
• Legal aid Law (published in State Gazette on 4 October 2005, entered into 
force on 01.01.2006г.) 
•  Judiciary IT Strategy – adopted with the Decision by the SJC dated 
07.04.2003 
• Updated Strategy for the Reform of the Bulgarian Judiciary  
• Phare Bankruptcy: The electronic system for the bankruptcy cases has 
already been installed and functioning in the Supreme Cassation Court and 
all Appellate and District Courts.   
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BG 0203.04 
Improvement of 
administrative justice 
in view of the fight 
against corruption 
800,000.00 799,683.27 539,870.77 
• National Strategy for Fight against Corruption, 2001, and the Programmes 
for its implementation for the periods: 2002-2003 and 2004-2005. 
• 3 National consultations held with the National Service for Fight Against 
Organised Crime, National Service “Border Police” and National Service 
“Police”.   
• Twinning covenant signed between BG and GB – main activities were 
related to internal anti-corruption: legal and institutional framework 
changes, public awareness, prevention, training, information activities and 
operational practices. 
• National conference on internal anti-corruption held in May/June 2004.  
the Minister then signed a new Order that treats the management of the 
corruption signals and the relevant organizations for processing the 
signals.  The methodological control and support for the specialised anti-
corruption units is ensured by the Inspectorate at the MoI. 
• The Unified Anti-corruption System has become similar to the one used 
by the Anti-corruption unit (command) of Scotland Yard. 
• Anti-corruption activities implemented under the project that will be 
continuously implemented after the end of the project: 
• Info campaign – including posters, ads in the media. 
• Promotion of the anonymous telephone lines and the web-site for 
corruption signals. 
• Questionnaires among the police servants.  Loyalty tests. 
• Visits of the Inspectorate at the territorial and border units. 
• Control checks at the MoI services that are under corruption pressure. 
BG 2004/016-
711.08.01 
Support for further 
implementation of the 
strategy for reform of 
Bulgarian Judiciary 
6,700,000.00 3,199,664.88 1,130,341.75 
• Civil Procedures Code (the draft should be ready and introduced to the 
National Assembly until the end of March)  
• Penal Procedures Code (published in State Gazette on 28 October 2005 
and enters into force on 29 April 2006 
• Administrative Procedural Code (second reading at the National 
Assembly) 
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Others (Public Administration) 
BG 0103.01 
Strategic policy-
making and co-
ordination  
2,000,000.00 1,767,750.00 1,447,335.52 
• Training materials, including on strategy planning, impact assessment, 
monitoring and evaluation of policies, public consultations, training of 
trainers were submitted to the Institute for Public Administration and 
European Integration (IPAEI) .  Pilot training was delivered by its 
lecturers using the submitted materials in 2005.  The training will be 
included in the regular programme of the IPAEI.  IPAEI participated in all 
training activities and study trips.  In addition, four training brochures 
were prepared on strategic planning, impact assessment, public 
consultations and monitoring and evaluation.  1000 copies of them were 
distributed to Ministries and the Supreme Judicial Council.  Cases 
described in the brochures have been used as models for good practice. 
• Developed methodology for impact assessment.  Pilot impact assessment 
was done only under several articles from a law implemented at the 
Ministry of Environment and Waters and not for the whole law as there 
was not enough time.  It has bee included as a case study in the text books. 
• Analysed the consultation mechanisms.  Suggestions for improvement of 
the political coordination and public consultations. 
• Suggestions for amendments of the set-up regulation of the Council of 
Ministers (agreed among all Ministries but not yet adopted because of the 
Governmental elections in June 2005) that allowed public consultations, 
impact assessment and other instruments to be used in strategic policy 
making.  This regulation will incorporate the already adopted Regulation 
by the Ministry of Finance for financial impact assessment of new 
legislation. 
BG 0103.02 Implementing civil service reform 2,400,000.00 2,186,043.75 2,076,258.00 
• Functional analyses of seven pilot ministries and six pilot district (oblast) 
administrations. 
• Elaborated draft methodology for analysis and assessment of the 
functionality and the effectiveness of the public administration 
(performance appraisal of the management of a whole administration as a 
follow-up of earlier DFID project for performance appraisal of the 
individual civil servants).  Developed criteria and procedures for the 
Inspectorates at the state administration (that have control functions over 
the work of the public administration) that should increase the control and 
the accountability of the public administration, including 
guidelines/manuals. 
• Established and equipped six training centres for the district (oblast) 
administrations.  Decentralised training held in the six centres for 300 
oblast and municipal administrative servants on civil service issues, 
functional analysis of the administrative structures, delivery of public 
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service, access to information and accountability mechanisms (June/July 
2004).  In realization of the Concept for improvement of the administrative 
service in the context of the “one stop-shop” principle (adopted on 
28 December 2003 or 29 December 2002). 
• Computers and printers delivered to all 264 municipalities, and to some 
regions (24 Sofia, 6 Plovdiv and 5 Vrana), as well as servers for the 
registers (of the administrative structures and of the civil servants) at the 
Council of Ministers. 
BG 0203.05 
TA to implement key 
measures of the 
Programme for the 
Implementation of the 
National Anti-
Corruption Strategy 
1,000,000.00 999,890.00 999,890.00 
• Best practices analysis and functional analyses of the Council for 
Coordination of the Anti-corruption Activities, and of the Regional Anti-
corruption Councils. 
• One annual conference for all organizations involved in anti-corruption 
coordination was organized with the support of the project.  Contribution 
to the communication strategy. 
• Training materials on anti-corruption prepared and submitted to the IPAEI.  
The IPAEI holds training for newly employed civil servants, using the 
materials. 
BG 0203.07 
Strengthening Human 
Resource Capacity in 
the Bulgarian Public 
Administration 
2,000,000.00 1,766,720.00 1,702,635.90 
• Suggestions for legislative amendments in the area of mobility and 
pension schemes, carrier development and structural organization of the 
administration.  Adopted by the Council of Ministers and at the National 
Assembly at present. 
• Developed strategy for human resource management, including structure 
and training.  The Strategy is on the agenda of the Council of Ministers, to 
be adopted. 
• Developed methodologies for consultations and surveys of the civil 
servants aimed to improve the working environment.  Prepared job 
descriptions and held training for the human resource management units of 
the state administrative structures (ministries, agencies, municipalities). 
• Developed system for human resource management, using unified 
software installed on the central server.  It should be accessible for 
introduction of appointments, promotions, holidays, training, gender, etc.  
through the Web.  The system was tested in nine pilot administrations - 
three central, three oblasts and three municipalities.  A plan for gradual 
launch of the system in all administrative structures was elaborated. 
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ESC 
BG 9914 
(ESC) 
Employment and 
social affairs.  
Beautiful Bulgaria II: 
temporary 
employment and 
vocational training 
4,591,086.00 4,591,086.00 4,585,767.97 
• Improved management skills of the project’s staff at the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Policy.  Some new tools for project management and 
control were used.  For example, external and internal audit, memoranda of 
understanding signed between the key stakeholders (municipalities, UNDP 
and the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy), monitoring and evaluation, 
double signature, international accounting standards. 
• Created project monitoring practices at the 11 municipalities where the 
project was implemented. 
• 15% of the people involved in the project found permanent job (however 
this was monitored at the end of the project therefore this can not be 
considered as permanent employment).  8500 temporary employed during 
the project implementation, mostly as construction workers. 
• SMEs project experience (179 subcontracts concluded). 
• 221 sites (cultural, historical and other buildings, gardens, squares) in the 
11 municipalities refurbished. 
• Business start-up training of 526 unemployed. 
BG 0102.05 
(ESC) 
Labour Market 
initiatives 6,300,000.00 4,729,077.31 4,459,730.56 
• Grant scheme funding human resource projects (ESF type measures)C 
• Refurbishment of vocational education institutions 
BG2003/004-
937.11.03 
Pilot integrated 
investment scheme for 
Regional 
Development Actions  
   
• No substantial outputs to date as the project is in the beginning stage of 
implementation. Substantial delays in approving grantees, only 10% of 
submitted documents considered adequate by the IA. 
Source for financial data: Perseus; figures in €; discrepancies between final commitment and final disbursement indicate projects with still on-going disbursements;  
Source for results: project final reports. 
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Annex 6.  Additional Sectoral Information 
This Annex provides some additional information to support the text in Sections 2.4 and 2.5.  
 
Much new legislation was prepared and enacted with the help of twinning, but little has been applied or enforced.  
Much of the Phare 1999-2001 assistance was concerned with the introduction, harmonisation, implementation and 
enforcement of legislative change in the sectors directly concerned with the closing of acquis chapters (agriculture, 
environment, economy, internal market, and energy and transport).   
 
Phare has been behind institution building in a number of key sectors, such as agriculture and public finance.  
However the systemic lack of institutional capacity remains a constraint for all capacity building interventions.  A 
substantial number of projects either directly or indirectly related to the reform of public administration have been 
implemented in the period covered by this evaluation.  These projects aimed at underpinning high-level change, for 
example civil service reform, improvement in the strategic decision making culture and strengthening of human 
resource capacity.  However despite the enormous effort from significant numbers of individuals, the systemic lack 
of institutional capacity across many of the line ministries combined with widespread resistance to change has meant 
that the absorption potential for such far-reaching reform interventions is severely limited.  The primary outputs from 
such interventions was training on a massive scale; some projects report training of 700 staff or 200 staff from the 
central administration and the six district centres of the six planning regions.  The production of documents and 
materials to support the introduction of more modern working practices was a common output.  For some projects 
thematic working groups were established to stimulate and involve the different line ministries.  Study tours were 
organised to provide Bulgarian authorities with the opportunity to observe the suggested systems in practice.  
 
In the justice sector, Phare supported significant legislative and administrative change.  Twelve twinning projects 
were used to assist with the drafting of new legislation and as a direct consequence there have been revised versions 
of the penal codes, the civil codes, procedural codes, and administrative codes.  The Phare interventions also aimed 
to create a critical mass of positive actions to stimulate and achieve real change.  As a consequence some concrete 
achievements have been made with the assistance of Phare.  In certain areas, the widespread training of young 
technical and administrative staff is a success story, and earlier projects have created the foundations for future 
projects and the basis for ongoing change.   
 
The National Institute of Justice was created as a direct result of Phare assistance.  It is responsible for a number of 
core actions including recruitment, training for new magistrates, and other internal professional training.  It has 
already introduced a cohort of new magistrates with modern views towards corruption and transparency.  Over time 
new people will be absorbed into the system every year.  Although the numbers of new recruits each year is 
relatively small, the growing numbers of such people should accelerate the judicial reform process.  A very new 
concept for Bulgaria was introduced in 2004, having a competitive process for the recruitment and selection of new 
magistrates, rather then political appointments. 
 
Phare-supported unified information system is a core element of the judicial reform process.  The information 
technology strategy for the justice sector, which was also prepared as a result of Phare assistance in the earlier 
period, sees a need to create an integrated system across the whole of the judiciary.  Phare has been used to start this 
process and to roll it out in different stages to different elements of the judiciary and to the different levels, national 
and regional, of the court system. When fully functional the IT system will result in the modernisation of procedures 
and practices across all courts in Bulgaria.  Although the work is still in progress the positive effects, and a more 
streamlined, modern working environment, are already being experienced and appreciated by those people in the 
areas where the system is being tested.  
 
Despite these achievements, the justice sector remains one of the key areas requiring further assistance. 
 
In the agriculture sector, assistance from three interlinked Phare projects underpinned the establishment of the 
Bulgarian agricultural statistical network.  The immediate result has been the establishment of the institution and the 
capacity building in the Agriculture Statistic Directorate to guarantee a fully operational structure.  The development 
in the agriculture sector needed to overcome earlier delays in the establishment of structures but the 2004 Regular 
Report indicated that further strengthening of administrative structures had been noted.  This was confirmed through 
some of the projects examined where operational results are emerging in inspection and control areas like control of 
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy (TSE), phytosanitary control, biological testing and the registration of 
plant protection products. Like most of the Bulgarian administration, the organisational development is constrained 
because of the difficulty of retaining good staff, especially in the regions where the salaries are very low (regional 
salaries are around €120 per month.  
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In the public finance sector, Phare has provided consistent support to the strengthening of the functions of the 
Ministry of Finance including a new organisation structure, modernisation of systems, including state budgeting and 
financial reporting, and economic modelling.  Elsewhere in the same sector support has been provided to allow for 
the acquis required separation between the internal audit and inspection functions.  For this three laws have recently 
been brought to the National Assembly (the Financial Management and Control Act – approved on 24 February 
2006, the Internal Audit Act approved on first reading, and the Inspections Act being discussed in the relevant 
Parliamentary commission) and the changes have implications for the functioning of the Public Internal Financial 
Control Agency (PIFCA).  Earlier Phare support through twinning strengthened the auditing procedures in the 
PIFCA and a new strategy for development of the PIFC in Bulgaria, adopted in June 2005, has recommended a 
decentralised model.  Phare has been instrumental in supporting this process of reform in the PIFCA.  Already some 
450 of the circa 1,100 employees have moved to the State, municipal and district administrations as internal auditors.  
Others have moved to two Directorates that were created in the MoF, the Internal Control Directorate to develop the 
methodology for internal control, financial management and control and training programmes, and the Audit of EU 
Funds Directorate to prepare for the audit role required as part of the winding-up of the SF cycle.  
 
Phare supported the creation of a strategy for development of the information systems.  It also provided hardware 
and software (in two phases).  The effects of the first phase from Phare 2000 are beginning to improve 
communication between the staff working in the PIFCA.  Internal auditors have been trained in the use of the 
specialist audit software.  Trainers were also trained and as a result significant numbers (700 people) staff received 
introductory training.  However, some recent changes to the structures of the PIFCA may affect these developments.  
At the time of this evaluation many experts are being removed from the PIFCA, especially from the district 
directorates.  
 
The internal market sector included a successful merger of production and trade functions in the Ministry of 
Economy and a similar combination of the foreign trade functions in the Ministries of Economy and Energy.  In both 
cases Phare supported the reshaping of Directorates within the ministries and the development of new agencies.  Two 
projects in the later period (2002) built on earlier foundations.  In one case, a project to strengthen the foreign trade 
capacity of the SME promotion agency was reshaped to take account of comments in the Commission Regular 
Report.  The second intervention supports the continuing development of company law in the specific area of 
intellectual property rights.  A positive feature of this project was the strong co-operation between the beneficiaries, 
which included the National Customs Agency (project co-ordinator), the Patents Office and the Ministries of 
Culture, Justice, and Interior. 
 
An integrated information system has been put into operation on all customs sites and the applications within the 
system have gradually been developed with the assistance of Phare.  Considerable efforts have been put in place to 
achieving interconnectivity with EU systems by the time of accession.  This process is ongoing and the immediate 
effects of this new system are already being experienced across all customs sites.   
 
In the social sector, Bulgaria has struggled to realise tangible intermediate impacts from Phare assistance to Roma 
minorities.  Phare and the EU accession process have been instrumental in highlighting the issues of poverty and 
social exclusion of minorities, in particular the Roma community in Bulgaria.  Like the other earlier candidate 
countries, Bulgaria has struggled to realise intermediate impacts from the significant number of Roma projects that 
have been implemented.  The greatest effects are experienced at local level in communities, but there is no 
mechanism in place to measure or quantify the extent of these impacts.   
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Annex 7.  Legislative, procedural and institutional changes in the environmental sector 
that were initiated in Bulgaria as a result of twinning projects 
 
Twinning Partner, 
Total Budget (€)  
Legislative, procedural and institutional changes that were initiated in Bulgaria as a result of the twinning Contribution to the National 
Environmental Law 
BG2000EN01A – Institutional strengthening at national and regional level for implementation of the drinking water, fish water and shellfish water, bathing water and dangerous 
substances discharges directives 
French Ministry of 
Spatial Planning and 
Environment 
990,000  
 
Sub-project A : Drinking Water main results: 
1.  Assessment on the current state of the public water supply and monitoring system in Bulgaria, including a gap 
analysis with respect to legal, organisational and technical aspects 
2.  Development of an investment programme for improving water works, raw water treatment plants and the 
drinking water distribution systems 
3.  Preparation of an appropriate cost recovery and pricing system in close correlation to the necessary financing 
strategy and taking into consideration related social aspects 
4.  Assessment of the current drinking water monitoring system with regard to the EU requirements and 
development of a future programme to reach full compliance with the stipulations of the Drinking Water Directive, 
including the preparation of a monitoring/Good Laboratory Practise (GLP) manual 
5.  Trained staff within the national and regional authorities, responsible for raw water quality (MoEW), water 
abstraction, treatment, storage and distribution (MRDPW) and drinking water hygiene (MoH),  
6.  Establishment of closer co-operation between the concerned national and regional authorities including consumer 
protection organisations and stakeholders 
7.  Preparation and implementation of a public awareness campaign in order to inform the public about current water 
related issues, in close integration with the IMWGs recommendations and related activities of sub-project B. 
Sub-project B : Bathing water, Fish and Shellfish water, Dangerous Substances 
Fish Water and Shellfish Water Directive 
Identification of fish and shellfish waters (for salmonid and for cyprinid)  
Elaboration of programmes for fish and shellfish water pollution reduction for those waters that are designated to 
salmonid and cyprinid but are not in compliance with the standards 
Preparation of adequate sampling and monitoring programmes and procedures   
Preparation of a public awareness campaign. 
Bathing Water Directive  
Identification of the potentially bathing waters (sea, rivers, lakes, dams)  
Definition of a bathing water quality improvement programme, identifying the measures needed for compliance with 
the quality standards 
Adoption of a programme for modernisation of the bathing water monitoring systems  
Preparation of a public awareness campaign. 
Dangerous Substances Discharges  
Definition of pollution reduction programmes for all substances listed in list II, identifying the measures needed for 
compliance with the quality standards 
Preparation of effluent monitoring and inspection programmes and procedures  
Strengthening the River Basin Authorities capacities to carry out inspection and monitoring procedures and to 
improve the co-operation with industries. 
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Twinning Partner, 
Total Budget (€)  
Legislative, procedural and institutional changes that were initiated in Bulgaria as a 
result of the twinning 
Contribution to the National Environmental Law 
BG2000EN01B – Institutional strengthening for implementation of Regulation EC/338/97 on trade in species of wild flora and fauna 
Austrian Federal 
Environment Agency 
894,000  
Adoption of measures preventing illegal traffic of wild fauna 
Improvement of control efficiency at the boarders  
Improvement of the identification procedures and mechanisms to send the confiscated 
animals to their country of origin  
Establishment of Rescue Centres  
Improvement of management capacity to deal with confiscated alive animals  
Improvement of public awareness  
 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora (The Washington Convention, CITES) - ratified in 
1990, in force for the Republic of Bulgaria since 16.04.1991 (State 
Gazette No 6/1992); 
Law on Biological Diversity (State Gazette No 77/2002);  
Customs Act (State Gazette No 15/1998, as amended in 2000);  
• Regulation No.4 on the conditions and order for issuance of 
permits for introduction of non-native or reintroduction of native 
animal and plant species into the nature.  (SG 65/2003)  
• Regulation No.5 on the conditions and order for the elaboration of 
action plans for animal and plant species.  (SG 73/2003)  
BG2000EN01C – Transposition and basic practical application of regulations related to the Law on protection from the harmful impact of chemical substances and preparations  
German Federal 
Ministry for the 
Environment, Nature 
Conservation and 
Nuclear Safety 
770,000  
 
 
• Finalisation of the transposition process concerning testing and modification of 
chemicals and preparations through the assistance in drafting regulations. 
• Definition of a detailed phased programme for the implementation of the new chemical 
legislation 
• Strengthening the institutional and administrative framework responsible for the 
implementation and enforcement of the regulations. 
 
Law on Protection against Harmful Impact of Chemical Substances 
and Preparations (Published in State Gazette No.10/04.02.2000, in 
force since 05.02.2002, amendments published in SG 
No.91/25.09.2002, No.86/30.09.2003, SG No.114/30.12.2003, in 
force since 31.01.2004.)  
Regulation on the procedure and method of import and export of 
dangerous chemical substances and preparations on the territory of 
the Republic of Bulgaria, State Gazette No.  63/20.07.2004  
Regulation relating to bans and restrictions on the marketing and use 
of certain dangerous substances, preparations and products (SG 
69/17.07.2002)  
Regulation on the procedure and method of the assessment of risks to 
man and the environment of notified chemical substances, State 
Gazette No.  110/17.12.2004  
Ordinance on classification, packaging and labelling of existing and 
new chemical substances and preparations (Adopted with Council of 
Ministers’ Decree No 316/20.12.2002, published in the State Gazette 
No.5/17.01.2003, in force as of 01.01.2004.)  
Regulation on the notification of new chemical substances (Adopted 
by Council of Ministers’ Decree No 327/2004, published in the State 
Gazette issue No.  110 from 17 December 2004, in force from 1 
January 2005)  
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Twinning Partner, 
Total Budget (€)  
Legislative, procedural and institutional changes that were initiated in Bulgaria as a result of the 
twinning 
Contribution to the National Environmental Law 
BG2000EN01D – Training and application of the IPPC Directive on a regional level for specialists from the Regional Inspectorates and from the industrial sector 
German Federal 
Ministry for the 
Environment, Nature 
Conservation and 
Nuclear Safety 
964,000  
 
1. Draft the regulations and the codes of practice for the protection of Bulgarian population from 
ionising radiation in relation to medical exposures (Directive 97/43/EURATOM), including: 
• Patients as part of their own medical diagnosis or treatment; 
• Individuals as part of occupational health surveillance, health screening programme or medico-legal 
procedures;  
• Healthy individuals or patients voluntarily participating in medical research programmes 
2. Building the institutional procedural framework; 
3. Establish a quality assurance programme ensuring that medical exposures to ionising radiation is 
justified and optimised according to the requirements of the Medical Exposures Directive 
97/43/EURATOM; 
4. Set up a quality control system to ensure the safety and safe use of radiological equipment; 
5. Improve the education and training systems for all specialists involved in medical radio diagnostic 
and radio therapeutic procedures in accordance with the Medical Exposures Directive 
97/43/EURATOM  
 Environmental Protection Act  
Ordinance on the conditions and procedure for issuing 
of permits for construction and operation of new 
establishments or installations and for operation of 
existing establishments and installations implementing a 
system for the prevention of major accidents involving 
dangerous substances or the limitation of their 
consequences 
 
BG2000EN01E – Radiation protection and safety at medical use of ionising radiation51 
German Federal 
Ministry for the 
Environment, Nature 
Conservation and 
Nuclear Safety 
2,715,000  
 
Draft the regulations and the codes of practice for the protection of Bulgarian population from ionising 
radiation in relation to medical exposures (Directive 97/43/EURATOM), including: 
 Patients as part of their own medical diagnosis or treatment; 
 Individuals as part of occupational health surveillance, health screening programme or 
medico-legal procedures;  
 Healthy individuals or patients voluntarily participating in medical research programmes 
Building the institutional procedural framework; 
Establish a quality assurance programme ensuring that medical exposures to ionising radiation is 
justified and optimised according to the requirements of the Medical Exposures Directive 
97/43/EURATOM; 
Set up a quality control system to ensure the safety and safe use of radiological equipment; 
Improve the education and training systems for all specialists involved in medical radio diagnostic and 
radio therapeutic procedures in accordance with the Medical Exposures Directive 97/43/EURATOM  
1.The draft on the Ordinance “Protection of individuals 
at medical use of ionising radiation” transposing the EU 
Directive 97/43/EURATOM into national law has been 
finalized. 
2.A system of procedures and guidelines for Quality 
Assurance (QA) and Quality Control (QC) in form of 
annexes to Ordinance “Protection of individuals at 
medical use of ionising radiation” to improve and 
maintain the image quality in medical diagnostics and 
patient protection has been elaborated. 
 
                                                 
51  The Ministry of Health of the Republic of Bulgaria was the Implementing Agency (IA) for this project. 
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Annex 8.  Processing delays with development and approval of project fiches 
 
     Duration (days) 
Name of project Date IA to NF Date NF to 
NAC 
Date NAC 
to ECD 
Date of ECD 
approval/ 
rejection 
NF NAC ECD Total 
BG 0201.05 Improvement in phytosanitary control 
 
08.04.2004 02.06.2004 07.06.2004 01.07.2004 
approved 
56 5 23 84 
BG 0201.06.01 Control on TSE - only the Twinning component! 
 
08.04.2004 28.04.2004 05.05.200 4 11.05.2004 
approved 
20 7 6 33 
BG 0202.02 Development of Bulgarian Eco-tourism 
 
28.07.2004 12.08.2004 17.08.2004 04.10.2004 
approved 
15 5 48 68 
BG 0203.01 Implementation of the strategy for reform of the 
Judiciary in Bulgaria 
 
14.03.2005 18.03.2005 23.03.2005 15.08.2005 
approved 
4 5 145 154 
BG 0203.07 Strengthening Human Resource Capacity in the 
Bulgarian Public Administration 
 
16.05.2005 23.05.2005 03.06.2005 30.06.2005 
rejected 
7 11 27 45 
BG 0203.08 Development of Customs standards and practices 
 
23.03.2004 15.05.2004 21.05.2004 09.07.2004 
approved 
53 6 49 108 
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Annex 9.  List of Documents 
Originator Date Title of Document 
OVERALL DOCUMENTS 
European Commission 2005, 2006 Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Bulgaria’s preparation 
for Membership 
European Commission 2000, 2001, 
2002, 2003, 
2004 
Regular Reports on Bulgaria’s Progress towards Accession 
European Commission 2003 Roadmaps for Bulgaria and Romania, Public Administration 
and Judicial Capacity 
various Bulgaria National Programmes 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004, 
Financing Memoranda,  
European Commission and 
the Government of Bulgaria 
various Cross-border Cooperation Programmes, Financing Memoranda 
with Greece (1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004), Romania 
(1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004), Turkey (2004), Serbia 
and Montenegro (2004), and the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (2004) 
Court of Auditors June 2006 Special Report 4/2006 concerning Phare Investment Projects in 
Bulgaria and Romania 
CFCU (MoF),  
Ministry of Regional 
Development and Public 
Works,  
Ministry of Environment 
and Waters, 
Ministry of Labour and 
Social Works 
March/2006 Perseus for all programmes under evaluation 
INTERIM EVALUATION REPORTS 
European Commission 
(author ECOTEC) 
 
25/10/2005 
22/09/2005 
04/08/2005 
19/07/2005 
24/05/2005 
06/06/2005 
11/05/2005 
05/04/2005 
05/04/2005 
09/02/2005 
24/11/2004 
07/12/2004 
November/2005 
Interim Evaluation Reports (electronic versions) 
R/BG/SOC/0508 
R/BG/REG/0506 
R/BG/JHA/0505 
R/BG/ENE-TEL/05.04 
R/BG/ENV/0503 
R/BG/EC-DEV/0502 
R/BG/AGR/0501 
R/BG/PAD/0406 
R/BG/FIN/0405 
R/BG/NUC/0404 
R/BG/SOC/0403 
R/BG/TRA/0402 
BG Country Summary 
European Commission 
(author ECOTEC) 
18/01/06 Thematic report No. ZZ/JHA/0533 
Support to the Justice and Home Affairs Acquis 
European Commission 
(author EMS) 
 
12/11/2002 
25/02/2002 
27/05/2003 
26/04/2002 
10/12/2002 
24/01/2001 
Interim Evaluation Reports (electronic versions) 
R/BG/ENV/02.012 
R/BG/ENV/01050 
R/BG/ENV/03003 
R/BG/AGR/02.002 
R/BG/AGR/02.013 
R/BG/PRI-SME/01048 Private Sector Development and SME 
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30/09/2002 
16/05/2003 
08/08/2002 
27/02/2003 
24/01/2001 
04/12/2002 
01/07/2002 
03/02/2003 
18/06/2002 
25/02/2003 
18/06/2002 
20/06/2002 
09/01/2003 
20/03/2002 
14/01/2003 
25/02/2002 
24/11/2002 
18/11/2003 
March/2004 
 
R/BG/EC-DEV/02.010 
R/BG/EC-DEV/03.001  
R/BG/EN-TEL/02.007 
R/BG/EN-TEL/02.018 
R/BG/FIN/01047 Public Finance 
R/BG/PAD/02016 Public Finance 
R/BG/JHA/02006 
R/BG/JHA/02017 
R/BG/NUC/02001 
R/BG/PAD/02019 Public Administration 
R/BG/PAD-STA/02005 Public Administration and Statistics 
R/BG/REG/02.003 
R/BG/REG/02.014 
R/BG/SOC/02.004 
R/BG/SOC/02.015 
R/BG/TRA/01.049 
R/BG/TRA/02.011 
BG/CPER/03074 
From Pre-accession to Accession Interim Evaluation 
Consolidated Summary Report, Phare support 1999-2002 
European Commission 
(author RAMBOLL 
Management and Eureval-
C3E) 
April/2003 Phare Country Ex post Evaluation and Capacity Building 
Country Report-Bulgaria 
European Commission 
(author OMAS) 
19/04/2001 S/BG/CAR/00009 Country Assessment Review of Phare 
Assistance up to the Year 2000 
AGRICULTURE 
 BG 9913.04 TA Support to restructuring of agricultural 
statistics 
• Financing Memorandum 
• Project Fiche 
 
 
 
BG 0103.08 Improving the quality of agricultural statistics 
• Financing Memorandum 
• Project Fiche 
 BG 0101.04 Improvement of animal health and diagnostics 
control 
• Project Fiche 
 BG 0201.06-01-0001 Control on TSE 
• Financing Memorandum 
• Project Fiche 
European Commission and 
the Government of Bulgaria 
 BG 0201.05 Improvement in phytosanitary control 
• Project Fiche 
CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 
European Commission and 
the Government of Bulgaria 
 
 BG 0007-04-01 Joint Small Project Fund 
• Financing Memorandum  
• Project Fiche  
• Compendium of the projects 
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 BG 0007.01-01-01 Development of the Telecommunications 
Infrastructure of the BG-RO electricity companies for the 
improvement of data exchanges between their Dispatching 
Centre and UCTE – Technical Study. 
• Financing Memorandum  
• Project Fiche  
 BG 0107.01 CBC BG-RO Construction of a crossing border 
check points in Silistra 
• Financing Memorandum  
• Project Fiche  
European Commission and 
the Government of Bulgaria 
 BG 2002/000.624.005 Small projects Bulgaria – Greece 
• Financing Memorandum  
• Project Fiche  
• Compendium of the projects 
PUBLIC FINANCE 
 
Public Internal Financial 
Control Agency 
 BG 0006.01 Strengthening Public Internal Financial Control 
(twinning, equipment) 
• Financing Memorandum  
• Project Fiche  
• Twinning covenant 
• Final Report 
 
Financial Intelligence 
Agency 
 BG 0103.07 Combating Money Laundering 
• Financing Memorandum  
• Project Fiche  
• Twinning covenant 
 
National Customs Agency 
 BG 0203.08 Development of Customs Standards and Practices 
• Financing Memorandum  
• Project Fiche  
• Monitoring Report 
Ministry of Finance (various 
directorates) and 
Agency for Economic 
Analyses and Forecasting 
 BG 2004/016-711.09.04 Strengthening the Institutional 
Capacity of the Ministry of Finance  
• Financing Memorandum  
• Project Fiche  
SOCIAL AFFAIRS 
 
Beautiful Bulgaria, 
Ministry of Labour and 
Social Policy, 
UNDP 
 BG 9914 Employment and social affairs.  Beautiful Bulgaria II: 
temporary employment and vocational training 
• Financing Memorandum  
• Project Fiche 
• Case Study UNDP 
 
Ministry of Labour and 
Social Policy 
 BG 0102.05 Labour Market initiatives 
• Financing Memorandum  
• Project Fiche 
 
NGOs and  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 BG 0010 Access programme  
• Financing Memorandum  
• Project Fiche 
• Compendium of the Projects 
Ministry of Labour and 
Social Policy 
Ministry of Education and 
Science 
 BG 0202.03 Lifelong learning and vocational education and 
training 
• Financing Memorandum  
• Project Fiche 
National Council on Ethnic 
and Demographic Issues, 
and 
Ethnic and Demographic 
 BG 2004/016-711.01.03 Improvement of the situation and 
inclusion of the disadvantaged ethnic minorities with a special 
focus on Roma 
• Financing Memorandum  
• Project Fiche 
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Issues Directorate, Council 
of Ministers 
TRANSPORT 
European Commission and 
the Government of Bulgaria 
 BG 0012.01 Vessel traffic management information system 
• Financing Memorandum  
• Project Fiche 
 BG 0106.01 Rehabilitation and partial reconstruction of Road 
II-19 
• Financing Memorandum  
• Amended Project Fiche 
European Commission and 
the Government of Bulgaria 
 BG 2002/000.624 Rehabilitation and Partial Reconstruction of 
Road II-19 "Razlog-Bansko - Gotse Deltchev - Sadovo" 
• Financing Memorandum  
• Project Fiche 
ENVIRONMENT 
 BG 9906 LSIF Part V Sofia Waste Water Treatment Project 
• Financing Memorandum  
• Project Fiche 
 BG 0003.06 Environment acquis and institution building 
• Financing Memorandum  
• Project Fiche 
European Commission and 
the Government of Bulgaria 
 BG 0201.11 Integrated management planning and admin 
capacity for protected wetland areas 
• Financing Memorandum  
• Project Fiche 
INTERNAL MARKET 
 BG 0002.01 Strengthening the capacity of the Ministry of 
Economy 
• Project Fiche 
 BG 0003.03 Support in the implementation of the reform in the 
Public Procurement System 
 BG 0201.07 Development of Company Law 
 BG 0201.01 Strengthening the administrative capacity of 
Bulgarian Trade Promotion Agency 
European Commission and 
the Government of Bulgaria 
 BG 0202.02 Development of Bulgarian Eco-tourism 
JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS 
Ministry of Justice  IT Strategy for the Judiciary 
 
 
 
 
Public Prosecutors’ Office 
 
 
 
 
2003 
BG 0005.01 Strengthening the Public prosecutor’s office 
(twinning, equipment) 
• Financing Memorandum  
• Project Fiche 
• Twinning covenant  
• Final Report 
 
 
Ministry of Justice 
National Institute of Justice 
 
 
 
 
BG 0203.01 Implementation of the strategy for reform of the 
Judiciary in Bulgaria (twinning, twinning, equipment) 
• Financing Memorandum  
• Project Fiche 
• Twinning Covenants 
 
 
Supreme Administrative 
Court 
 BG 0203.04 Improvement of administrative justice in view of 
the fight against corruption (twinning) 
• Project Fiche 
• Twinning Covenant 
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Ministry of Justice 
 
 
 
BG 2004/016-711.08.01 Support for further implementation of 
the strategy for reform of Bulgarian Judiciary  
• Financing Memorandum 
• Project Fiche 
OTHERS (PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION) 
SIGMA 2000  
SIGMA June 2005 Bulgaria Policy-Making and Coordination, Assessment 
SIGMA July 2004 Bulgaria Anti-corruption and Integrity Framework, Assessment 
SIGMA June 2005 Bulgaria Element of the Public Integrity System 
SIGMA June 2005 Public Service and the Administrative Framework, Assessment 
 BG 0103.01 Strategic policy-making and co-ordination 
• Financing Memorandum 
• Project Fiche 
 BG 0103.02 Implementing civil service reform 
• Project Fiche 
 BG 0203.05 TA to implement key measures of the Programme 
for the Implementation of the National Anti-Corruption 
Strategy 
• Project Fiche 
European Commission and 
the Government of Bulgaria 
 BG 0203.07 Strengthening Human Resource Capacity in the 
Bulgarian Public Administration 
• Project Fiche 
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Annex 10.  List of Interviews 
Institution Interviewee Date 
Richard Ferrer 
Bulgaria Task Manager 
09/02/06 European Commission 
DG ELARG 
 Martine Parmentier 
CBC Bulgaria Task Manager 
09/02/06 
Konstantinos Soupilas, 
Phare Section, Horizontal Issues 
01/02/2006 
Ruud van Enk, 
First Secretary, Head of Phare/ISPA Section 
01/02/2006 
Alexander Alexandrov 
Advisor, Transport 
01/02/2006 
Milena Damyanova 
Advisor, Judiciary 
03/02/2006 
09/02/2006 
Angeliki Votsoglou, 
Advisor, Civil Society and PAD Reform 
09/02/2006 
Juergen Becker, 
Advisor, Social Inclusion, Minorities, Health 
08/02/2006 
Hermann Hagspiel 
Advisor, Private Sector Development and 
Banking 
23/02/2006 
Magdalena Mueller-Uri 
Advisor, Customs and Political Affairs 
01/03/2006 
Paulina Stanoeva 
Advisor, Public Finance 
02/03/2006 
European Union,  
EC Delegation  
 
Christina Naneva 
Task Manager Agriculture & Fisheries 
 
Daniela Tzoneva, 
Head of Monitoring and Evaluation Unit 
31/01/2006 
Branimir Stoyanov 
Junior Expert, 
Social Development 
31/01/2006 
Svetlin Ganchev 
Junior Expert,  
Regional Development/CBC 
31/01/2006 
Angelina Todorova, 
Junior Expert, 
Environment 
31/01/2006 
Ministry of Finance, 
Management of EU Funds Directorate, 
Management of Phare Funds Department 
 
Adelina Vezenkova, 
Junior Expert, 
Justice and Home Affairs 
31/01/2006 
Jenya Dinkova 15/3/06 Ministry of Finance, 
Management of EU Funds Directorate, 
Management of Phare Funds Department 
Daniela Tzoneva 
Head of Monitoring and Evaluation Unit 
15/3/06 
Ministry of Finance, 
National Fund Directorate 
Diana Marinova 
Senior Phare Financial Controller 
06/02/2006 
Ministry of Finance, 
Central Finance and Contracts Unit 
Directorate 
Stanislav Stavrev 
Legal Expert 
Deputy Head of Contacting Unit 
06/02/2006 
Council of Ministers, 
European Integration Unit 
Tzvjatko Velikov 
Chief Expert 
07/02/2006 
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Council of Ministers, 
European Integration Unit 
Silvia Stoilova, 
Expert 
07/02/2006 
Ministry of Public Administration and 
Administrative Reform 
Valeri Natan 
Junior Expert 
07/02/2006 
Council of Ministers, 
European Integration Unit 
Tatyana Kmetova 
Consultant under BG 0103.01 
08/02/2006 
Council of Ministers, Ethnic and 
Demographic Issues Directorate 
Maya Cholakova, 
Director 
09/02/2006 
Beautiful Bulgaria Georgi Stamatov 
Director 
10/02/2006 
Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, 
Beautiful Bulgaria Project 
Mihail Bachvarov 
State Expert 
10/02/2006 
Council of Ministers, 
State Administration Directorate 
Irena Borissova 
 
10/02/2006 
United Nations Development Programme,  
Beautiful Bulgaria Project 
Elena Panova 
Programme Officer 
10/02/2006 
Financial Intelligence Agency, 
Sector International Cooperation and 
Training Programmes 
Johanna Razpopova 
Head of sector 
24/02/2006 
Public Internal Financial Control Agency Ginka Draganinska 
Director 
27/02/2006 
Public Internal Financial Control Agency Dr.  Walter Schmidt-Bens 
Resident Twinning Advisor 
27/02/2006 
Council of Ministers Lilia Todorova 
Advisor 
27/02/2006 
Customs Agency, Central Customs 
Directorate, Institutional Building and 
Phare Programme Department 
Vyara Filipova 
 
01/03/2006 
Diana Atanasova 
Chief, Division of Agrostatistics 
 
Mariana Toteva 
Chief Expert, Statistical analysis and balances 
 
Ministry of Agriculture 
Vasilka Galabova 
State Expert 
 
Registry Agency Dimiter Tzvetanov 
Executive Director 
09/03/2006 
Ministry of Justice Dimiter Dimitrov 
Head of Political Cabinet 
09/03/2006 
Ministry of Justice Vassil Merdzhanov 
IT Counsellor 
09/03/2006 
District (Oblast) Administration Centre 
Varna 
Ivan Kamenski, 
Secretary General 
(Deputy SPO - ESC, Integrated Grant Scheme 
Phare 2003) 
30/03/2006 
MRDPW Daniela Nikolova 
Expert, tendering and procurement, MRDPW 
30/3/06 
 
